Foreseen and unforeseen circumstances by Castermans, A.G. et al.




A.G. CASTERMANS, K.J.O. JANSEN, M.W. KNIGGE,















Deventer – Kluwer – 2012
Lay-out: Anne-Marie Krens – Tekstbeeld – Oegstgeest
© 2012, Castermans, Jansen, Knigge, Memelink & Nieuwenhuis
ISBN 9789013109597 (Garenloos gebrocheerd)
9789013109603 (E-Publishing)
Kluwer b.v., Deventer
This publication is protected by international copyright law.
All rights reserved. No part of this pubilcation may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted
in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior
permission of the publisher.
Author and publisher alike are entirely aware of their task of providing an as accurate possible publication.
Nevertheless, they cannot accept any liability for inadequacies which might occur in this publication.
A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
Table of contents
INTRODUCTION VII
PART I – GENERAL ASPECTS 1
1 Meijers on imprévision in 1918, in 1937, in 1950, and today
C.H. Bezemer 3
2 The role of the court and of the parties in adapting a contract to
unforeseen circumstances
Jaap Hijma 17
3 Unforeseen circumstances after enforcement or expiry of the
contract, prescription and forfeiture of rights
H.J. Snijders 29
4 Legal certainty and the construction of contracts in Dutch law
M.H. Wissink 41
PART II – APPLICATIONS 57
5 How flexible must a marriage settlement be?
T.J. Mellema-Kranenburg 59
6 Foreseeable and unforeseeable defects after the transfer of
immovable property
C.G. Breedveld-de Voogd 71
7 Success and new technologies as unforeseen circumstances in
intellectual property law
D.J.G. Visser & P.A.C.E. van der Kooij 85
8 The Material Adverse Change clause from a Dutch perspective: a
solution for the uncertainty caused by unforeseen circumstances?
V.C. Engel 103
VI Table of contents
PART III – COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 113
9 Change of circumstances: the Trento project
E.H. Hondius 115
10 Change of circumstances in Latin American law. A comparative
overview
R. Momberg 135
11 France and Belgium
D. Philippe 157
Introduction
In times of war and recession the law used to be strict, as some would wish
it to be nowadays.
In December 1915 and November 1916 the Haarlem-based Cotton Company
sold a large quantity of ‘sarongs’ to Stork, to be delivered in Rangoon (Myan-
mar). Due to the Great War, shipping was hampered. For a long time it was
impossible to deliver on time. Obviously, this resulted in force majeure on
the part of the Cotton Company during the war period. After the war, it was
disputed that the Cotton Company was still obliged to deliver under the same
conditions agreed upon before the war, even though production costs had
risen some 70%. The Dutch Supreme Court chose a very firm stance. The effects
of agreements had to be in accordance with good faith, but good faith cannot
bring about the extinction of obligations.1
In the same era, the Dutch company Holland purchased weaving looms
from Globe. Under the agreement, Globe was required to buy the looms from
the British company Butterworth & Dickinson Ltd. However, deliverance by
Butterworth & Dickinson Ltd. was forbidden by the British government due
to the fact that Holland was involved with German companies. When the
British government lifted the ban, Holland demanded delivery at the original
purchase price. Again, the Supreme Court rejected a change in the contractual
terms.2
What if the economy collapses and the Deutsch Mark becomes worthless?
Could this be a circumstance under which a court may modify the agreement?
Müller & Co. borrowed a large sum of Marks from Ms. Marken Heerdt in
1911, when one Mark was worth 0.60 Guilders. In 1924 Müller & Co still had
to pay 125,000 Mark. In the meantime a new Mark had been introduced, at
a rate of one billion old ones for one new Mark. Again, the Supreme Court
decided in line with its previous decisions, with the effect that the value of
the remaining debt was practically nil.3
The Leiden professor in private law Eduard Maurits Meijers, commenting
on the last Mark-is-Mark case, exclaimed bitterly:
1 HR 8 January1926, NJ 1926, 203 (Sarong).
2 HR 19 March 1926, NJ 1926, 441 (Weefgetouw).
3 HR 2 January1931, NJ 1931, 274 (Mark=Mark).
VIII Introduction
‘This decision hurts our sense of justice and can only serve to make our justice
unpopular.’
This infamous line in the jurisprudence, as well as Meijers’ bitterness, ultimate-
ly led to the codification of a regime of unforeseen circumstances. Article 6:258
paragraph 1 of the Dutch Civil Code reads as follows:
‘Upon the demand of one of the parties, the court may modify the effects of a
contract or it may set it aside, in whole or in part, on the basis of unforeseen
circumstances of such a nature that the other party, according to standards of
reasonableness and fairness, may not expect the contract to be maintained in
unmodified form. The modification or setting aside may be given retroactive effect.4
Facing the economic and financial crises of our time, this article might be useful
to modern sellers of sarongs and businessmen yearning for the return of the
Mark and Florin. Is it the solution to their problems? This question merits a
strongly negative response. In the doctrine of unforeseen circumstances a
balance is sought between two major principles. On the one hand, the principle
that agreements are binding or, as put by art. 1374 paragraph 1 of the former
DCC; to parties, agreements are like law. On the other hand, the law has to
be equally just in its consequences. The decisions of the twenties and thirties
show that we should be able to deviate from the principle that contracts are
binding, but not too soon and not too much. Where and how should the line
be drawn? The 27th Leiden Yearbook of Private Law (BWKJ) is dedicated to
this question.
Part I – General aspects
The first part of this Yearbook covers some general aspects. Bezemer describes
the early involvement of professor Meijers in the debate on ‘imprévision’. In
1918, Meijers already rejected a solution based on the presumed intention of
the parties, favouring an objective approach instead – taking into account all
the circumstances relating to a contract and its performance. Bezemer shows
how Meijers used rhetoric and his well-known comparative method to try
to convince his audience.
Hijma analyses the division of powers between the court and the parties,
when faced with a change of circumstances. The court may modify or even
set aside a contract, in whole or in part. But is this power really that inter-
vening? Hijma argues that the court is still obliged to choose one of the solu-
tions the parties put forward: it may not draft the outcome itself, nor may it
reject any demand which does not entirely suit the view of the court. Further-
4 Translation by H. Warendorf, R. Thomas and I. Curry-Sumner, The Civil Code of the Nether-
lands, Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International 2009.
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more, the ‘general’ article on reasonableness and fairness (6:248 DCC) still plays
a complementary role, according to Hijma. He argues that parties may expect
that the party needing adaptation will first undertake a proper initiative to
negotiate. This would probably have satisfied Meijers, since not the presumed
intention, but the current intention of the parties then becomes most relevant.
Snijders delves into another discussion: is it possible to modify or set aside
a valid contract that (1) has been enforced or (2) has expired because the agreed
period has expired Meijers’ legislative drafting of 6:258 DCC allows for such
an application. Enforcement and expiry do not exclude modification per se.
However, they are still relevant as arguments to determine whether and to
what extent unmodified maintenance of the contract would be unacceptable,
in light of the requirements of reasonableness and fairness. Finally, Snijders
deals with a question that precedes this substantial and marginal scrutiny by
the court: at what time should the right to make such a demand be evoked
by either party?
What exactly are unforeseen circumstances? To answer this question it is
necessary to determine what parties actually have foreseen and should have
foreseen. This will eventually be a matter of interpretation: what have parties
agreed upon? Wissink describes tendencies in the case law of the Dutch
Supreme Court on the interpretation of contracts: from the Haviltex criterion
(how can parties reasonably be expected to interpret the contract and what
can they have been expected to have agreed upon?) to the recent emphasis
on textual interpretation when dealing with commercial parties. The influence
of reasonableness and fairness thus fluctuates, depending on the nature of
the contract and of the contracting parties. Even though parties cannot exclude
6:248 DCC, they may agree that certain changes in circumstances cannot be
considered to be ‘unforeseen’. Still, the ambit of such a clause will need to
be determined through interpretation.
Part II – Application
In the second part several authors focus on a specific application of the ‘impré-
vision’ rule. The contribution of Mellema-Kranenburg deals with family property
law. To what extent may one of the spouses ask the court for a revision of
the marriage settlement because of a change of circumstances, when no pre-
amble or revision clause is included in the agreement? While case law does
not provide many leads and so far courts seem to have been reluctant, she
argues for a generous application of the general imprévision rule with regard
to marriage settlements. Life and marriage in particular may turn out different-
ly than had been foreseen or was foreseeable, even if parties were excellently
informed and advised at the time the marriage was concluded.
Unforeseen circumstances play a role in different areas of private law,
besides the interpretation of contracts and the application of article 6:258 DCC.
In the context of the law of sale Breedveld-de Voogd concentrates on foreseeable
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and unforeseeable defects after immovable property has been transferred to
a new owner. Although each of the parties performed its part of the contract,
the legal relationship, which is governed by good faith and which commenced
when the parties started negotiating, has not ended. In this post-contractual
phase, the buyer’s perspective of the property is decisive: what was he entitled
to expect?
Visser and Van der Kooij write about unforeseen circumstances in intellectual
property law. Is it possible for employees to get additional equitable remunera-
tion when their invention becomes a success? Could authors or actors make
a rightful claim for additional remuneration on top of what was contractually
agreed upon? Visser and Van der Kooy show that this is fairly improbable
under current Dutch law. They critically assess a Dutch legislative proposal
to grant the right to an equitable remuneration for authors and even enable
them to request a court to change their agreement if the remuneration is
disproportionate in relation to the benefits of their work (“bestseller”-clause).
Based on experiences in Germany, Visser and Van der Kooij doubt whether
these changes will be of benefit to actors and authors.
Could a crisis be foreseen in the contract – for example when a buyer wants
to ensure that he is relieved of his obligations when the target company
suddenly gets into difficulties? In his contribution Engel considers the so-called
Material Adverse Change (MAC) clauses from a Dutch perspective. These
clauses are still considered to be important tools in international business,
though they have gradually become more and more negotiated, specific and
complex. Nevertheless, Engel advocates the use of such clauses as a way to
prevent litigation and accommodate a more precise assessment and allocation
of risk between the parties –besides the more general system of 6:258 DCC.
Part III – Comparative perspectives
In the third and last part of the compendium, authors discuss some com-
parative law perspectives on unforeseen circumstances. Hondius sets out the
main findings of the Trento European private law group on the issue of
unexpected circumstances in European contract law. Binding force of contract
and requirements of equity seem to lead to uncertain outcomes in many
jurisdictions. Many cases in which relief is discussed are quite eccentric. This
makes research on a European level difficult, since precedents are rare and
not easy to compare. According to Hondius, further harmonization may
enlarge the basis of precedents. However, he is in favour of a more advanced
legal discourse, to which he hopes the Trento report will contribute.
Momberg gives a comparative overview of Latin American law on this
subject, and discusses the Argentinian law in detail. Most of the Latin Ameri-
can jurisdictions have followed the Italian Codice Civile, which has a more
structured approach. The affected party is granted an exclusive right to claim
termination of the contract. The other party can avoid such a claim by offering
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modifications. Thus, the affected party is not entitled to request a court to
adapt or modify the contract, and no duty to renegotiate exists. Momberg
believes that a duty to negotiate, as provided in the PICC and PECL, would
better protect the interests of both parties.
Finally, Philippe analyses the practice in France and Belgium, where the
doctrine of ‘imprévision’ is currently the most important concept in dealing
with the effects of unexpected circumstances. Only recently in Belgium, a
situation similar to the old decisions by the Dutch Supreme Court on sarongs
and weaving looms urged the Belgian Supreme Court to consider the adapta-
tion of a contract possible, in this case under the influence of international
usage as expressed by the UNIDROIT principles.
On the editors
The 27th edition of the Leiden Yearbook of Private Law is the last yearbook
to be edited by Kasper Jansen and Pauline Memelink. They left our faculty
to put their knowledge into practice, Kasper in The Hague and Pauline in
Amsterdam. We will miss them dearly. Luckily, this was not unforeseen. We
are happy to welcome Clementine Breedveld-de Voogd, Teun van der Linden





1 Meijers on imprévision in 1918, in 1937,
in 1950, and today
Kees Bezemer
1 1918
The eminent Dutch jurist E.M. Meijers [1880-1954] devoted three larger publica-
tions to the subject of imprévision (fundamental change of circumstances). All
three were published at crucial moments in European history: the year the
First World War ended, the year of the German bombardment of Guernica,
and the year the Cold War became violent. This was not altogether accidental.
The first publication was part of a report presented, in Dutch, to the Dutch
Society of Jurists in 1918.1 Until then, our subject had been a sleeping doctrine
waiting to be kissed to life. Meijers realised its importance for the aftermath
of the war, and presented his point of view together with the necessary histor-
ical and comparative arguments. Not everybody will have noticed the topical
interest of the subject – the Dutch had been allowed to continue their slumber
as a neutral nation during the war. However, Meijers immediately saw the
chance for a revival, on a purer basis, that is. He explained that the imprévision
doctrine was intimately connected to devastating wars and to natural law
doctrine.2 The latter because of its stress on the intention of the parties, be
it explicit, or implicit, as the clausula rebus sic stantibus is based on a presumed
intention of the parties to a contract.
Having paved the way in a few lines, it was not difficult for Meijers to
show how the idea of imprévision in the past had been put into practice in
Germany, France, and England. He ended this part of his report with the
question: what to think of the judicial decisions of these three countries?
Answer: they certainly have a practical value, but what about their scientific
value? What followed was an argument against the use of the clausula rebus
sic stantibus as a solution to the imprévision problem.3 Meijers concluded that
Kees Bezemer is associate professor of Legal History, Leiden University (c.h.bezemer@
law.leidenuniv.nl).
1 A French translation of the relevant part of the report entitled ‘Essai historique sur la force
majeure’ has been published in E.M. Meijers/R. Feenstra & H.F.W.D Fischer (eds.), Études
d’histoire du droit. Vol. IV, Leiden: Universitaire Pers Leiden 1966, pp. 27-51, which is the
version I quote.
2 Meijers 1918, p. 29.
3 Meijers 1918, pp. 38-40.
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all these decisions were only in appearance based on the presumed intention
of the parties. In reality they were equitable solutions in a more palatable
disguise. So away with this fiction and back to the original meaning the
Romans gave to equity in their bona fide contracts. He meant an objective
equity, irrespective of the (subjective) intentions, real or presumed, of the
parties to a contract.
A mere five lines were spent on the Dutch situation: ‘In our country,
however, the clause is superfluous. Theoretically unsound and limitless, it
would do more bad than good’. Meijers then referred to a provision of the
Dutch Civil Code (art. 1374 par. 3) which should allow a Dutch judge to make
equity prevail in exceptional cases. That was all. Nothing about judicial de-
cisions of the past. But there was an expectation for the future in it. It took
almost twenty years before he made another attempt to influence Dutch judicial
practice. He had grown impatient, and was not pleased with the decisions
of the Dutch Supreme Court. And he was not the only academic jurist who
was not. In a note on one of its notorious decisions he could mention that
Scholten and Van Oven, both leading jurists, were on his side.4
In 1936 a report had been presented to the Dutch Society of Jurists, which
defended a view on imprévision that in its essence did not differ much from
the practice he had been fighting against.5 It was time for action.
2 AMSTERDAM 1937
Meijers’s second publication on imprévision – based on a speech given at the
Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences in Amsterdam – , appeared in 1937. Its title
was ‘Goede trouw en stilzwijgende wilsverklaring’ (Good faith and implied
condition).6 It was an attempt to convince, indirectly, the judges of the Dutch
Supreme Court that their interpretation of the concept of ‘good faith’ in the
law of contracts was too narrow. In 1923 a spark of hope had shimmered when
the Dutch Supreme Court decided that if someone acts incorrectly in the
4 See Dutch Supreme Court 2 January 1931, NJ 1931, 274 (Mark is Mark). This case emerged
because of the extreme monetary inflation in Germany after WW I.
5 M. Bregstein, ‘Moet den rechter de bevoegdheid toekomen verbintenissen uit overeenkomst
op bepaalde gronden, zooals de goede trouw, te wijzigen? Zoo ja, in welke gevallen en
in hoeverre?’, in: Handelingen 1936 der Nederlandse Juristen-Vereeniging, deel 1, tweede stuk,
’s-Gravenhage: Belinfante 1936. Bregstein said that a gap (‘leemte’) in a contract could be
filled by a judge on the basis of good faith. This complement should be derived, however,
from the presumed intention of the contracting parties.
6 Mededeelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandsche Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde,
Deel 84, Serie B, no. 5, Amsterdam: Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij 1937; reissued
in E.M. Meijers, Verzamelde privaatrechtelijke opstellen. Derde deel (Verbintenissenrecht), Leiden:
Universitaire Pers Leiden 1955, pp. 277-300. I quote the latter version.
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performance of a contract he acts against good faith, even if he is not aware
of the incorrectness of his behaviour.7
The claimant had insured a sire named Artist de Laboureur against the
consequences of roaring, a serious horse disease. In the contract it was stipu-
lated that a board of the insurance company was to decide about any damages
to be paid. The horse was affected by the disease but the insurance company
refused payment. The Dutch Supreme Court ruled that not only the (subjective)
outlook of the members of the board, but also the presumed intention of the
parties about a performance according to good faith had to be taken into
account.
Meijers considered the decision a step in the right direction, because the
Dutch Supreme Court seemed to have returned to an interpretation of good
faith in the sense of classical Roman law, that is (objectively) taking into
account all the circumstances relating to a contract and its performance.8 The
winds of change did not blow for long through the stately rooms of the Dutch
Supreme Court in The Hague. As of 1925 an impressive series of decisions
reconfirmed the idea that good faith cannot put aside or even change the
contents of a contract.9
Thus classical Roman law was used by Meijers to convince the honourable
judges that their moment of weakness in 1923 stood in a very respectable
tradition, of which later generations unfortunately had not appreciated the
merit. Knowing this would not be enough, Meijers called in the help of some
of his learned colleagues who had tried to make sense of the not particularly
transparent case law of the Dutch Supreme Court.10 Needless to say that none
of them had succeeded in shedding the necessary light on the subject matter.
To put even more emphasis on the seriousness of the matter, Meijers then set
out to add a dose of comparative law to legal history. He did find some
support for his view on good faith in contemporary French law in the sense
that also in France a judge was entitled to explain the express terms of a
contract according to the implied common intention of the parties. Meijers
gave an historical reason for this still restricted interpretation of good faith
both in France and in the Netherlands: in the course of time the application
of equity tends to result in rules that take the place of equity and introduce
a strictness that equity was meant to correct.11 The suggestion is clear: this
historical process can be reversed and the original meaning of good faith
restored.
7 See Meijers 1937, p. 281.
8 Among legal historians this was the generally accepted view about Roman law. See H.R.
Hoetink, ‘De beperkende werking van de goede trouw bij overeenkomsten’, Tijdschrift voor
Rechtsgeschiedenis 1928-8, pp. 417-438.
9 Meijers mentions fifteen decisions of the Dutch Supreme Court for the years between 1925
and 1936. See Meijers 1937, p. 281 n. 4.
10 Meijers 1937, pp. 282-283.
11 Meijers 1937, pp. 284-285. In 1918 Meijers had not given this historical explanation
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All these deeper insights into the workings of law in history were only
a preparation for dealing with what would seem to be the legal culture most
resistant to the acceptance of good faith as a means to curtail the express terms
of a contract: the English legal culture. Neither common law nor equity
authorised an English judge to bring about a material change in a contractual
obligation with a plea of good faith. Also in this case Meijers came with
(historical) explanations: English law would have needed a stronger emphasis
on legal security and pacta sunt servanda in order to counterbalance the freedom
of judges to develop their own rules.12 It will be clear that this excursion into
the territory of comparative law had as yet not offered much scope for a
renaissance of the original Roman-law interpretation of good faith. To increase
the sense of urgency Meijers therefore referred to the actual economic and
political situation in Europe, meanwhile keeping a secret weapon near at hand
for the decisive turn of his argument.
When Meijers delivered his speech among his fellow members of the Royal
Academy the effects of the economic crisis of the thirties (of the 20th century)
were still badly felt. In France as in the Netherlands, and even in England,
the legal community discussed the question whether a fundamental change
of circumstances should have any impact on the obligations of a contract made
in less barren times. It is not without significance for the general atmosphere
in the Netherlands that two years earlier a colleague and friend of Meijers,
the historian Johan Huizinga [1872-1945] had published a book entitled In de
schaduwen van morgen (In the Shadow of Tomorrow), which had an enormous
success, also abroad, and painted the future of European culture in dark
colours, not so much because of the economic crisis and the threat of the
totalitarian regimes of Germany, Italy and Soviet Russia as because of its own
intellectual weaknesses.13 I doubt whether Meijers agreed with Huizinga’s
rather old-mannish analysis. He would certainly have paid more attention
to the social and economic aspects of the crisis. It does not matter: the feeling
of being witness to a cultural crisis was widespread among the intellectual
elite.14
12 Meijers 1937, p. 286.
13 The book appeared in 1935 in Dutch and was reprinted several times. Translations followed
soon: German (1935), English, Spanish, Swedish (all 1936), Italian, Norwegian (both 1937),
Hungarian, Czech (both 1938), French (1939).
14 Even the literary critic Menno ter Braak [1902-1940], who always had problems with
Huizinga’s noncommittal professorial attitude, wrote a favourable review although he was
critical of Huizinga’s use of the concept of ‘culture’. See his Verzameld werk.Vol. 5, Amster-
dam: Van Oorschot 1980, pp. 625-631. The erudite Amsterdam professor of Roman law
Hoetink also had reserves of a more historical nature. See P.B.M. Blaas, Henk Hoetink (1900-
1963), een intellectuele biografie, Hilversum: Verloren 2010, pp. 70-71. Recommended reading
is the essay ‘Kan de tijd tekens geven?’ by Hermans, in which Huizinga’s fear of cultural
decline is placed in a tradition of irrational fear of technological change. See W.F. Hermans,
Van Wittgenstein tot Weinreb. Het sadistische universum 2, Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij 1970,
pp. 86-109 (at 92-109).
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This is not the place to elaborate on the details, but up to this moment
Meijers had along the lines of classical rhetoric prepared his audience for the
decisive argument that should overcome all doubts. His speech had reached
the rhetorical moment of the confirmatio. It was time to place the secret weapon
in position.
3 THE IMPLIED CONDITION
Legal cultures, Meijers argued, which do not allow much scope for good faith
or equity usually have another concept to mitigate the extreme consequences
of contractual obligations: the implied condition. There followed an impressive
panorama beginning with the early reception of Roman law in the twelfth
century, when the classical view on good faith was soon reduced to a dim
existence whereas at the same time the implied condition began its unstoppable
rise.15 In the civilian tradition of legal science the concept clausula rebus sic
stantibus and the maxim cessante causa cessat effectus began to spread their wings
over areas of law they never had been intended for. The implied condition
also moved up to the centre of the law of contracts and remained there for
centuries as a companion of the pacta sunt servanda principle.16
It is not necessary to discuss Meijers’s interesting remarks about the devel-
opments in France and England, their aim being evident: also in these countries
there were and are possibilities to tackle the problem of imprévision by means
of the concept of implied condition. These remarks had another purpose as
well: to prepare his Dutch audience for a renewed, if possible decisive attack
on the Supreme Court. Meijers gave several examples of the use of the implied
condition by Dutch judges as a tool to adjust the binding force of an obligation,
including a few decisions by the Supreme Court itself, in which it all but used
the concept, and, against its own doctrine, admitted that strict adherence to
contractual obligations would in unforeseeable and fundamentally changed
circumstances lead to unfair consequences.17 Meijers: why does the Supreme
Court not say so in similar cases? This is, of course, a typically ‘continental’
question. An English judge would always find some reason why in another
case he should decide differently. And Meijers knew this, but he had reached
the rhetorical phase of the refutatio, which was not only intended for jurists
belonging to the civilian tradition.
15 Meijers 1937, pp. 287-289.
16 For a recent overview see A. Thier, Legal history, in: E.H. Hondius & H.C. Grigoleit (eds.),
Unexpected Circumstances in European Contract Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
2011, pp. 15-32. In the context of our subject it should be mentioned that the first author
who rejected the clausula in its entirety was not a German but Cornelis van Bynkershoek
[1673-1743], a member of the Supreme Court of Holland and Zeeland since 1704, and its
president as of 1724. See already Meijers 1918, p. 29 note 11 and p. 31.
17 Meijers 1937, pp. 290-295.
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If I may summarise what Meijers implicitly said to refute all possible
objections: why all this fuss about good faith? Behind the ‘mask’ of the implied
condition you will always find the same idea when it comes to its application
to a specific case. Away with this artificial construct! Admittedly, the concept
of implied condition has advantages in practice.18 But a just and fair legal
system requires a kind of justice that is not derived from the supposed will
of the parties to a contract. As it was in good old Rome. In this refutatio we
see the ‘decent man’ (fatsoenlijk mensch) appear for the first time. This is a
person who does what he should do (or omit to do) according to objective
standards of justice, regardless of his intentions, be they real or presumed.
He is the ideal contracting party who knows that law is more than the subject-
ive intentions of the parties.
It is not by accident that Meijers used the term ‘decent man’. The essayist
Menno ter Braak [1902-1940] had given currency to it – as honnête homme –
in two of his books, in the latter of which he accepted ‘fatsoenlijk mensch’
as its Dutch equivalent. That book had appeared at the beginning of 1937.19
I suppose in his speech Meijers wanted to show he was worried too about
the events in Germany and other countries. In 1936 he had been reluctant to
sign a declaration of Ter Braak and seven other Dutch intellectuals against
the threat of National Socialism to society, culture and science.20 I do not
exclude that Meijers thought it wiser not to sign, as the signature of an assured
victim of National Socialism might weaken the effect of the declaration. We
will see this decent man reappear in a slightly different shape in the speech
Meijers gave in 1950, after WW II.
The peroratio was brief and realistic: the implied condition in its various
forms will not disappear soon because of its practical advantages, but legal
science should not give in and continue to defend the good faith of Roman
times.21 The audience will have applauded politely but wholeheartedly. These
were words of wisdom in a world full of war and the threat of war. Even
Eggens [1891-1964], who did not share Meijers’s approach to law, and who
is reported to have said ‘wat zou ik willen dat ik de hersens van Meijers had,
want ik zou er nog mee kunnen denken ook’ (I wish I had the brains of
18 Meijers writes that for judges the implied condition offers better possibilities to change
the law without openly saying so. And parties will be more inclined to accept a decision
based on their supposed own will than on an abstract kind of justice. See Meijers 1937,
pp. 297-299.
19 The former book was Politicus zonder partij (Politician without a Party) of 1934. The latter
was entitled Van oude en nieuwe christenen (Of Old and New Christians). The honnête homme
is discussed on page 32 to 49 of the Rotterdam first edition of 1937. The translation ‘fatsoen-
lijk mensch’ can be found on page 48.
20 See Blaas 2010, pp. 72-74. Meijers, and some of his Leiden colleagues also, refused to sign
another more successful protest later that year. To the disappointment of one of its initiators:
Hoetink. See Blaas 2010, pp. 74-78.
21 Meijers 1937, p. 300.
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Meijers, because I would also use them to think),22 in 1958 spoke of a magis-
terial speech.23 We cannot deny that Meijers did have foresight: neither he
nor Eggens lived to see the Dutch Supreme Court switch over to the view he
had defended so eloquently.
4 ROME, JULY 1950
In 1940 war did not pass over the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and as a Jew,
Meijers was one of the marked victims of the German occupation. He lost his
professorship at Leiden University and was deported with his family to a
concentration camp. They survived and he returned, his spirit apparently
unbroken. He resumed his position at the university but not for long, because
in 1947 he received a commission from the Dutch government to prepare a
new codification of private law, a long-time wish of his. It did not keep him
from publishing and maintaining his contacts with foreign jurists. In the
context of the latter Meijers returned to the subject of change of circumstances.
In July 1950 he made a speech (in French) at the Congrès international de droit
privé (Unidroit) in Rome about the binding force of contracts and their modifica-
tion in modern law.24
It was briefer than the 1918 and 1937 speeches, and more practical.25 After
stating that the theory of imprévision and the doctrine of frustration are especial-
ly important in periods of economic instability, as the world had seen after
the First World War, and that state intervention had become more common,
also in contractual relations, Meijers immediately enumerated four solutions
to the problem posed: 1. the implied condition 2. the principle of good faith
3. statutory rules for specific cases 4. statutory rules of a more general char-
acter. Each of these solutions was discussed briefly and illustrated with
examples from history and from various European countries, as only a scholar
of the stature of Meijers could do. Although there were some examples from
22 The source of this quote is G.E. Langemeijer, at the time Eggens’s colleague in the Dutch
Supreme Court. See J.M. van Dunné, P. Boeles & A.J. Heerma van Voss, Acht civilisten in
burger, Zwolle: Tjeenk Willink 1977, p. 135.
23 See J. Eggens, Over het fingeren van rechtsficties (speech Amsterdam 24 februari 1958),
Haarlem: Erven F. Bohn 1958; reissued in Verzamelde privaatrechtelijke opstellen. Deel 2, Alphen
a/d Rijn: Samson 1959, p. 314-328; reprinted in H.C.F. Schoordijk & J.M. Smits (eds.), Eggens
bundel, Overveen: Belvédère 1998, pp. 440-454 (on p. 453). Eggens speaks of an organic
whole (‘organisch geheel’). He does not seem to have noticed the rhetorical structure of
this organic whole.
24 The title was: ‘La force obligatoire des contrats et ses modifications dans les droits moder-
nes’. The easiest way to consult it is in R. Feenstra, H.F.W.D. Fischer, M.E. Blok & F.B.J.
Wubbe (eds.), Bibliographie der geschriften van Prof. mr. E.M. Meijers, Leiden: Universitaire
Pers Leiden 1957, pp. 297-309.
25 It contains elements of both previous speeches, and not only of the 1918 speech, as the
editor’s note to the latter would seem to suggest. See Meijers 1918, p. 27 n. *.
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Dutch practice and doctrine, and from England and France, several other
countries were mentioned as well: Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, Hungary,
Poland, Italy, Greece, and Egypt (its brand-new decidedly French Code civil
of 1949). Everybody who is familiar with Meijers’s drafts for the new Dutch
private law code will recognise his comparative method.26
This method not only involved a list of countries and their particular
solutions, it was immediately followed by a list of the common elements in
their doctrine and statutory law. Meijers noted five common elements for a
plea of imprévision: 1. unforeseeability 2. exceptionality 3. not due to the
debtor’s fault 4. beyond his normal sphere of risk 5. excessively onerous for
the debtor to comply with.27 A few remarks were added about Swiss, French,
English, and German case law insofar as each of these countries had adopted
concepts of a (slightly) different nature.
After some remarks on the various possible effects of imprévision on a
contract, Meijers came to the quintessential question: which of these solutions
is to be preferred? Meijers: a solution that suits all (European) countries men-
tioned cannot be given. A sobering answer. Probably also a realistic one if
you consider the political situation in 1950. The European countries (except
for Switzerland) were impoverished and were only beginning to regain their
economic strength. In spite of a serious weakening of some colonial empires
(India and Pakistan 1947, Indonesia 1949), most European countries still
thought of themselves as masters of the world. The first armed conflict of the
Cold War had only recently broken out (Korean War 25th June 1950). Who
would like to be reminded of the hardships of war and economic crisis, and
think about their possible effect on contractual obligations? Meijers did not
say so, but his stress on the relation between economic (in)stability and the
doctrine of imprévision must have made him realise that the moment for a
unification of European law, the theme of the conference in Rome, was not
ideal. So he came to what in its essence was a moral appeal.
He returned to his ideal of the Roman bonae fidei contracts in their original
shape, as he had done in 1918 and 1937. Countries that honoured this concept
should perhaps make some additional statutory law to specify the conditions
to be met for a plea of imprévision. Thus the legislator might help the judiciary
to get a more precise idea of the situations that were envisaged. But please,
not too much: the legislator should not encroach upon the principle of pacta
sunt servanda, as it is understood by decent people (honnêtes gens), even in
unforeseen circumstances.28 These decent people had also appeared in
Meijers’s 1937 speech, in that case, however, to argue that a decent man is
26 On this method see in particular V.J.A. Sütö, Nieuw vermogensrecht en rechtsvergelijking –
Reconstructie van een wetgevingsproces (1947-1961) (thesis Leiden), Den Haag: Boom Juridische
uitgevers 2004.
27 Meijers 1950, p. 307.
28 Meijers 1950, pp. 308-309.
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someone who acts according to objective standards of justice, also if the
circumstances have dramatically changed. I use the word ‘however’, because
I feel there is a shift of emphasis in Meijers’s view on imprévision probably
connected with his activities as a legislator and perhaps his experiences in
wartime and thereafter.29
This time the learned audience will also have applauded the masterly
analysis and the very cautious recommendations. It should be remarked that
this audience consisted for the larger part of jurists from civil-law countries.30
The only British speaker gave a paper on the trust in English law. The United
States were represented by Hessel E. Yntema, who spoke about the bill of
exchange.31 It need not surprise us that less attention was paid to the Dutch
situation than in 1937. Still, the chances for a change in the direction Meijers
aimed at were certainly better there. He was working hard on his draft for
the new codification, and almost two years later the Dutch Minister of Justice,
on behalf of Meijers, sent a list of questions (‘Vraagpunten’) to the Council
of Ministers. One of the questions was: should there be a provision (in the
new code) for the case in which unforeseen circumstances make the perform-
ance of a contract extremely onerous for one of the parties? An answer was
given by a standing committee of the Dutch parliament. It said that in such
a case the debtor should be able to ask the judge to modify or set aside the
contract. The Lower House of Parliament had a meeting about it on July 2nd
of the year 1953, in which Meijers replied to the remarks of some of its mem-
bers and in which the answer of the committee was accepted without a formal
vote.32 It was the last public statement Meijers made about imprévision.
5 THE FINAL RESULT
Meijers continued with his work on the new codification until his death in
1954. He left drafts in various stages of completion. The draft for Book 6 (law
of obligations and contracts, general part), in which the provision on imprévision
was to have its place, was all but finished. The work on this book was carried
29 After the war Meijers fought a bitter battle against the bankers and stockbrokers who had
profited from the confiscation of Jewish property by the German authorities. These people
were in every respect the opposite to honnêtes gens. In an article that Meijers wrote about
a proposal for compensation of the victims or their surviving relatives his restrained anger
is palpable when he speaks of ‘deze personen’ (these persons) and ‘deze heren’ (these
<ungentle> men). See E.M. Meijers, Het voorstel van L.V.V.S. aan haar schuldeisers, Zwolle:
Tjeenk Willink 1950, p. 11.
30 This can be gathered from the report published in the Revue internationale de droit comparé,
Octobre-décembre 1950 (Vol. 2 no. 4), pp. 703-707 (available on the Internet on the site of
Persée.fr)
31 Yntema was of Dutch (better: Frisian) descent and knew Meijers well, especially because
of their shared interest in the history of private international law.
32 Handelingen II 1952/53, pp. 2766-2772.
12 1 – Meijers on imprévision in 1918, in 1937, in 1950, and today
on by three persons each of whom had been allotted a part of it. This made
a revision by a fourth person necessary. For our purpose the exact details of
the legislative process are not important. Only this: what in 1961 was presented
as Meijers’s draft reveals the spirit of its original author. The relevant provision
was (in translation):33
1. Upon the request of one of the parties, the judge may modify a contract, or
set it aside in whole or in part on the basis of unforeseen circumstances which are
of such a nature that the cocontracting party, according to criteria of reasonableness
and equity, may not expect that the contract be maintained in an unmodified form.
The modification or the setting aside of the contract may be given retroactive force.
2. A request as referred to in par. 1 is refused to the extent that the circumstances
invoked by the plaintiff are accountable to him according to the nature of the
contract or common opinion.
3. For the purposes of this article, a person to whom a contractual right or obliga-
tion has been transferred, is assimilated to a contracting party.
In the commentary on this provision the hand of the master was still visible
as well.34 We find references to the codes of Egypt, Greece, Italy, and Poland,
to which Meijers had referred in his 1950 speech in Rome. The discussions
that followed about this draft and its commentary need not keep us.35 What
counts is the final result. This was achieved in 1992 when the bulk of the newly
codified law of property was put into force. The relevant provision is article
258 of Book 6. It states:36
1. Upon the demand of one of the parties, the judge may modify the effects of
a contract, or he may set it aside in whole or in part on the basis of unforeseen
circumstances which are of such a nature that the cocontracting party, according
to criteria of reasonableness and equity, may not expect that the contract be main-
tained in an unmodified form. The modification or the setting aside of the contract
may be given retroactive force.
2. The modification or the setting aside of the contract is not pronounced to the
extent that the person invoking the circumstances should be accountable for them
according to the nature of the contract or common opinion.
3. For the purposes of this article, a person to whom a contractual right or obliga-
tion has been transferred, is assimilated to a contracting party.
33 For this translation I owe much to the translation mentioned in note 36.
34 For both the draft and the commentary I used M.M. Olthof & J.W. du Pon, Parlementaire
geschiedenis van het nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek, Boeken 3,5 en 6, Deventer: Kluwer 1982, pp.
771-774 (Artikel 6.5.3.11).
35 For a detailed discussion see J.M. van Dunné, ‘De goede trouw in het Gewijzigd Ontwerp
Boek 6 Nieuw BW’, WPNR 1976 (5371), pp. 747-755; reissued in J.W.M.K. Meijer et al. (eds.),
Normatief Uitgelegd, Verzamelde privaatrechtelijke opstellen van J.M. van Dunné, Deventer:
Kluwer 2006, pp. 849-863.
36 Translation of P.P.C. Haanappel & E. Mackaay, Netherlands Civil Code, Book 6. It can easily
be consulted on the Internet.
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As anybody can see, the differences between the draft and the final version
are minimal and a matter of wording. It can be said without reservations that
eventually Meijers had his way in the sense that the Dutch Civil Code contains
a provision about imprévision based on the principle of good faith (in modern
terminology ‘reasonableness and equity’), sufficiently specified to give a judge
the necessary guidelines for a balanced judgment.
In Dutch case law his victory came earlier. There is no unanimity about
this. According to some authors it happened in 1967 when the Dutch Supreme
Court decided that under certain circumstances an appeal to an exculpatory
clause can be excluded.37 This meant that an express provision in a contract
can be set aside. In 1976, in a similar case, the Dutch Supreme Court ruled
that under such circumstances an appeal to an exculpatory clause is against
the requirements of good faith.38 These two cases were not downright cases
of imprévision. The first decision of the Dutch Supreme Court where a funda-
mental change of circumstances was the reason to set aside a contract was
taken in 1977. It concerned a physician who had an unlimited contract with
the Dutch National Health Service. The physician had committed fraud with
his account bills and the Health Service wanted to terminate the contract, but
the contract contained no clause about this. The Dutch Supreme Court ruled
that under these unforeseen and very serious circumstances, according to
criteria of reasonableness and equity, the physician should not expect the
contract to be maintained in its unlimited form.39 The attentive reader will
recognise the phrasing of the 1961 draft.
By 1984 there was no longer any doubt about the existence in Dutch law
of a plea of imprévision based on good faith.40 Meijers had finally beaten the
resistance against his view on imprévision. That the judges declared that unfore-
seen circumstances should not be assumed too easily was not something he
had not acknowledged.
6 WHAT IF MEIJERS HAD LIVED TODAY
At the moment of Meijers’s death this was all beyond the horizon. Still, it
would be interesting to know what a great jurist like Meijers would have to
say about today’s situation.
37 Dutch Supreme Court 19 May 1967, NJ 1967, 261 (Saladin/HBU).
38 Dutch Supreme Court 20 February 1976, NJ 1976, 486 (Pseudovogelpest).
39 Dutch Supreme Court 16 December 1977, NJ 1978, 136 (Ziekenfonds).
40 Dutch Supreme Court 27 April 1984, NJ 1984, 679 (Nationale Volksbank – Sipke Helder).
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WARNING: THIS SECTION CONTAINS FICTIONAL MATERIAL
As I do not possess a time machine to go back to him, the only way to know
this is to let him embark on a time machine and come to us. First of all, a
preliminary question has to be asked: is the European world we live in funda-
mentally different from the Europe of 1950? Sure, there is a European Union
now, and there is European legislation in some areas of private law. But a
general provision on the subject of imprévision only exists in the form of drafts,
usually called principles. Europe still is a loosely organised set of countries,
and the essential prerequisite for a unification of the law, a political union,
is lacking as ever before. What keeps them together is economic profit and
wealth. And economic profit and wealth can be subject to forces beyond the
control of even the largest countries. Here we touch on Meijers’s deeper view
on imprévision: it is connected to economic (in)stability and to the possibilities
of state intervention. We would have to tell him about the financial crisis of
the autumn of 2008, and about its effects on the European countries. He would
be bitterly reminded of the war to hear that those who profited from dubious
financial constructions, and were the main cause of the crisis, in Europe as
a rule were saved from bankruptcy by the taxpayers, who, as a rule, had seen
little money coming to the state treasury when fortunes were made before
the crisis broke out. The taxpayers had to be grateful that their savings had
not disappeared into the black holes of banks going bankrupt. The 1929 crash
has had worse consequences, indeed, but new threats to economic stability
have emerged: European countries that do not obey the rules that are necessary
to keep up a common currency. Again the taxpayer sees that public funds
are spent on institutions that are supposed to protect his interests, this time
to save disobedient countries and indirectly the banks that have bought their
government bonds. No debt reductions as yet, only postponement of payment:
the pacta sunt servanda principle saved! To save countries that did not keep
to it.
What would Meijers say to this, having had some time to collect the
necessary information, which did not take him long? He produced a small
checklist containing the following points:
1. pacta sunt servanda is the rule, a plea of imprévision the exception
2. a plea of imprévision cannot be made by a party at whose risk it is
3. a statutory provision should be based on objective criteria
4. a statutory provision should contain some specifications as to its application
Then he continued. ‘If there are still honnêtes gens these days, they should know
that, as a rule, they should keep their promises. Only in exceptional cases may
a judge decide otherwise on the basis of objective criteria. The Romans did
so too. Talking about the Romans: recently there has been a discussion in South
Africa, a country where civil law and common law go side by side, about the
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exceptio doli generalis as a remedy in cases of imprévision.41 In Roman times
this exceptio was available to a defendant who claimed that his plaintiff was
not acting in good faith by bringing an action against him under the given
circumstances. In itself this remedy would be fitting to some cases of impré-
vision, and I do not object to the modern use of old concepts. This exceptio,
however, has the smell of strict law about it. It was superfluous in cases where
a bonae fidei contract was involved, and we had better not revive that part of
the Roman law heritage, as all our contracts are considered to be bonae fidei.’
Meijers had again shown his mastery of the subject and was about to go
back into his time machine (‘My time has run out. I have to leave.’). Somebody
said: ‘One last question please: what do you think of the article about impré-
vision in the DCFR?’ What exactly happened I do not know to this day. All I
can remember is that he turned away his face from the people listening to
him, and carefully entered the vehicle. The last words I am sure I have heard
him say before its door closed noiselessly were: ‘It is ….’. About the following
word there was and is no agreement. Some imagined having heard ‘futurism’.
Others thought it had been something like ‘bull …’. Personally, I do not believe
that Meijers would have put it so strongly.
7 EPILOGUE
As I do not believe in what-if history, we have to return from an imagined
present to the actual present. In fact they do not differ much. If we take a look
at the juristic analysis of the imprévision problem by an authority like Treitel,
we see the same elements as those mentioned by Meijers.42 There is something
perennial about the relationship between the principle of pacta sunt servanda
and the concept of the clausula rebus sic stantibus, at least since the sixteenth
century. Today’s solutions go back to that period. And every country cherishes
its own of the limited number of solutions. There are no new solutions. The
exceptio doli generalis mentioned in the preceding section is another example
of these voices from the past. Every survey of the doctrine and practice of the
various European countries will show remarkable similarities to the one Meijers
gave in his 1950 speech. And always it will be said that the various solutions
41 This is not (science) fiction. The discussion has been rekindled through a note in a decision
of the Constitutional Court (Crown Restaurant v Gold Reef City Theme Park, 6 March 2007).
The Supreme Court of Appeal, which thought it had buried the exceptio doli generalis as
a ‘superfluous, defunct anachronism’ (See Bank of Lisbon and South Africa v Ornelas; 30
March 1988), returned to the subject last year (Bredenkamp v Standard Bank; 27 March
2010). Again this court tried to silence the minority judgment in the 1988 case. It is doubtful
whether this will be the end of the discussion. Cf. R. Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations,
Cape Town/Deventer: Juta/Kluwer 1992, p. 677. All the South African cases mentioned
can be consulted on the Internet.
42 See G.H. Treitel, The Law of Contract, London: Sweet & Maxwell 1995, pp. 832-837.
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are essentially the same and appear to be growing nearer to each other. This
is not true. Legal traditions are very tough and hard to change, as Meijers’s
own experience has shown. Only political power can effect a change if there
is not some intrinsic necessity that compels people to abandon their cherished
and familiar ways.
At this moment the market value of Europe, also in terms of political
power, is not very high. This may change, as everybody knows. Especially
crises are recommended as a means to promote cooperation. The financial crisis
of 2008 is bearing fruit in the sense that large banks are now forced to keep
larger reserves. This certainly is important, as some other measures are about
supervision of the credit system. But this is public law born out of the necessity
to prevent the downfall of banks that are essential to the credit system of a
country. In private law it works differently, more slowly, especially if it con-
cerns ‘old law’. Meijers has been able to influence Dutch case law with his
draft on imprévision, and, of course, when it had gained force of law. It was
the chance of a lifetime. Such chances are very rare. I do not expect it to be
repeated soon on a European level. Where Meijers had to fight on one front,
their number are manifold now. Should it occur nonetheless, it would be a
typical case of imprévision.
2 The role of the court and of the parties in




In the course of time the position of the judiciary vis-à-vis the legislator has
gone through considerable changes. Well over two hundred years ago the court
was depicted as the mouth of the written law (la bouche de la loi).1 In modern
civil law its role has become more and more important. Nowadays the judi-
ciary can rather be portrayed as a partner to the legislator, each of them
playing a different role: the legislator provides the framework and the general
rules, the court ensures a just and proper application in the concrete cases
which are brought before it.
In the new Dutch Civil Code (DCC), enacted nearly twenty years ago,2 this
partnership is clearly visible. In various contexts the legislator equips the court
with the power to decide whether a certain juridical consequence shall or shall
not occur (‘The court may [...]’). Such a power to decide is stronger than the
standard power to assess, which a court has as a consequence of its task to
judge. The latter ‘power’, present throughout the judgment process, embodies
no more than a latitude. Especially with so-called open criteria, however, this
latitude can be substantial.
This essay serves to analyse (the power and) the role of the court,3 in
connection with that of the parties, when a change of circumstances occurs
that undermines an existing contract.4
Jaap Hijma is professor of Private Law, Leiden University (j.hijma@law.leidenuniv.nl).
1 Ch. de Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois, Paris 1748.
2 The central Books 3, 5 and 6 of the Burgerlijk Wetboek were enacted 1 January 1992.
3 The essay comprises a continuation of some of the thoughts developed (in Dutch) in Jac.
Hijma, Het constitutieve wijzigingsvonnis, inaugural lecture Leiden, Deventer: Kluwer 1989;
Jac. Hijma, Imprévision, in: M.E. Franke c.s. (eds.), Europees contractenrecht, BW-krant Jaarboek,
Deventer: Kluwer 1995, pp. 57-69.
4 The consequences of unforeseen circumstances are the subject of some interesting comparat-
ive law studies published recently: E. Hondius & H.C. Grigoleit (eds.), Unexpected Circum-
stances in European Contract Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2011; R. Momberg
Uribe, The effect of a change of circumstances on the binding force of contracts, diss. Utrecht,
Intersentia 2011.
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2 REASONABLENESS AND FAIRNESS; UNFORESEEN CIRCUMSTANCES
The judicial ‘power’ to assess reaches its zenith in article 6:248 DCC, which
establishes a dual effect of reasonableness and fairness (i.e. the unwritten law
between a debtor and a creditor). In the first place reasonableness and fairness,
like the law or usages, bring a useful tool to fill the gaps the parties left in
their contract. In the second place reasonableness and fairness are endowed
with a derogating power. The overall character of the latter demonstrates the
paramount character of reasonableness and fairness under the Dutch law of
obligations.5
Article 6:248 DCC6
1. A contract not only has the juridical effects agreed to by the parties, but also
those which, according to the nature of the contract, apply by virtue of law, usage
or the requirements of reasonableness and fairness.
2. A rule binding upon the parties as a result of the contract does not apply to the
extent that, in the given circumstances, this would be unacceptable according to
standards of reasonableness and fairness.
Reasonableness and fairness produce their effects ipso iure, without the inter-
vention of a court.
Various Civil Code provisions contain elaborations of this general concept
of reasonableness and fairness. Among them is article 6:258 DCC, governing
the occurrence of unforeseen circumstances.7
Article 6:258 DCC
1. Upon the demand of one of the parties, the court may modify the effects of a
contract or it may set it aside, in whole or in part, on the basis of unforeseen
circumstances of such a nature that the other party, according to standards of
reasonableness and fairness, may not expect the contract to be maintained in
unmodified form. The modification or setting aside may be given retroactive effect.
2. The modification or the setting aside shall not be pronounced to the extent that
it is common ground that the person invoking the circumstances should be account-
able for them or if it follows from the nature of the contract.
3. For the purposes of this article, a party to whom a contractual right or obligation
has been transmitted, is treated as a contracting party.
5 Likewise art. 6:2 DCC regarding all (so also non-contractual) obligations.
6 When citing Dutch Civil Code provisions I adopt the English translation by H. Warendorf,
R. Thomas and I. Curry-Sumner, The Civil Code of the Netherlands, Alphen aan den Rijn:
Kluwer Law International 2009.
7 A concise commentary on this Dutch article is provided by W. Wiggers, in: Hondius &
Grigoleit 2011, pp. 70-76. For a comparison with article 6:111 PECL see D. Busch, in: Busch
c.s. (eds.), The Principles of European Contract Law and Dutch Law, Nijmegen & The Hague/
London/New York: Ars Aequi Libri & Kluwer Law International 2002, p. 285-289. In the
Dutch language see inter alia E. Baan & W.L. Valk, in: E.H. Hondius & R.J.Q. Klomp (eds.),
Verbintenissenrecht, loose-leaf, Deventer: Kluwer, Art. 258.
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At least two aspects catch the eye. Firstly that the occurrence of unforeseen
circumstances is governed by the standards of reasonableness and fairness,
mentioned already in article 6:248 DCC. Secondly that with regard to unforeseen
circumstances reasonableness and fairness do not produce their effect ipso iure:
it is the court itself which, by means of its decision, modifies the effects of
the contract or sets the contract aside.
3 RATIO OF COURT INTERVENTION
Why did the Dutch legislator devote a separate provision to the appearance
of unforeseen circumstances, instead of leaving the subject simply to the
general regime of reasonableness and fairness? The question arises the more
because the Minister of Justice of that time observed that it would be possible
to reach a comparable result by means of the derogating effect of reasonable-
ness and fairness, if necessary combined with their supplementary effect.8
Indeed it is plausible that an interplay of derogation and supplementation
within the frame of article 6:248 DCC can lead to any thinkable result.
As the parliamentary history shows, the predominant reason for adding
article 6:258 DCC was that for determining the consequences of unforeseen
circumstances the legislator prefers a constitutive court decision to the ipso
iure effect of article 6:248 DCC. The difference is considered appropriate because
changed circumstances lead to a definitive new arrangement of the contractual
relations. This implies a deep intervention; moreover, many cases will be rather
complex so that various solutions are possible.9 So it is for reasons of legal
certainty that the legislator here prefers a constitutive court verdict to a declar-
ative one.
4 DISCRETIONARY POWER?
Article 6:258 DCC requires ‘unforeseen circumstances of such a nature that the
other party, according to standards of reasonableness and fairness, may not
expect the contract to be maintained in unmodified form’. This formula not
only makes up a threshold for a court intervention, but simultaneously contains
the standards which govern such an intervention. As a result the powers of
the court are limited.
In the first place, both the Dutch legislator and the Dutch Supreme Court
emphasize that the judiciary shall adopt a reserved attitude towards the
alteration or termination of contracts. Reasonableness and fairness demand
8 Parlementaire Geschiedenis van het nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek, Boek 6, Deventer: Kluwer 1981,
p. 973.
9 Ibid., p. 974.
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first and foremost that the parties are bound according to the contract they
concluded; therefore the requirements of article 6:258 DCC will only (very)
rarely be met.10 In the second place, if according to reasonableness and fair-
ness a party may not expect the contract to be maintained unmodified, the
court will be obliged to modify or terminate the contract.11 The expression
‘the court may’ does not imply a real discretionary power, in the sense that
courts would be free to dismiss the demand wilfully or to push forward their
personal views. It actually indicates the possibility of an adaptation or setting
aside in the specific way of a court decision. In this view the emphasis is not
on the word ‘may’, but on ‘the court’: the court may adapt the contract or set
it aside, by means of a constitutive verdict.
5 CONTRACT MODIFICATION; AN ILLUSTRATION
In this essay I will concentrate on the option of a modification of (the effects
of) the contract. A case study may illustrate that in view of changed circum-
stances this can be an attractive solution.12
KBB, a chain store business, concludes a development contract with the
municipality of Utrecht: Utrecht will (in due time) provide a site ready for
building, KBB will establish an ambitious Bijenkorf store there. The preparation
of the building site takes a number of years. After completion KBB remains
inert. When the municipality demands the building of the store, KBB argues
that in view of the dramatically changed circumstances it cannot demand
performance. In the years that passed the population of Utrecht grew less than
expected, the purchasing power generally declined, the public with greater
purchasing power left the city, and a number of competing shopping malls
were established. In the present circumstances the fulfilment of the large-scale
plan will prove highly loss-making for KBB. The municipality takes the view
that such difficulties belong to the normal risks of entrepreneurship, adding
– hardly delicately – that this holds true even if it would result in the downfall
of the entrepreneur.
The District Court rules that KBB is bound by the contract (pacta sunt
servanda). The Court of Appeal, however, holds the opinion that the city,
according to standards of reasonableness and fairness, may not demand the
contract to be fulfilled unmodified. The Court holds that the fact that the city
cannot demand performance of the original contract does not imply that it
can demand nothing at all. The contract obliges KBB to investigate other possib-
10 Ibid., p. 969; Dutch Supreme Court 20 February 1998, NJ 1998, 493 (Briljant Schreuders/ABP).
11 Provided one of the parties so demands; see infra, nr. 6.
12 The case was decided by the Amsterdam Court of Appeal (Hof Amsterdam 6 May 1982,
nr. 314/81). Its decision was not published as such, but is cited extensively by P. Abas,
Rebus sic stantibus, Deventer: Kluwer 1989, pp. 202-205.
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ilities and varieties of performance, to serve the contract in a new way that
is meaningful for both parties. Eventually the Court directs an appearance
of the parties, to research in what way KBB can still be held to deliver a per-
formance.
A few years afterwards a more modest Utrecht Bijenkorf store is festively
opened.13
6 ‘UPON THE DEMAND OF ONE OF THE PARTIES’
The Bijenkorf case arose when the former Dutch Civil Code, enacted in 1838,14
was still in force. An adaptation of the contract by the court was not a valid
option then. Under the operation of the present Code, article 6:258 DCC enables
the court to adapt the contract itself. According to this article the court is only
entitled to do so ‘upon the demand of one of the parties’. So either KBB, or
the city of Utrecht is needed to activate the judicial power. Such a party
demand can take various forms, both formally and materially. As far as the
contents are concerned, it can range from very abstract on the one hand (e.g.
‘such an adaptation of the obligations as the court will seem fit’) to very
concrete on the other hand (e.g. ‘a price reduction of C= 1000’).
Concrete demands
Let us start with the more concrete demands. Suppose that, in the above-
mentioned case, KBB agreed with Utrecht to establish a three-storey Bijenkorf
(a luxury store). Circumstances deteriorate seriously. Utrecht requires perform-
ance of the contract as it is, but KBB demands (a termination or) an adaptation
by the court, thus that KBB will be obliged to establish the three storey-store
not of the Bijenkorf formula but instead of the less glamorous HEMA formula,
which aims at a lower market segment and consequently holds much better
prospects. The court ponders on the various solutions. Eventually it reaches
the conclusion that in this case the establishment of a smaller, two-storey,
Bijenkorf store would be the adequate result. The court attempts to lead the
parties in this direction, but they stick to their views. So three opinions com-
pete: that of the municipality (a three-storey Bijenkorf), that of KBB (a three
storey HEMA) and that of the judging court (a two-storey Bijenkorf).15 From
here on, different ways of reasoning can be followed.
Some will argue that every demand as meant in article 6:258 DCC puts the
matter completely into the hands of the court, thus that the court – once it
is activated by the party demand – can freely pursue its own point of view.
13 NRC Handelsblad 26 November 1984 (mentioned by Abas 1989, p. 205).
14 This former Dutch Civil Code was largely derived from the French Code civil (1804).
15 For reasons of lucidity these alternatives are rather stylized.
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In my opinion this argument pays too little tribute to the fact that the phrase
‘upon the demand of one of the parties’ principally serves to make the court
dependent on the party views which are presented to it. The party demand
does not only trigger the court decision, but simultaneously confines it. To
that extent the court is obliged to turn to the solutions mentioned by the
parties.16 But how shall it treat these?
The first option is, that the court will reject any demand which does not
(sufficiently) indicate the outcome it considers best. Thus the risk rests with
the party refusing to fulfil the contract, in casu KBB. If this party fails to suggest
the ‘right’ solution (i.e. the solution the court thinks fit), its demand for adapta-
tion of the contract will be denied; as a result it will have to perform the
contract as promised.
The second option is, that from the various solutions which the parties
bring up the court will choose the one that, in its opinion, comes closest to what
the parties are entitled to expect from one another according to reasonableness
and fairness. If the establishment of a HEMA store qualifies as more than an
unmodified contract fulfilment, the court will choose that relatively best
solution, even though it is convinced that a third solution (a smaller Bijenkorf
store), which is not brought up by one of the parties, would be preferable.
The raising of a better alternative by party A thus shifts the risk to party B,
in the sense that A’s suggestion will prevail unless B provides the court with
an even better proposition.
I recommend the second approach. Principally a second-best result is to
be preferred to the (possibly) worst outcome. Moreover: in the first system
one party can sit back and hope the other party proposes a ‘wrong’ solution
that is rejected by the court, as a result of which the other party stays bound
to fulfil the contract as it is. In the second system the party who is confronted
by a better demand, is urged to show its cards and produce an even more
suitable alternative.
General demands
When a party brings up an adaptation request of a more general nature, the
situation will not be as delicate. Suppose KBB demands its obligations to be
reduced to the establishment of ‘a considerably smaller department store’, or
simply demands a reduction of its obligations, leaving the elaboration to the
sound insight of the court. This kind of demand provides the court with every
opportunity to reach the result that, in its opinion, is dictated primarily by
reasonableness and fairness (i.e. the smaller Bijenkorf store). If a party feels
16 A similar opinion is given by M. Mekki & M. Kloepfer-Pelèse, Hardship and Modification
(or ‘Revision’) of the Contract, in: A.S. Hartkamp c.s. (eds.), Towards a European Civil Code,
Alphen aan den Rijn & Nijmegen: Kluwer Law International & Ars Aequi Libri 2011, p.
679.
Jaap Hijma 23
insecure about the outcome it prefers, it will be wise to formulate a subsidiary
demand in general terms.
7 COMPLEMENTARY ROLE OF ARTICLE 6:248 DCC
Does the general article 6:248 DCC (reasonableness and fairness)17 play a role
in cases of unforeseen circumstances? The fact that article 6:258 DCC was
created to put these matters into the hands of the court18 points to a negative
answer. Where a more specific article exists, the general article will withdraw
(lex specialis derogat legi generali). Moreover, if reasonableness and fairness still
have their effect ipso iure, the constitutive judicial verdict referred to in article
6:258 DCC becomes an oddity. The conclusion that the court on the one hand
is dependent on a party demand (art. 6:258 DCC), but on the other hand can
simply observe modifications by reasonableness and fairness (art. 6:248 DCC),
is contradictory.
These observations do not implicate that there is no place at all for article
6:248 DCC in cases of changed circumstances. Let us return to the Bijenkorf
case. Unforeseen circumstances have occurred implying that the city may not
expect the contract to be maintained unmodified. But what is the city entitled
to expect then? As discussed above, various results are possible; it will not
be easy to determine which of these is ‘the perfect option’. The court considers
a reduced Bijenkorf store the best solution. If reasonableness and fairness
automatically modified the contract in that way, KBB would not realize that
it is obliged to establish that smaller store, and the city would not realize that
it can demand that (and only that) performance. Such an ‘invisible’ outcome
is neither attractive nor reasonable and fair.
A different approach seems preferable: what the parties are entitled to
expect from one another is that they strive, in consultation, for a mutually
acceptable solution. The parties may expect that the contract is put on the table
to exchange the old certainty for a new certainty. The party seeking perform-
ance of the original contract has the advantage. The law will honour its claim
until the other party – needing adaptation – has taken a proper initiative. In
view of articles 6:248 and 6:258 DCC the pursuit of performance must be
unacceptable. This severe demand will only be met if the other party does not
simply refuse performance but takes a constructive attitude.19 If the other
party shows insufficient initiative, the first party is entitled to pursue the
contract in unmodified form. This effect of article 6:248 DCC is not blocked by
article 6:258 DCC. On the contrary, interpreted like this, the articles are comple-
mentary and constitute a coherent system.
17 Cited supra, nr. 2.
18 See supra, nr. 3.
19 With the exception of cases in which a termination of the contract is the obvious solution.
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In view of these considerations article 6:258 DCC does not, as a lex specialis,
push article 6:248 (2) DCC aside. It is no lex specialis, but rather a lex suppleta,
indicating that – next to the parties themselves – the court too has the power
to modify the contract or to set the contract aside. Such a dual system, consist-
ing of an extrajudicial and a judicial component, is not uncommon under Dutch
law.20
8 OBLIGATIONS AND OBLIEGENHEITEN; PRINCIPLES
In the system depicted the duties of both parties to reconsider the contract
do not have the character of real obligations. They are duties of a lower grade,
usually labelled Obliegenheiten: if a party does not comply, this does not
constitute a failure and the party will not be liable because of nonperformance.
The sanction is more subtle: reasonableness and fairness prevent the (first)
party from invoking the unforeseen circumstances so that it stays obliged to
perform the contract as it is, respectively reasonableness and fairness prevent
the (second) party from invoking the original contract so that it cannot demand
its fulfilment.
Some other legal systems establish real obligations to (re)negotiate when
unforeseen circumstances occur. A prominent example lies in the Principles
of European Contract Law (PECL).
Article 6:111 PECL
Change of circumstances
[...]. If, however, performance of the contract becomes excessively onerous because
of a change of circumstances, the parties are bound to enter into negotiations with
a view to adapting the contract or ending it [...]. If the parties fail to reach agree-
ment within a reasonable period, the court may: [...] award damages for the loss
suffered through a party refusing to negotiate or breaking off negotiations contrary
to good faith and fair dealing.
The recently published Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) shows a
more restrained approach.
Article III.-1:110 DCFR
Variation or termination by court on a change of circumstances
[...] Paragraph (2) applies only if: [...] the debtor has attempted, reasonably and
in good faith, to achieve by negotiation a reasonable and equitable adjustment of
the terms regulating the obligation.
20 Cf. art. 3:49 DCC (annulment), art. 3:54 DCC (modification in case of undue influence),
art. 6:230 DCC (modification in case of mistake) and art. 6:267 DCC (setting aside because
of nonperformance).
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The accompanying commentary mentions that the solution chosen in the PECL
is criticized as ‘undesirably complicated and heavy’. The DCFR takes account
of these criticisms by not imposing an obligation to renegotiate on the parties,
but making it a requirement for a remedy that the debtor attempted to achieve
a proper adjustment of the contract. ‘There is no question of anyone being
forced to negotiate or being held liable in damages for failing to negotiate’,
the commentary stresses.21
The authors of the DCFR also refer to the UNIDROIT Principles of Intern-
ational Commercial Contracts (PICC), which in their opinion ‘adopt a similar
basic approach but use a slightly different drafting technique’.22 This estima-
tion seems questionable. The PICC-provision reads:
Article 6.2.3 PICC
Effects of hardship
In case of hardship the disadvantaged party is entitled to request renegotiations.
[...].
The phrase ‘entitled to request’ suggests an obligation, which can give rise
to claims for performance and damages because of nonperformance.23 In this
interpretation (this part of) the PICC regime is closer to that of the PECL than
to that of the DCFR.
It is interesting to learn that the youngest principle-like project, the Feasibil-
ity Study of the Expert Group on European Contract Law, sticks to the exist-
ence of obligations.24
Article 92 Feasibility Study
Change of circumstances
[...] If, however, performance becomes excessively onerous because of an exceptional
change of circumstances [...], the parties have a duty to enter into negotiations in
accordance with good faith and fair dealing with a view to adapting or terminating
the contract. Subject to [..], the court may award damages for the loss suffered
21 Chr. von Bar & E. Clive (eds.), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law,
Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), Munich: Sellier 2009, Volume I, Art. III.-1:110,
Comments, C.
22 Von Bar & Clive 2009, ibid.
23 E. McKendrick, in: S. Vogenauer & J. Kleinheisterkamp (eds.), Commentary on the UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC), Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009,
Art. 6.2.3, sub 1, notes that there is no express obligation imposed, but adds that it must
be borne in mind that the PICC contain a general principle of good faith (art. 1.7) and that
the parties are subject to a duty to co-operate (art. 5.1.3). Cf. UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts, Rome: UNIDROIT 2010, Art. 6.2.3, Comments, 5. See
also ibid., Comments, 2, mentioning the disadvantaged party’s ‘right to request renegoti-
ations’.
24 Commission Expert Group on European Contract Law, Feasibility Study for a future instrument
in European Contract Law, 3 May 2011, published on the Internet: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/
contract/files/feasibility-study_en.pdf (Annex IV).
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through a party refusing to negotiate or breaking off negotiations contrary to good
faith and fair dealing.
However, the Expert Group is not sure of the suggested system. Article 92
is one of seven issues on which it seeks the advice of ‘all interested parties’:25
‘Article 92 foresees an exceptional possibility to alter a contract due to change of
circumstances. [...]. Do you think that the procedure which leads to the alteration
of a contract is appropriate?’26
9 REAL OBLIGATIONS TO NEGOTIATE?
In my opinion the creation of obligations to renegotiate is not necessary and
may therefore, in the words of the DCFR commentary, be labelled ‘undesirably
complicated and heavy’. What such obligations add to the more reserved
model of Obliegenheiten is the possibility for the other party to demand per-
formance (negotiations in good faith) or to claim damages because of non-
performance (frustration of negotiations). Neither of these options is really
useful. We should bear in mind that the parties concluded a contract which
is still on the table. The sanction that a party who refuses to negotiate ‘only’
forfeits the opportunity to refuse performance (debtor) respectively forfeits
its right to demand performance (creditor), has the fundamental advantage
that it focuses on the heart of the matter: the contract itself. Renegotiation
issues have a derived character, which is reflected accurately and attractively
by the technique of Obliegenheiten.
The creation of obligations is not necessary to protect the parties from
damage caused by unwillingness. This again follows from the fact that the
heart of the matter is the contract itself. If a party frustrates desirable
renegotiations, the court will be inclined to alter the contract not ex nunc but
from an earlier date, namely the date on which reasonable parties would
presumably have concluded their negotiations. The Dutch Code mentions
explicitly that the modification or setting aside may be given retroactive effect
(article 6:258 (1) DCC).27 Such an automatic compensation in natura makes
more sense than an isolated financial compensation of the damage resulting
25 Feasibility Study, Introductory remarks, sub V (3).
26 After the completion of this essay, the Feasibility Study was succeeded by the Proposal
for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Common European
Sales Law (CESL) d.d. 11 October 2011, COM(2011) 635 final. The proposed art. 89 (1) CESL
reads: ‘[...] Where performance becomes excessively onerous because of an exceptional
change of circumstances, the parties have a duty to enter into negotiations with a view
to adapting or terminating the contract’. This article does not mention damages because
of noncompliance.
27 Moreover, the court may pronounce a contract modification subject to conditions (e.g.
compensation); art. 6:260 (1) DCC.
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from not renegotiating in good faith. The possibility that the court thus ‘over-
takes’ a reluctant party creates a welcome pressure: it may be wiser to take
part in the negotiations, and thereby retain influence, than to withdraw and
leave the matter to the insight of the court.
10 CONCLUSION
All in all the Dutch regime regarding the modification of a contract with
respect to unforeseen circumstances amounts to an interplay of the parties
and the court.
The Code seems to equip the judiciary with great powers: the court may
modify the contract or may set it aside, in whole or in part. In essence the
court’s power is limited. The requirements for an intervention are rarely
fulfilled; moreover, the court is only entitled to intervene upon a party
demand, which fundamentally restricts its options. The parties themselves
will be wise to declare and effectuate their willingness to renegotiate. A debtor
who is not prepared to negotiate will forfeit a possible intervention by the
court; a creditor who is not prepared to negotiate will forfeit his right to claim
performance. This mechanism of mutual Obliegenheiten is proper and generally
sufficient; there is no need to upgrade to structural obligations for the parties
to renegotiate.

3 Unforeseen circumstances after
enforcement or expiry of the contract,
prescription and forfeiture of rights
Henk Snijders
1 A CASE
A and B agree to a joint venture for the common exploitation of A’s coal plant
during the years 2001-2010. The agreement provides among others that B will
every year pay half of the depreciation for the plant estimated at C= 90 million
a year. At the moment when the parties agreed on that amount, they assumed
that the coal plant would have an operating time of 15 years, because the
government had decided to stop all coal plant exploitations from 2016. After
the expiry of the contract the government changes its decision: meanwhile
it is of the opinion that the exploitation of nuclear power plants must be
stopped and that coal plants can serve as an alternative for some decades yet.
The operating time of the coal plant is now estimated to be 30 instead of 15
years. Consequently, B claims modification of the contract, arguing that the
huge extension of the operating time is an unforeseen circumstance and that
therefore the contract has to be modified. A argues that the contract has
already been enforced and expired, and that judicial modification of the
contract is therefore not acceptable anymore.
What to think of A’s position, assuming that the huge extension of the
operating time is, as B argues, an unforeseen circumstance?
2 THE QUESTIONS
Article 6:258 DCC (Dutch Civil Code) states, among others, that the court may
modify (the effects of) a contract or set it aside, in whole or in part, on the
basis of unforeseen circumstances of such a nature that the other party, accord-
ing to standards of reasonableness and fairness, ‘may not expect the contract
Henk Snijders is professor of Private Law and Civil Procedure, Leiden University
(h.j.snijders@law.leidenuniv.nl). The author wishes to express his gratitude for the document-
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to be maintained in unmodified form’1 (in Dutch: ‘ongewijzigde instandhou-
ding van de overeenkomst niet mag verwachten’).
The word ‘maintained’ suggests at least that the contract still exists at the
moment when modification or setting aside is claimed, and that the contract
is still valid then. Indeed it can be held that a contract which is non-existent
or null cannot be modified on the basis of art. 6:258 DCC: there is nothing to
be changed anymore. The same applies to a contract which has been annulled,
at least if the annulment has been given retroactive effect to the time the
contract was agreed for, as usually occurs on the basis of art. 3:53 DCC. An
interesting question remains whether a valid and unannulled contract for a
definite period can be changed or set aside on the basis of unforeseen circum-
stances, if it has been enforced or has expired because that period is past. And
that is the central issue in this article. At the end the same question will be
considered shortly for some contracts which have expired in another specific
way: a) valid contracts for an indefinite period after termination of the contract,
b) contracts which have been subjected to annulment without retroactive effect
to the time the contract was agreed and c) contracts which have been set aside
on account of breach of contract. Furthermore, some attention will be given
then to the prescription of a claim for the setting aside or modification of such
a contract on the basis of unforeseen circumstances and to the possibility of
forfeiture of rights.
3 TEXT AND HISTORY OF ART. 6:258, FOREIGN AND TRANSNATIONAL LAW
The text of art. 6:258 does not explicitly give an answer to the questions dealt
with here. We will see that the text does give an interesting indication, but
first some attention to parliamentary history may be useful.
The text of art. 6:258 DCC may not explicitly answer the questions dealt
with, nor does it preclude application to a contract which has been enforced
in part or even entirely, as the main author of the code, E.M. Meijers, explains
the original draft of the article (which draft was not changed during the
parliamentary discussion on it, as far as relevant now, for that matter).2 Meijers
adds (l.c.) that the application is especially important with regard to a contract
which has been enforced only partly (i.e. the contract has not been enforced
by all the parties or the obligations out of the contract have been enforced only
1 The quotation is from the translation by H. Warendorf et al., The Civil Code of the Netherlands,
Kluwer Law International: Alphen aan de Rijn 2009. The translation by P.P.C. Haanappel
and E. Mackaaij (New Netherlands Civil Code/Nouveau Code Civil Néerlandais, Kluwer Law
and Taxation: Deventer/Boston 1990) differs only very slightly from that of Warendorf
et al. Both translations correctly underline that the question, whether the contract has to
be maintained in an unmodified form, is at stake (the verb to maintain means ‘handhaven’
or ‘in stand houden’ and corresponds to the substantive ‘instandhouding’.
2 Toelichting Meijers, Parlementaire Geschiedenis Boek 6, pp. 969-970.
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partly). The modification or setting aside of an agreement which has been
enforced entirely, will seldom be in accordance with reasonableness and
fairness, Meijers holds.3 The question what to think of this last observation
will be considered later on. Now, it is relevant to stress that this is not a
fundamental objection to the modification or setting aside of a contract which
has already been entirely or partly enforced, on the basis of unforeseen circum-
stances. On the contrary, Meijers seems to adopt such modification and setting
aside, in principle. What applies to a contract enforced entirely, must also be
applicable to (other) contracts which have expired. There is no reason to
assume that Meijers would have another view with regard to those contracts.
Especially the wording of art. 6:258 that regards the question whether an
existing contract has to be ‘maintained’, does not give a reason for that assump-
tion. The expiry of a contract from a certain date does not make it disappear,
it is still maintained. Then the question arises whether that contract still has
to be maintained for the period up till the expiry date.
Furthermore, the second sentence of art. 6:258 par. 1, which has been added
to the bill on Book 6 DCC while it was pending in parliament, indicates that
the judicial modification of entirely or partly enforced contracts is possible.
It permits retroactive effect of a judicial modification or setting aside to any
moment before the date of such judicial modification or setting aside. That
moment may be the date of a procedural document, such as a writ of summons
or a statement of defence, in which the possibility of modification or setting
aside because of unforeseen circumstances has been invoked in a concrete case.
It may also be situated before the civil procedure. Retroactive effect even seems
to be possible from the date of establishment of the contract itself. There is
no indication that the legislator would have been willing to limit the retroactive
effect to a certain period. Retroactive effect up to the date of the contract will
seldom be in accordance with reasonableness and fairness, Meijers could hold,
again, which will be also discussed later on. Important now is that retroactive
effect is permitted for -among others- contracts which have only been enforced
entirely or in part. Again, it may be held that what applies to a contract
enforced entirely must also be applicable to (other) contracts which have
expired. Therefore the second sentence of art. 6:258 par. 1 also suggests, albeit
slightly, that the judicial modification and setting aside of a contract which
has expired, is possible.
Summarizing, the legislator does not see any fundamental objections to
the judicial modification and setting aside of contracts already enforced or
expired. Meanwhile, he is of the view that the modification or setting aside
of a contract which has been entirely enforced will seldom be in accordance
3 Meijers refers to Karl Larenz, Geschäftsgrundlage und Vertragserfüllung, 1. Auflage, Beck:
München-Berlin 1951, p. 91 ff. See further, inter alia John Cartwright, Contract Law, An
Introduction to the English Law of Contract for the Civil Lawyer, Hart Publishing: Oxford and
Portland, Oregon 2007, p. 235, is of the same opinion.
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with reasonableness and fairness. Whether that last observation can be applied
to expired contracts per analogiam is another question. Both observations will
be considered in more detail under 4.
What about foreign laws? Provisions of foreign law do not explicitly deal
with the judicial modification and setting aside of contracts already enforced
or expired, as far as could be investigated. The same can be held for the
UNIDROIT Principles of International Contracts (UNIDROIT) and the Principles
of European Contract Law (PECL): neither the UNIDROIT Principles nor the PECL
give a clear indication of the answer to our questions. See arts. 6.2.1-3 UNIDROIT
and art. 6:111 PECL. The same applies to art. III – 1:110 of the Draft Common
Frame of Reference (DCFR), which is similar to arts. 6.2.1-3 UNIDROIT. All these
texts give no explicit indication for a positive answer to the question, but there
is no opposition to the judicial modification or setting aside of enforced or
expired contracts on the basis of unforeseen circumstances either. A general
investigation of foreign case law and literature on domestic provisions, trans-
national principals and the DCFR did not really help to interpret these rules.
Foreign and transnational law will be left aside further.
4 MEANING OF REASONABLENESS AND FAIRNESS IN CASE OF CONTRACTS
ENTIRELY OR PARTLY ENFORCED OR EXPIRED
As pointed out under 3 the modification and setting aside of an agreement
which has been enforced entirely, will seldom be in accordance with reason-
ableness and fairness, in Meijers’s view. It is not clear what exactly Meijers
means in this respect. Maybe the underlying idea is that the severer the con-
sequences of modification or setting aside (in the sense of the effect of a
reversal of what has already been done), the greater the chance that such
modification or setting aside will not be in accordance with reasonableness
and fairness. However, the reason for modification or setting aside on the basis
of unforeseen circumstance is precisely that the consequences of maintenance
of the contract in unmodified form are so serious that the counter-party of
the person who seeks the modification or setting aside may not expect mainten-
ance in unmodified form and it is clear that a modification or setting aside
on that basis will not only be effected in details but in a substantial way. It
is clear nevertheless that the judge dealing with the claim for modification
or setting aside will also consider the negative consequences of it for the other
party and calculate the extent of that disadvantage for that party as a factor
in weighing the interest of the parties with regard to the question whether
the other party may expect the contract to be maintained without modification,
and if not allowed to expect so, to what extent the modification must be
accepted (the concept of ‘claim’ is intended as a quite general one here: the
modification and setting aside can also be informally demanded by the de-
fendant, as will be pointed out and discussed under 6). In other words, it can
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be held that the application of the legislator’s criteria of reasonableness and
fairness to a claim for modification and setting aside of an agreement which
has been entirely enforced or has expired requires a careful consideration of
the advantages and disadvantages of such modification or setting aside for
both parties to the contract. That can be held both with respect to the question
whether the claim has to be granted and – in case of an affirmative answer
to that question – to what extent the claim for modification or setting aside
has to be granted. The latter question is also an important one. The modifica-
tion or setting aside can be applied only to a part of the subject of the contract,
for instance, or only without retroactive effect or with limited retroactive effect.
That test against the requirements of reasonableness and fairness is not
an ordinary but a marginal one: the judge is only allowed to modify or set
aside the contract if and insofar as it is unacceptable in the light of the require-
ments of reasonableness and fairness to keep a party to unmodified main-
tenance of the contract. After all, art. 6:258 DCC is a codification of a specific
rule which was derived from art. 1374 par. 3 of the Old Civil Code, which,
according to case law under the Old Civil Code, provided in general for the
so-called contract-limiting effect of reasonableness and fairness, as art. 6:248
par. 2 DCC does now: a rule binding upon the parties as a result of the contract
does not apply to the extent that, in the given circumstances, this would be
unacceptable according to standards of reasonableness and fairness.4 Therefore,
the judge has to apply the legislator’s authorization to modify or set aside a
contract on the basis of unforeseen circumstances with restraint and caution,
i.e. only in exceptional situations.5 In practice, it occurs very seldom indeed
that the judge modifies or sets aside a contract on the basis of unforeseen
circumstances.6
Altogether it may be concluded that the modification and setting aside
of contracts on the basis of unforeseen circumstances are only appropriate in
exceptional situations: it is only allowed if, and if so to the extent that, un-
modified maintenance of the contact is absolutely unacceptable according to
the requirements of reasonableness and fairness. There is no good reason in
principle to make it still more difficult in case of a contract which has been
enforced entirely or has expired.
4 Cfr. Voorlopig Verslag II and Memorie van Antwoord II, Parlementaire geschiedenis Boek
6, p. 971 resp. pp. 973-975. See further, inter alia Asser/Hartkamp & Sieburgh 6-III* (2010),
nr. 439.
5 Memorie van Antwoord, Parl. gesch. Boek 6, PG. See further, inter alia Asser/Hartkamp&
Sieburgh 6-III* (2010), nr. 444, Rechtshandeling en overeenkomst (W.L. Valk), Kluwer: Deventer
2007, nr. 288 and Attorney-General Wuisman in his ‘conclusie’ (official advice to the court)
in the case of Dutch Supreme Court 15 February 2008, NJ 2008, 110.
6 See for instance Dutch Supreme Court 19 November 1993, NJ 1994, 156, Dutch Supreme
Court 20 February 1998, NJ 1998, 493 and Dutch Supreme Court 21 March 2003, NJ 2003,
591, with commentary from JBMV.
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A fortiori, there is no good reason for making it more difficult in case the
contract has been enforced in part.7 On the contrary, modification or setting
aside of a contract on the basis of unforeseen circumstances will just be claimed
very often, maybe even in the large majority of the cases, with regard to
contracts which have already been enforced in part. The legislator must certain-
ly have been willing to provide for the modification and setting aside of such
contracts.8
5 MODIFICATION OR SETTING ASIDE ON THE BASIS OF UNFORESEEN CIRCUM-
STANCES AFTER TERMINATION OF THE CONTRACT, ANNULMENT WITHOUT
RETROACTIVE EFFECT AND SETTING ASIDE ON THE BASIS OF BREACH OF
CONTRACT
What to think of the modification or setting aside of a contract on the basis
of unforeseen circumstances after termination of a contract for an indefinite
period? In fact the termination of the contract, if valid of course, transforms
the contract for an indefinite period to a contract for a definite one. There is
no difference between both types, except that the former is definite from the
beginning while the latter is made definite in the course of its duration. It may
be held that the answers to the questions as given before also apply to in-
definite contracts which have been terminated and therefore expired.
Now for the case of a contract which has been subjected to annulment
without retroactive effect to the time the contract was agreed. A contract does
not disappear as a result of an annulment. It is still maintained, albeit only
for the period from the date of agreement up till the date of annulment or
a date in between insofar as limited retroactive effect is given to the annulment.
Therefore such an annulled contract must be susceptible to modification and
setting aside on the basis of unforeseen circumstances arisen after the annul-
ment, albeit it only for the remaining period of the contract.
Finally a look at contracts which have been set aside on account of breach
of contract. Such setting aside does not have retroactive effect according to
present Dutch law (art. 6:269 DCC). Still, the setting aside releases the parties
from the obligations effected by it (art. 6:271, first sentence DCC). However,
to the extent that these obligations have already been performed, the legal
ground for this performance remains intact, albeit that the parties have the
obligation to reverse the performance of the obligations already performed
7 The Court of Appeal in ‘s-Hertogenbosch appeared to be of another view, without mention-
ing any argument therefor (Court of Appeal ‘s-Hertogenbosch 11 April 2006, NJF 2006,
500). On the other hand, the Court of Appeal of Arnhem seems to be in favour of the
author’s opinion, albeit that it does not give any reasons for that either (Court of Appeal
Arnhem 14 July 2009, LJN BK6402).
8 See also P.S. Bakker and J.W. de Groot, WPNR 2009 (6797) under 5.
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(art. 6:271, second sentence DCC) or at least to compensate therefor by paying
damages in case the performance, given its nature, cannot be reversed (art.
6:272 DCC). Therefore, there is no interest for any party in the modification
or setting aside of a contract on the basis of unforeseen circumstances after
that contract has been set aside entirely on account of breach of contract. Only
in case of a partial setting aside on account of breach of contract (as art. 6:265,
par. 1 DCC in conjunction with art. 6:270 DCC permits respectively elaborates)
can such an interest still be there and if so, there is no reason why modification
or setting aside on the basis of unforeseen circumstances would not be allowed
then.
6 PRESCRIPTION AND FORFEITURE OF RIGHTS
The interim conclusion may be that the modification and setting aside of a
contract is possible on the basis of unforeseen circumstances arisen after the
enforcement or expiry of the contract. However, it is possible, of course, that
a claim for modification or setting aside in this matter is prescribed. Further-
more, it is possible that a claim in this matter will founder on forfeiture of
the right of action. Some remarks on these possibilities have to be made now,
but first some attention has to be paid to the concept of ‘claim’ in this matter.
As stated before, the concept of ‘claim’ is intended as a quite general one.
The original draft provision on modification and setting aside on the basis
of unforeseen circumstances allowed the interested party to institute court
proceedings for the modification and setting aside of a contract on the basis
of unforeseen circumstances by using the word ‘vordering’, i.e. a claim by the
original claimant in the action or by the defendant bringing a counterclaim.
In the final text of art. 6:258 DCC the word ‘vordering’ was changed by the
more neutral word ‘verlangen’ (i.e. demand), in order to provide not only a
possibility for a person to bring civil proceedings for the judicial modification
or setting aside of a contract on the basis of unforeseen circumstances, but
also by way of defence for the defendant or by way of an answer to a defence
for a claimant in a civil action for another claim. However, this change of
words was not necessary to achieve that the defendant or the claimant can,
by way of an answer to a defence in a civil action for another claim, seek to
gain a judicial modification or setting aside of a contract on the basis of unfore-
seen circumstances. This modification or setting aside can be achieved by a
counterclaim of the defendant respectively an additional claim of the original
claimant (these being claims in a narrow sense). Obviously the legislator still
wants to allow the possibility of seeking the judicial modification or setting
aside of a contract on the basis of unforeseen circumstances via another route,
notably by way of an informal demand by the original claimant or the de-
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fendant. What are we to think of this informal demand in connection with
the question of prescription?9
The legislator probably did not realise that through his use of the concept
of an informal demand, claimants and defendants could try to circumvent
the prescription. On the basis of the legislator’s wording, curious results in
the field of prescription could occur. What to think of an informal demand
of a claimant after prescription of his right of action (i.e. the ius agendi) for
instance? Whereas a claim for the judicial modification or setting aside of a
contract on the basis of unforeseen circumstances should be dismissed due
to that prescription, an informal demand later on in the procedure should be
admissible. Still, there is a strong need for prescription of a ‘right of informal
demand’ after a long time as well. Legal certainty is involved here, as it is
involved with regard to the prescription of claims in a narrow sense. Therefore,
in the author’s opinion, the informal demand has to be dealt with in the same
way as a claim in a narrow sense. For both of these it must be held that the
right to initiate the judicial modification or setting aside of a contract on the
basis of unforeseen circumstances must be interpreted as the right of action
in the sense of the Dutch law of prescription. Thus, the right of an informal
demand to the judge in the sense of art. 6:258 DCC can be prescribed on the
same conditions as a right of action in a narrow sense.
However, there is no specific provision on that right of action with regard
to the judicial modification or setting aside of a contract on the basis of unfore-
seen circumstances in Dutch law. There is still a specific provision on the
prescription of a right of action to set aside a contract (art. 3:311 DCC), but this
provision only refers to setting aside for failure to perform. That is why the
general provision on prescription of rights of action is applicable (art. 3:306)
which states that unless otherwise provided for by law, a right of action is
prescribed on the expiry of twenty years. From what moment does this term
start? From the moment the unforeseen circumstances occur or the moment
when the interested party is aware of these circumstances? Keeping in mind
the length of the period, the former option seems to be the most appropriate
one, but there is no indication for it in the text or in the history of the law.
However, even in that former sense, the 20-year period is an extremely long
one in the author’s opinion. The right of action to set aside a contract for
nonperformance is prescribed on the expiry of five years from the moment
when the creditor becomes aware of the failure and only in other situations
on the expiry of twenty years after the failure occurred (art. 3:311 DCC). There
is no reason why a right of action to the judicial modification or setting aside
of a contract on the basis of unforeseen circumstances should not be dealt with
in the same way, mutatis mutandis. The prescription would be better fixed on
five years from the moment when the interested party becomes aware of the
9 See more in general for instance H.J. Snijders et al., Nederlands burgerlijk procesrecht, Kluwer:
Deventer 2011, no. 126.
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originally unforeseen circumstances and in any case not more than twenty
years after the originally unforeseen circumstances occurred. It looks as if the
legislator simply forgot to make a specific prescription provision on rights
of action with regard to unforeseen circumstances, possibly due to the fact
that the old Code did not provide for a right of action as laid down in the
present art. 6:258 DCC. Anyway, the ius constitutum does not provide for such
a limited prescription period. Perhaps our Dutch Supreme Court is willing
to interpret art. 3:311 per analogiam in the sense argued just now, but it is not
sure whether it will do so.
However, as far as prescription is not at stake, the right of action can be
forfeited. This will be the case if in the given circumstances, according to
standards of – again – reasonableness and fairness, it cannot be accepted
anymore that a right of action is used. In that case the right of action expires
as well, as in case of prescription. This forfeiture of rights has not been laid
down in Dutch legislation, but was adopted by the Dutch Supreme Court
under the old Civil Code and is still accepted by the Dutch Supreme Court
under the present one.
There is no occasion for an elaborate analysis of Dutch legal criteria for
forfeiture of rights now. Some remarks may suffice. According to case law,
neither the simple expiry of a certain period after a certain event nor simply
sitting around doing nothing is enough for the reception of forfeiture. For-
feiture of rights is only accepted in two situations. It is accepted if under the
specific circumstances of a case the debtor suffers an unreasonable disad-
vantage if the creditor would, after a certain period, still invoke his right of
action. It is also accepted if the debtor correctly trusted that the creditor would
not invoke his right of action anymore.10Application of this general rule to
the right of action to the judicial modification or setting aside of a contract
on the basis of unforeseen circumstances means that this right of action can
be forfeited a) if the debtor suffered an unreasonable disadvantage in case
the creditor, after a certain period, still invoked his right of action to modifica-
tion or setting aside and b) if the debtor was allowed to trust that the creditor
would not invoke his right of action anymore. In general, it is clear that the
longer a prescription period is, the sooner the judge will dismiss a claim
because of forfeiture of rights. An example of the latter may be found in the
situation in which a debtor, from the moment he is conscious of a certain,
hitherto unforeseen circumstance, still, without any objection, continues to
enforce the agreement, for instance through the continuous annual payment,
without any objection, of the agreed amount for depreciation costs as could
occur in the case of section 1 supra.
The question of the forfeiture of rights precedes the substantive treatment
of a claim for the judicial modification or setting aside of a contract on the
10 See further for instance Verbintenissenrecht (W.L. Valk), loose-leaf and e-edition, Kluwer:
Deventer, art. 2, notes 1 ff.
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basis of unforeseen circumstances, because in case of forfeiture the claim will
not be admissible. The substantive treatment of that claim is not at stake
anymore in that case. However, the arguments in favour of forfeiture in a
certain case can be, entirely or partly, the same as the arguments in favour
of rejection of the claim for the judicial modification or setting aside of a
contract on the basis of unforeseen circumstances. This phenomenon is not
that strange. Both legal concepts – judicial modification or setting aside of a
contract on the basis of unforeseen circumstances and forfeiture of rights of
action – have a common assessment framework: the tandem of reasonableness
and fairness in its correcting function as laid down in art. 6:2 par. 2 DCC and
art. 6:248 par. 2 DCC.
7 SUMMARY AND FINAL REMARKS
It is clear now, how the case of section 1 should be decided. The single fact
that the contract has already been (entirely or partly) enforced or has already
expired does not prevent a judicial modification or setting aside of the contract.
A’s argument that the contract has already been enforced and expired, and
that judicial modification of the contract is therefore not acceptable, fails.
However, the enforcement and expiry arguments are still relevant. A’s
claim for the modification or setting aside of a contract on the basis of unfore-
seen circumstance can be granted and can be granted only if the consequences
of maintenance of the contract in unmodified form are so serious that the
counter-party of the person who wants the modification or setting aside may
not expect maintenance in unmodified form. The judge, dealing with such
a claim for modification or setting aside, will also consider the negative con-
sequences of it for the counter-party and calculate the extent of that disad-
vantage for that party as a factor in weighing the interest of the parties with
regard to the question whether the counter-party may expect the contract
maintained without modification, and if it is not allowed to expect so, to what
extent the modification must be accepted. It can be held that the application
of the legislator’s criteria of reasonableness and fairness to a claim for the
modification and setting aside of an agreement which has been entirely
enforced or has expired, requires a careful consideration of the advantages
and disadvantages of such modification or setting aside for both parties to
the contract. It can be held both to the question whether the claim has to be
granted and – in case of an affirmative answer to that question – to what extent
the claim for modification or setting aside has to be granted.
That test against the requirements of reasonableness and fairness is not
an ordinary but a marginal one: the judge is only allowed to modify or set
aside the contract if and insofar as it is unacceptable in the light of the require-
ments of reasonableness and fairness to keep a party to unmodified mainten-
ance of the contract. Modification and setting aside of contracts on the basis
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of unforeseen circumstances are only appropriate in exceptional situations:
it is only allowed if and insofar as unmodified maintenance of the contact is
absolutely unacceptable according to the requirements of reasonableness and
fairness.
Questions of prescription and forfeiture of rights precede the substantial
question whether a claim for modification or setting aside of a contract on
the basis of unforeseen circumstances has to be granted. Prescription is not
often an issue in practice, due to the long prescription period (20 years).
Forfeiture of rights is at stake more. The right of action to judicial modification
or setting aside of a contract on the basis of unforeseen circumstances can be
forfeited if the debtor was allowed to trust that the creditor would not invoke
his right of action anymore or if this put the debtor at an unreasonable dis-
advantage.

4 Legal certainty and the construction of
contracts in Dutch law
Mark Wissink
1 INTRODUCTION1
Dutch contract law relies heavily on the open standard of reasonableness and
fairness. In the end, the interpretation of a contract is based on “reasonableness
and fairness”, hereinafter also referred to as “good faith and fair dealing”. The
same goes for the question whether an addition to the contract is required,
because the parties have forgotten to include a provision.2 Moreover, the
exercise of contractual rights is not only corrected when there is abuse of rights,
but also if reliance on those rights were unacceptable in the circumstances
according to standards of reasonableness and fairness.3 Finally, a number of
provisions are regarded as special elaborations of the principle that parties
should behave in accordance with the requirements of reasonableness and
fairness. A typical example is the provision about unforeseen circumstances.4
According to this provision the court may, upon the demand of a party, modify
or set aside the contract on the basis of unforeseen circumstances that are of
such a nature that the other party may not, according to standards of reason-
ableness and fairness, expect the contract to be maintained in unmodified form.
This express acknowledgement of the role of reasonableness and fairness
is not unique. There are more legal systems in which similar notions have roles
to play. Thus, anyone who familiarises themselves with the Unidroit Principles
for International Commercial Contracts (PICC) or the comparative comments
on the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), can see that such notions
are recognisable everywhere, for example in words to the effect that contract
parties must observe “good faith and fair dealing”.5 Although the differences
Mark Wissink is advocate general at the Dutch Supreme Court and professor of private
law, University of Groningen (m.h.wissink@rug.nl).
1 This contribution is based on two earlier publications. See M.H. Wissink, ‘Vertrouwen op
tekstuele uitleg’, in: Th.M. de Boer, J.W. Fokkens, P. Vlas, M.J. Vos & C.L. de Vries Lentsch-
Kostense, Strikwerda’s Conclusies (Essays in honour of Luc Strikwerda), Deventer: Kluwer 2011,
pp. 585-601 and ‘Afspraak is afspraak?”, Tijdschrift voor Agrarisch Recht 2005, pp. 210-219.
2 Article 6:248 paragraph 1 DCC (Dutch Civil Code).
3 Article 6:248 paragraph 2 DCC.
4 Article 6:258 DCC.
5 C. Von Bar and E. Clive (eds.), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private
Law, DCFR, Full Edition, München: Sellier 2009, p. 679 et seq.
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between legal systems often concern the formal position of such notions (e.g.
do they only pertain to the performance of the contract?), in the end they are
concerned with their importance. Do such notions play a prominent role,
indeed one which sometimes permeates contract law as a whole, as is the case
in Germany and the Netherlands? Or is this a marginal role, whereby express
recognition is granted merely in certain cases, as in English law?6
The above may give the impression that reasonableness and fairness will
in Dutch contract law usually play a dominant role when solutions for concrete
cases are sought. Nevertheless, theory may differ from practice in this respect.
In theory, reasonableness and fairness always come into play. And it stands
to reason that nobody (wherever this may be) will defend the position that
the court must attain a result which is obviously unreasonable. That is the
long and the short of it for most cases, though. What really matters, is to
determine the true meaning of reasonableness and fairness in concrete cases
where the issue is the interpretation of or addition to a contract or interference
in the exercise of contractual rights. For example, the court cannot simply
interpret the contract in a way which it deems reasonable and fair. It must
interpret the contract on the basis of rules of law that are geared to the inten-
tion of the parties or to the meaning that third parties attribute to the text used
by the parties. Reasonable expectations will be instrumental here, such as the
question how certain words will normally be understood. Still, the importance
attached to this may be greater, but it may also be less.
Indeed, when a court has to assess a contract there is always an area of
tension between “certainty” and “flexibility”. This may be translated roughly
into the question whether the court should interpret the contract primarily
literally, should sparingly add terms, and should only in highly exceptional
circumstances – i.e. practically speaking: should not – interfere in the exercise
of contractual powers. Naturally these questions also turn up in a system such
as Dutch contract law. While Dutch law encompasses the possibility of “flexi-
bility”, it is not compulsory. The system provides an equal opportunity to give
priority to “certainty”. The court may postulate a flexible approach to a written
contract, for example when it has been drafted by parties lacking expertise,
in great haste and with the intention to represent no more than the outlines
of their agreement in words understandable for them at that moment. The
court may postulate the (relative) certainty of the text, for instance when there
have been final negotiations about the contract by professional parties assisted
by expert legal advisers who have made sure that the text of the contract
adequately and fully represents the consensus of the parties.
6 On the question how English law should deal with the duty to act in good faith accepted
elsewhere, see for example Gerard McMeel, The Construction of Contracts. Interpretation,
Implication and Rectification, Oxford University Press 2011, pp. 104 and 297 et seq.; Neil
Andrews, Contract Law, Cambridge University Press, pp. 375, 659 et seq.
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In the former case a flexible approach represents what in that particular
case is in keeping with reasonableness and fairness, since that approach takes
into account the circumstances of the case and the interests of the parties. In
that sense it is sufficient for the parties to make an inadequate representation
of their agreements in the contract, for they will not be punished with a textual
interpretation that does not do justice to their intentions. Of course they will
pay the price for this, i.e. they will have to incur costs ex post in order by
means of proceedings to obtain clarity on the contents of their contract and
in so doing will run the risk of the court ruling against them. In the latter case
a strict approach, aiming at legal certainty, will represent what in that case
is in agreement with reasonableness and fairness, because that approach takes
the circumstances of the case and the interests of the parties into account. They
have invested ex ante in a contract representing their consensus as adequately
and fully as possible and may therefore assume that the text of the contract
will take priority in its interpretation.
These examples indicate that giving a central role to reasonableness and
fairness in contract law admittedly opens up the possibility of a flexible
approach to a contract, but does not compel anyone to do so, and that the
circumstances may also justify a stricter approach. While this broad range of
options may be agreeable for a court, enabling it thereby to attune its resolution
of a conflict to the particularities of a case, it may simultaneously lead to a
measure of uncertainty for the parties about the way in which the court will
view their contract, if they are forced to seek a court judgment in case of a
conflict. It is against this background that this contribution concentrates on
the question to what extent the parties can exert influence on the way in which
the court will approach their contract. Thereby the interpretation of the contract
will be first and foremost. In this respect Dutch law shows a distinct develop-
ment, emphasising the importance of “certainty” in specific cases. Following
on that, some attention will be devoted also to the influence of the parties on
the addition to the contract and on the possibility of rectifying the exercise
of contractual powers.
2 CERTAINTY AND INTERPRETATION OF THE CONTRACT
The discussion whether Dutch law in its interpretation of certain contracts
succeeds in striking the right balance between legal certainty and flexibility
has been going on for a while. Some authors are of the opinion that the manner
in which contracts are interpreted according to Dutch law leads to uncertainty
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which specific types of parties would wish to avoid.7 A remedy could be
found in an approach to the contract that would be textual in principle. There-
by the interpretation of the contract would be influenced less by ‘the circum-
stances of the concrete case, assessed according to standards of reasonableness
and fairness’.8 The result would be that it is clearer beforehand how the
contract should and will be interpreted. It appears that this criticism is voiced
(in any case: also) against the background of the international commercial legal
practice.9 Just think of professional parties in an international context, under
the influence of the Anglo-American legal sphere, concluding commercial
contracts about the text of which they have had final negotiations assisted by
specialised legal advisers, whether based on internationally current models
or not. If these parties need the contract to be interpreted textually, there is
reason to consider to what extent Dutch law can fulfil that need.
In order to prevent misunderstandings it is useful to describe what is meant
by the phrase ‘textual interpretation’ in this contribution. While this may differ
from case to case, an attempt will be made to give a general interpretation
of this for the benefit of the discussion. Textual interpretation obviously means
7 See for this opinion, with different nuances, inter alia F.W. Grosheide, ‘Lees maar, er staat
wat er staat’, Contracteren 2000/4, p. 100 et seq.; the same, ‘Ad fontes’, Contracteren 2005/2,
p. 30; R.P.J.L. Tjittes, ‘Enige opmerkingen over de beperkte rol van de redelijkheid en
billijkheid in het ondernemingsrecht’, Contracteren 2001/2, p. 31; the same, Uitleg van
schriftelijke contracten, Nijmegen: Ars Aequi Libri 2009, p. 24; C. Drion, ‘Evenwicht en
proportionaliteit in het (commerciële) contractenrecht’, in: J.J. Brinkhof et al. (ed.), Contrac-
teren internationaal (Grosheide-bundel), Den Haag: Bju 2006, p. 190; R.H.J. van Bijnen,
Aanvullend contractenrecht (doctoral thesis Tilburg), Den Haag: Bju 2005, p. 319; R. de Vrey,
‘Het waterdicht maken van een Nederlands contract op Angelsaksische wijze’, in Contrac-
teren internationaal 2006, p. 87 et seq.; R. Hofstede and W. Oostwouder, ‘To cultivate com-
mand of language. Over het gebruik en de uitleg van Engelse termen in Nederlandse
(overname-)contracten’, in Contracteren internationaal 2006, p. 30; H.N. Schelhaas, ‘Pacta
sunt servanda bij commerciële contracten’, NTBR 2008/4, p. 150 et seq.; J. Meier Timmerman
Thijssen, ‘De ontvankelijkheid van het Nederlandse privaatrecht voor invloeden vanuit
de Anglo-Amerikaanse financieringspraktijk’, Contracteren 2009/4, p. 123. Further compare
M. Wolters, ‘Uitleg van schriftelijke overeenkomsten. Over de onzalige trend naar een
primair taalkundige uitleg van contracten’, Contracteren 2009/1, p. 14; M.M. van Rossum,
De redelijkheid en billijkheid bij commerciële contracten (oration OU), Deventer: Kluwer 2010;
C.E. Drion, ‘Anglo-Amerikaanse contracten, een zegen of een ramp?’, NJB 2011/24, p. 1523;
P.S. Bakker, ‘Uitleg van commerciële contracten (I)’, WPNR (2011) 6891, p. 477.
8 Dutch Supreme Court 20 February 2004, LJN AO1427, NJ 2005/493 with commentary from
C.E. du Perron (Pensioenfonds DSM-Chemie/Fox).
9 Thus, there are many references to English law. See on interpretation Lord Hoffmann in
Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v. West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896, 912.
See for example R.P.J.L. Tjittes, Uitleg van schriftelijke contracten, Nijmegen: Ars Aequi Libri
2009, p. 77. This has brought English law closer to Dutch law among others, but how much
closer is a matter of appreciation. See for instance Lord Hoffmann in Chartbrook Limited
v Persimmon Homes Limited and others [2009] UKHL 38 esp. nos. 37-39 and 47; J.M. van
Dunné, ‘Normatieve uitleg à l’anglaise. Investors Compensation Scheme (1998) als de
Engelse Haviltex-zaak’, in: E.H. Hondius et al. (ed.), Contracteren internationaal (Grosheide-
bundel), Den Haag: Bju 2006, p. 104.
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an interpretation based on the text as a whole, i.e. including arguments that
may be derived from its methodology. That will not suffice, though, as it is
inevitable to consider factors outside the text in order to attach significance
to it. Factors such as the type of transaction and its business background do
tend to cast light on the meaning of the text. In addition, the context may prove
that the contract does not use certain terms in their customary linguistic
meaning, but in a technical meaning connected with the nature of the trans-
action. Although the above may be extended with more examples,10 the aim
here is to clarify that textual interpretation encompasses more than a merely
linguistic interpretation of the contract and cannot go without the context.
Consequently, textual interpretation is not at odds with a contextual interpreta-
tion, it is more a matter of gradation. Textual interpretation presupposes a
certain attitude to the text of the contract. To put it briefly, the point is that
in determining what the parties have agreed, the third party called in to do
so (court, arbitrator) should focus attention on the text. The text is central and
contextual factors, if any, play a role in that light. First the text, then the rest,
if necessary. In this way, one avoids elaborations unknown beforehand (i.e.
at the time of conclusion of the contract) of what requirements of reasonable-
ness and fairness would entail in the circumstances of the case, unless this
is impossible.
What does Dutch law now have to offer to the professional parties referred
to in 7? According to the casebook judgment Pensioenfonds DSM-Chemie/Fox,
in the interpretation of a written contract all circumstances of the concrete case
are always decisive, assessed according to what the standards of reasonableness
and fairness entail.11 At first glance this is a far cry from the textual interpreta-
tion described above. On closer consideration, though, that is not always so.
After all, in practice interpretation does not take place on the basis of this
principle, but on the basis of a criterion of interpretation grafted onto it.12
Briefly put, interpretation is generally conducted on the basis of either the
‘Haviltex’ criterion, named after the 1981 judgment in the case Ermes/Havil-
tex).13 Upon application of the (subjective-objective) Haviltex criterion the
question at issue is what the parties thought and could think they agreed to;
in that context all circumstances of the case are relevant. However, in some
case, notably when interpreting collective bargaining agreements, an (objective)
criterion is applied. According to this so called CAO criterion (these three letters
refer to the Dutch abbreviation for collective bargaining agreement) the ques-
tion is what third parties think the document means; in that context not only
10 Think of interpretive tools such as those expressed in articles 4.4-4.7 of the Unidroit PICC.
11 Dutch Supreme Court 20 February 2004, LJN AO1427, NJ 2005/493 with commentary from
C.E. du Perron (Pensioenfonds DSM Chemie/Fox).
12 Dutch Supreme Court 1 October 2004, LJN AR2974, NJ 2005/499 (Taxicentrale Middelburg),
refers only to the principle, for that matter.
13 Dutch Supreme Court 13 March 1981, NJ 1981/635 with a commentary form C.J.H. Brunner.
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textual arguments are relevant, but other arguments also, provided they are
objectively apparent.14 The casebook judgment referred to holds that there
is a smooth transition between the two criteria of interpretation. On the one
hand, because there is sometimes a reason for a more objective interpretation
in the application of the Haviltex criterion in connection with the position of
third parties. On the other hand, because the collective bargaining agreement
criterion takes into account more circumstances than just textual ones. The
contracts discussed in this contribution must in principle be interpreted accord-
ing to the Haviltex criterion, which, as stated, already leaves room for an
objective application. In all cases the text of the contract is, of course, an
important factor. In the Pensioenfonds DSM-Chemie/Fox judgment it is also
observed that the idea underlying both the collective bargaining agreement
criterion and the Haviltex criterion is that the interpretation of a written
contract should not be made only on the basis of the linguistic meaning of
the words in which it has been put. However, as the Dutch Supreme Court
continues, in practice the linguistic meaning usually attributed to these words,
when read in the context of that document as a whole, according to generally
accepted standards (in the relevant circle of society), are often of great rel-
evance in the interpretation of that document. This observation is made against
the background that (even) according to the Haviltex criterion the text of the
contract is not sanctifying. As the Haviltex criterion is context-sensitive, it is
equally possible in its application in a concrete case that much or little weight
should be accorded to the text of the contract. This is right and proper accord-
ing to Dutch (and other)15 views, because the parties are bound to what they
envisaged. If the text expresses the parties’ intention inaccurately or incom-
pletely, then this will be taken into account. For the Dutch Supreme Court
it appears to be relevant to retain an equilibrium between factors providing
“certainty” and factors providing “flexibility” in the interpretation of contracts.
A judgment balancing between different approaches may well be unavoidable,
not only because Dutch law is familiar with both approaches (and variants),
but also because the Dutch Supreme Court here speaks at a high aggregation
14 See for example Dutch Supreme Court 20 February 2004, LJN AO1427, NJ 2005/493 with
commentary from C.E. du Perron (Pensioenfonds DSM Chemie/Fox); Dutch Supreme Court
8 October 2010, LJN BM9621, NJ 2010/456.
15 See C-W Canaris and H.C. Grigoleit, ‘Interpretation of Contracts’, in: A. Hartkamp et al.
(ed.), Towards a European Civil Code, Nijmegen: Ars Aequi Libri and Kluwer Law Inter-
national, 2011, pp. 606-607; article II:801(1) DCFR and the pertinent Notes 8 and 9 (C. Von
Bar and E. Clive (eds.), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law, DCFR,
Full Edition, München: Sellier 2009, p. 558. This approach is taken in article 56 of the
Feasibility study for a future instrument in European Contract Law dd. 3 May 2011 of the
Commission Expert Group on European Contract Law (http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/
consumer/docs/explanatory_note_results_feasibility_study_05_2011_en.pdf) and in article
58 of Annex I to the Proposal for a Regulation on a Common European Sales Law
(COM(2011) 635 final) of 11 October 2011.
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level, namely about the interpretation of all contracts in all possible sorts of
cases, which may thus be vastly different from each other.
At the same time reference may be made to a tendency in the case law
of the Dutch Supreme Court in the interpretation based on the Haviltex cri-
terion to attribute much weight to textual arguments when the dispute con-
cerns commercial contracts concluded between professional parties for which
the final negotiations have been conducted with the assistance of legal
experts.16 Thereby, then, it aims for the objective application variant of the
Haviltex criterion. In a number of cases, (too) briefly put, a (more) textual
interpretation of the relevant contracts is approved by the Dutch Supreme
Court. That textual arguments in these cases carry a lot of weight, does not
appear to be the result of a merely case-bound judgment of the weight of the
arguments put forward by the parties for or against a certain interpretation.
It turns out that there is a normative component at play as well: textual argu-
ments must weigh heavily here. This tendency forms part of a broader develop-
ment in Dutch law, whereby different cases are mentioned in which an object-
ive interpretation occupies a special place.17 At the same time the standard
application of the Haviltex criterion is maintained, which also gives the court
more scope to tackle the interpretation of the contract in the manner it deems
best in the given case,18 even if this should mean that the contract is not
interpreted literally. Thereby the court deciding questions of fact has a great
16 Dutch Supreme Court 19 January 2007, LJN AZ3178, NJ 2007/575 (Meyer Europe/PontMeyer);
Dutch Supreme Court 29 June 2007, LJN BA4909, NJ 2007/576 with commentary from M.H.
Wissink (Derksen/Homburg); Dutch Supreme Court 9 April 2010, LJN BK1610, NJ 2010/411
(UPC/Aandeelhouders Signal); Dutch Supreme Court 4 June 2010, LJN BL9546, NJ 2010/ 312
(Euroland/Gilde Buy-Out Fund).
17 Dutch Supreme Court 20 February 2004, LJN AO1427, NJ 2005/493 with commentary from
C.E. du Perron (Pensioenfonds DSM Chemie/Fox) mentions the collective bargaining agreement
criterion and considers that there may be reasons for a more objective interpretation under
Haviltex in connection with the interests of third parties. See further: Dutch Supreme Court
8 December 2000, LJN AA8901, NJ 2001/350 (Eelder Woningbouw/Van Kammen), Dutch
Supreme Court 13 June 2003, LJN AH9168, NJ 2004/251 (Teijsen/Marcus) and Dutch Supreme
Court 22 October 2010, LJN BM8933, NJ 2011/111 with commentary from F.M.J. Verstijlen
(Kamsteeg/Lisser), all about the interpretation of a notarial deed of transfer of or creation
of a right to a registered property regarding the question what has been transferred or
created; Dutch Supreme Court 23 December 2005, LJN AU2414, NJ 2010/62 (De Rooij/Van
Olphen) about the interpretation of a provision about ‘normal use’ in a standard deed such
as the NVM deed; Dutch Supreme Court 2 February 2007, LJN AZ4410, NJ 2008/104 (NBA
Management/Meerhuysen) about the interpretation of a perpetual clause in auction conditions.
Sometimes it is sufficient to indicate that there is a reason for interpreting a contract
especially on the basis of objective factors; see Dutch Supreme Court 16 May 2008, LJN
BC2793, NJ 2008/284 (Chubb/Dagenstead) concerning the description of cover in a contract
of insurance; Dutch Supreme Court 22 October 2010, LJN BN5665, NJ 2010/570 (Euronext/ASF
Brokers) concerning the AEX Listing and Trading Rules; Dutch Supreme Court 18 June 2010,
LJN BL8514, NJ 2010/354 (Erasmus Beleggingen) concerning a perpetual clause and a stipu-
lation attached to a certain capacity.
18 Dutch Supreme Court 23 April 2010, LJN BL5262, RvdW 2010/579 (Halliburton/X).
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arsenal of strategies at its disposal for the interpretation of a contract. Although
it is clear in some cases that a certain mode of interpretation must be selected,
the choice of the approach to be adopted is mostly left to the understanding
of the court (of the fact-finding instance).
In view of this case law there is a good chance that according to Dutch
law, textual arguments will play a big role, or will even be decisive, in the
interpretation of commercial contracts concluded between professional parties
for which the final negotiations have been conducted with the assistance of
legal advisers. However, it is not a foregone conclusion that the court must
in such contracts always select this mode of application of the Haviltex criterion.
Perhaps that would be asking too much, notably for a practical reason. Even
though this group of contracts may be described in the abstract on the basis
of a number of factors (such as professional parties, commercial contract,
negotiations assisted by advisers), that description is not so accurate that one
can always say that textual arguments should carry a lot of weight in the
interpretation. It does make a difference how professional the parties involved
really are: is it a small shopkeeper, working locally, or an internationally
operating company? It also makes a difference how intensive the negotiations
have been and to what extent the pertinent expert assistance influenced the
phrasing of the contract. Prescribing a certain manner of interpretation
exclusively on the basis of the factors mentioned could give rise to discussions
about the proper delineation of the relevant category, when the discussion
should focus on the proper interpretation of the contract. Conversely, an
inductive approach, like the one adopted so far by the courts , allows the court
to assess on the basis of the concrete case whether the case is one in which
a (more) textual interpretation of the contract is called for.
Does this case law sufficiently meet the need of certain parties for their
contract to be interpreted textually? For the parties that would like to have
clarity beforehand about the question whether their contract will be interpreted
textually, the message has not been unambiguously confirmed according to
the current state of the art in case law. The existence of the possibility or even
likelihood of a textual interpretation of the contract may not be enough to meet
the need for textual interpretation when that question implies that the parties
(and their advisers) may firmly depend on it. Can this certainty be provided
under Dutch law?
Although courts, on the basis of their extensive experience in deciding all
kinds of matters about different types of contracts, may have reasons to ques-
tion the correctness of a textual interpretation, there may be grounds in certain
cases to focus on that in particular. Not in every case does the contract prove
to be the reliable compass which the parties had beforehand thought they could
go by safely. Experience has shown that a textual interpretation only gives
certainty to the extent that the text closes discussions. Whether the text will
indeed prove to do so, is something that the parties can never be sure of in
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advance.19 Nor are they sure in advance whether their own party interest
will in a future dispute be served best by a textual interpretation. Still, it is
conceivable that the parties are aware of this and yet display a preference for
textual interpretation. This may be explained as follows. In a certain sense
the desire for a contract to be interpreted textually implies a lack of confidence
in the ability of a third party (court or arbitrator) – still unknown at the time
of conclusion of the contract – who will judge a possible dispute, to judge on
the basis of what the parties really envisaged when concluding the contract.20
This is not intended to disqualify any such third party, for that matter. The
lack of confidence in this third party may be seen as a derivative of a lack
of confidence in the other party. Will the latter, in case of a dispute about the
contract arising after its conclusion, not be tempted to give its own interpreta-
tion (‘twist’) to the contract, only because that is advantageous for it and will
its scope to do so not increase as contextual factors are more decisive for the
interpretation? Maybe it does not end with the fear that such perceived oppor-
tunism of the other party will succeed with the court or the arbitrator. The
lack of confidence may also be related to the contracting party itself. There
are always different people from the organisations of the parties and from
their advisers involved in (highly) complex transactions, while the degree of
involvement and responsibility of each of them will vary. In such transactions
there is a risk that a joint memory regarding the meaning of some of the
agreements made at the time is absent, or cannot be (re)constructed afterwards
with sufficient certainty.21 Thus, the preference for a textual interpretation
eventually rests on an effort to reduce uncertainty. For the parties – particularly
the other party – the margin must be reduced to plead (apparently) with the
force of arguments certain views not supported by the text of the contract.
For the court or the arbitrator the margin must be reduced to take a certain
decision not supported by the text of the contract. Parties who think along
19 Compare for instance Dutch Supreme Court 19 January 2007, LJN AZ3178, NJ 2007, 575
(Meyer Europe/PontMeyer) LJN BL9546, and Dutch Supreme Court 4 June 2010, LJN BL9546,
NJ 2010/312 (Euroland/Gilde Buy-Out Fund).
20 Compare R.H.J. van Bijnen, Aanvullend contractenrecht (doctoral thesis Tilburg), Den Haag:
Bju 2005, p. 200.
21 A similar thing applies when standard contracts or boilerplate provisions are used without
the parties devoting sufficient attention to their contents. Compare C.E. Drion, ‘Anglo-
Amerikaanse contracten, een zegen of een ramp?’, NJB 2011/24, p. 1523. The problem may
be obviated partly by working with a customary or standard meaning of such provisions.
However, it is not the starting point of Dutch law that certain formulations have a standard
or customary meaning. The familiar example refers to terms such as ‘vouch for’ or ‘guaran-
tee’; see Dutch Supreme Court 22 December 1995, LJN ZC1930, NJ 1996/300 (Hoog Catha-
rijne); Dutch Supreme Court 4 February 2000, LJN AA4728, NJ 2000/562 with commentary
from JBMV (Mol/Meijer Beheer II). When such a meaning is actually established, the Haviltex
criterion subsequently takes it into account. See Dutch Supreme Court 4 May 2007, LJN
BA1564, NJ 2007/187.
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these lines, choose to rely on the text of their agreements, knowing that this
entails risks as well.
In view of the principle of party autonomy the court has reason to respect
that choice. As argued, however, it is difficult to formulate a general sub-rule
by way of a distinction of the general Haviltex criterion. Indeed, under Dutch
law the circumstances under which the arguments in favour of a textual
interpretation apply are circumstances that will not always be valid. Therefore
it is for the court to decide whether the case is one in which the conditions
for a textual interpretation are present. An expedient may be for the parties
in their contract to make a distinct choice for a textual interpretation. This is
not necessary for the court to arrive at a decision that in the circumstances
of the case the interpretation should accord a lot of weight to textual argu-
ments; this decision is made even now, without such a clause. It is possible
for the court to derive from a contractual choice for textual interpretation that
the parties insist on this form of interpretation, provided that choice was made
deliberately. If it then concerns a case that qualifies for this, the court can rest
assured that this manner of interpretation, with all the pros and cons it entails,
is the desirable form of interpretation for the parties concerned. That provides
the basis for taking things a step further and stating that under these circum-
stances the parties’ choice for textual interpretation must be respected. Once
that is assumed, the parties can be certain beforehand that their contract will
be interpreted textually.
3 CERTAINTY OF AND ADDITION TO THE CONTRACT
This will not suffice, because the legal consequences of contracts are not
determined only by (interpretation of) the agreements made, but also by the
other sources of law referred to in article 6:248 DCC (Dutch Civil Code): law,
usage and reasonableness and fairness. The effect of reasonableness and
fairness warrants particular attention in this context,22 for its impact on the
contract is the most difficult to gauge beforehand. It is known that interpreta-
tion and addition are legally related instruments. According to the (prevailing)
view, which is also expressed in the case law of the Dutch Supreme Court,23
these are two separate tenets. Indeed, only after it has been established by
means of interpretation what rights and duties arise directly from the con-
22 Compare C.E. Drion, ‘Uitleg van uitleg’, NJB 2010, p. 279 and ‘De status van de redelijkheid
en billijkheid, NJB 2007, p. 433, which speaks of the ‘knotty tenet’ of interpretation and
the ‘panacea’ of reasonableness and fairness.
23 See for example Dutch Supreme Court 19 October 2007, LJN BA7024, NJ 2007/565, JOR
2008/23 with commentary from Tjittes (Vodafone/ETC), legal grounds 3.4-3.5 (cf. about this
judgment also the discussion between Grosheide and Drion in Contracteren 2008, pp. 30-32);
Dutch Supreme Court 19 November 2010, LJN BN7886, NJ 2010/623 (Skare/Flexmen); Parl.
Gesch. Boek 6, pp. 67 and 69; Asser/Hartkamp&Sieburgh 6-III* 2010, nr. 366.
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tractual agreements, can it be ascertained which obligations and other legal
consequences are additionally attached to these agreements by the law, usage
and reasonableness and fairness. It is at once acknowledged that in practice
the interpretation of the contract as a whole and the role of the additional effect
of reasonableness and fairness are occasionally difficult to separate, seeing
that reasonableness and fairness also play a role in the interpretation. As a
result, one cannot always indicate clearly where ‘interpretation’ stops and
‘addition’ begins. For that matter, the prevailing doctrine in the Netherlands
is in line with that of other (European) systems, which also make the distinc-
tion between interpretation and addition, along with their own nuances.24
Whereas the blurred boundary line between interpretation and additional
effect of reasonableness and fairness is not problematic in general, it may give
rise to problems in contracts referred to here whereby the parties’ wish is that
the text should be central in their interpretation. That is precisely where the
follow-up question may crop up: is it not likely that a contract interpreted
so strictly should have shortfalls rather than a contract that allows for a broad
and reasonable interpretation based on the circumstances of the case? And
if so, does this not imply that this leaves more room for the additional effect
of the principle of reasonableness and fairness? Or, conversely, should the
strict approach governing the interpretation of such a contract be carried
through also to the additional effect of reasonableness and fairness? The latter
approach is preferable when it may be assumed that the parties have deliber-
ately decided on a strict interpretation in a case qualifying therefor. This
approach seems feasible.
The impact of the additional effect of reasonableness and fairness may
fluctuate, depending on the nature of the contract. This may mean that there
is little room left for the additional effect of reasonableness and fairness,
because it concerns a contract that must be interpreted strictly. In case law
this is expressed, for example, in the idea that a strict application of the condi-
tions of an independent bank guarantee cannot be circumvented by attaining
a result deviating from that strict application on the basis of the additional
effect of reasonableness and fairness.25 Following on this, it may also be
argued that a strict application of the additional effect of reasonableness and
fairness ties in with the nature of the contract in the sense that the result of
the strict interpretation of the contract cannot be prejudiced by means of the
24 See M.W. Hesselink, De redelijkheid en billijkheid in het Europees privaatrecht (doctoral thesis
Utrecht) 1999, p. 138; N. Kornet, Contract Interpretation and Gap Filling: Comparative and
Theoretical Perspectives (doctoral thesis Maastricht), 2006, p. 4, 266.
25 Dutch Supreme Court 26 March 2004, NJ 2004/309 (Anthea Yachting Company/ABN-AMRO).
This does not exclude, by the way, that the bank may be obliged to point out to a party
that the party’s reliance on the guarantee does not satisfy the requirements. See Dutch
Supreme Court 9 June 1995, LJN ZC1749, NJ 1995/639 (Gesnoteg/Mees Pierson) with com-
mentary from PvS, in which the Dutch Supreme Court recognises the principle of strict
conformity in accordance with the conclusion of advocate general Strikwerda.
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addition.26 This is not to say that no scope would be left for the additional
effect of reasonableness and fairness. Here too, though, restraint will need to
be exercised. The wish to do so could also be expressed by the parties in their
contract, for instance by indicating that they think that the contract should
only be added to on the ground of reasonableness and fairness when this is
necessary to make the contract work in accordance with the parties’ inten-
tions.27 In this context reference can be made to the provision of article II-9:101
paragraph 4 DCFR. It says that no ‘implied term’ can be assumed by the court
‘if the parties have deliberately left a matter unprovided for, accepting the
consequences of so doing’. The comment clarifies that this provision is intended
for the event ‘where the parties have foreseen a contingency and have deliber-
ately left it unprovided for, accepting the risks and consequences of so doing.’
The provision is not intended for the event ‘where the parties foresee a
situation but either think it will not materialise or “forget” to regulate it
without intending to accept the risks.’28 A similar provision has been included
in article 66 par. 3 of the Feasibility Study, though formulated slightly different-
ly: ‘if the parties have deliberately left a matter unprovided for, accepting that
one or other party would bear the risk.’ Article 68 par. 3 of the proposal for
a Common European Sales Law also uses this formulation.29 This formulation
expresses even better that there is a distribution of risks. One could say that
with regard to these deliberately ‘unregulated’ situations there is no ‘gap’ in
the agreements, as it has been agreed that the party confronted with this
situation must bear the consequences thereof itself.30 It concerns situations
of which the parties know that they could occur and which they knowingly
leave ‘unregulated’ in the sense referred to just now.
4 CERTAINTY AND UNFORESEEN CIRCUMSTANCES
According to art. 6:258 DCC a contract may be modified or set aside ‘on the
basis of unforeseen circumstances of such a nature that the other party, accord-
ing to standards of reasonableness and fairness, may not expect the contract
to be maintained in unmodified form’. The provision concerns the occurrence
26 See also a case such as Dutch Supreme Court 16 May 2008, LJN BC2793, NJ 2008/284 (Chubb/
Dagenstead). It is difficult to conceive that the additional effect of reasonableness and fairness
could lead to yet another result than the objective interpretation of the description of cover.
27 Compare Tjittes, Uitleg van schriftelijke contracten, Nijmegen: Ars Aequi Libri 2009, p. 88,
about the correction by means of addition of a meaningless interpretation result.
28 C. Von Bar and E. Clive (eds.), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private
Law, DCFR, Full Edition, München: Sellier 2009, p. 580.
29 On the understanding that one speaks of ‘a matter unregulated’ instead of ‘a matter
unprovided for’.
30 That is why in Dutch Supreme Court 19-11-2010, LJN BN7886, NJ 2010, 623 (Skare/Flexmen)
it could be judged that the contractual provision about the allocation of taxes was not of
such a far-reaching tenor as appeared to be the case at first sight.
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of circumstances after the conclusion of a contract which are unforeseen, i.e.
which have not been taken into account in the contract because the parties
have not made any (tacit) arrangement about them. In addition, it must be
a change of circumstances that is not for the risk of the party which suffers
a loss as a result. According to settled case law the provision should be applied
restrictively, since reasonableness and fairness require allegiance to the given
word first and foremost.31
In the application of a provision such as article 6:258 DCC uncertainties
are bound to present themselves, for the very reason that it concerns such
special cases.32 This may be clarified by some examples. Fluctuations in the
market and hence of prices are a general fact. In principle, then, these cannot
lead to the application of article 6:258 DCC. The same goes for price changes
caused by amendments to legislation and regulations. In extreme cases the
application of article 6:258 DCC is not excluded. A clear criterion is lacking,
however. Sometimes a change in value of 50% or more is mentioned.33 This
is not meant to indicate that at such a percentage the contract should be
modified; at most it gives an indication that article 6:258 DCC could apply
(leaving aside whether, upon an affirmative answer, a price correction by the
same percentage should take place). A very sharp fall in prices (by 170%) of
waste paper has been deemed sufficient in case law, though.34 One should
consider that a contract of a (partly) speculative nature is incompatible with
modification for that very reason, as it has allowed for the risk of price
changes. In that sense the court ruled on a disappointing development in the
price of building land when an appeal was made to a building company to
fulfil its repurchase obligation after having transferred land to the municipality
within the framework of the development of a zoning plan.35
The parties may have an interest in agreeing on a contractual arrangement
about unforeseen circumstances. In this respect it should be noted that article
6:258 DCC is mandatory and cannot be contractually excluded.36 The parties
can try to put the flesh on the bones of this provision. They can make arrange-
ments from which it follows that allowance has been made for certain changes
in the contract. It may be agreed that certain changes are at the risk of one
of the parties. Such a clause may also indicate how such changes should be
31 Dutch Supreme Court 20 February 1998, LJN ZC2587, NJ 1998/493 (Briljant Schreuders/ABP);
Asser/Hartkamp & Sieburgh 6-III* 2010, nr. 444.
32 For an extensive survey of possible applications see P. Abas, Rebus sic stantibus, Deventer:
Kluwer 1989, pp. 215-216. See also R. Momberg Uribe, The Effect of a Change of Circumstances
on the Binding Force of Contracts-Comparative Perspectives (doctoral thesis Utrecht), Antwerp:
Intersentia 2011.
33 In the comment on art. 6.2.2 Unidroit Principles for International Commercial Contracts.
See also Abas, WPNR 6307.
34 District Court of Roermond (summary proceedings) 1 July 1993, KG 1993, 317.
35 Court of Appeal of ’s-Hertogenbosch 17 November 1983, BR 1984, p. 152.
36 Article 6:250 DCC.
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dealt with. Thus, a price clause may indicate that the price is indexed according
to a certain formula. Clauses like this clarify that the said change of circum-
stances cannot be considered to be ‘unforeseen’ in the sense of art. 6:258 DCC.
However: no absolute certainty can be obtained thereby. The extent of the
clause will need to be determined through interpretation (such as: does a price
indexation also regard excessive price increases or only those that are normally
foreseeable?). Here a contractual arrangement about the interpretation, such
as discussed in section 2, may be useful.
5 CONCLUSION
All things considered, what role is left for reasonableness and fairness?
Although that role is not played out, practically speaking it has been driven
away towards the edges of the playing field. Rendered briefly, the following
applies. In the approach described above, too, the starting point is maintained
as described in the judgment Pensioenfonds DSM-Chemie/Fox, that for the
interpretation of a written contract decisive importance will always be
attributed to all circumstances of the concrete case, assessed according to
standards of reasonableness and fairness. In the administration of justice this
principle is made operational in an interpretation criterion which under certain
circumstances may be objective (Haviltex criterion) or is objective by definition
(the CAO or collective bargaining agreement criterion). It has been argued that
an application of the Haviltex criterion may result in an objective interpretation
whereby textual factors are dominant, that the parties may have good reasons
for deciding on these in their contract and that the court can and must respect
that choice in the cases referred to. Further, it has been argued that the addi-
tional effect of reasonableness and fairness should reflect this strict manner
of interpretation of the contract. This means that the additional effect must
not detract from the result of the interpretation when it concerns subjects which
the parties have deliberately not provided for. The above implies that the
parties can to a great extent exert influence on what reasonableness and
fairness entail in the interpretation of and addition to their contract.37 That
also applies to parties’ agreements about the application of article 6:258 DCC.
Focusing attention on the text when determining the contents of the contract
is, in these cases, not at odds with what reasonableness and fairness imply
37 This is not the same as the question whether the parties could contractually declare the
additional effect of reasonableness and fairness to be inapplicable. See for that view R.H.J.
van Bijnen, Aanvullend contractenrecht (doctoral thesis Tilburg), Den Haag: Bju 2005, p. 284;
C.E. Drion, NJB 2007, p. 433; H.N. Schelhaas, NTBR 2008, p. 153. Against that H.C.F.
Schoordijk, ‘Het betwiste onderscheid tussen uitleg en derogeren te goeder trouw breekt
op’, NJB 2007, p. 1233; Asser/Hartkamp&Sieburgh 6-III* 2010, nr. 380; P.S. Bakker, ‘Uitleg
van commerciële contracten (I), WPNR 6890 (2011), pp. 481-482 and (II, end)’, WPNR (2011)
6891, pp. 505-508.
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in the relationship between these parties. However, in extreme cases, reason-
ableness and fairness will intervene. That follows from the presence of correct-
ive mechanisms, such as articles 3:13, 6:248 par. 2 and 6:258 DCC. Thus, certain
undesirable forms of party behaviour can be corrected (such as acting in bad
faith and conduct resulting in forfeiture of rights), and in exceptional cases
of circumstances really not foreseen by the parties the contract may be
modified.

5 How flexible must a marriage settlement be?
Tea Mellema-Kranenburg
1 THE MODERNIZATION OF THE MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT
Although since the 1970s community property law has been modified several
times on more or less important or subordinate points, our community
property law remains an important focus of interest. I should like to draw
attention to the question already posed by Schoordijk in 1996 whether a
marriage settlement also applies in the event of changed circumstances.1 When
a marriage settlement is made, attention is focused on entering into a marriage
on the one hand, and on the other hand on dissolution of the marriage, es-
pecially in the event of divorce. In the intervening period everything is relative-
ly peaceful and there appears to be little need for a legal arrangement.
When discussing a marriage settlement we may distinguish between
different phases.
2 ENTERING INTO THE MARRIAGE
Quite recently it was discussed in de ‘Tweede Kamer’ (the Lower House)
whether it was desirable to make it mandatory for intending spouses to make
a marriage settlement or to go to a notary to discuss whether a marriage
settlement with some substance should be entered into. For the time being
it has not materialized, but I believe that it is not desirable either.
In my opinion the community of property is the ideal system for commun-
ity property for the majority of young couples. It is the pinnacle of solidarity:
sharing the sweet and the bitter, not only the gains but also the burdens.
Naturally this may be unpleasant in certain circumstances, for instance
if one of the spouses is an entrepreneur without personnel and has bitten off
Tea Mellema-Kranenburg is professor of Family Property Law, Leiden University
(t.j.mellema@law.leidenuniv.nl).
1 H.C.F. Schoordijk, ‘De betekenis van de rechtswetenschap voor het notariaat’, WPNR 1996
(6207), pp. 11-17 even suggests the hypothesis that science has neglected this question.
Schoordijk wrote his article, by the way, mainly on the basis of the subordinated position
of women. ‘A smart girl prepares for her future’. After fifteen years that is perhaps an
obsolete slogan, in view of both the absolute and the relative power of women in the lecture
halls. The principle of desirability of flexible marriage settlements is not changed by that.
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more than he can chew, i.e. taken too great a risk, as a result of which not
only he but also his spouse runs into bankruptcy problems. If only they had
known! And that exactly seems to be what probably motivated the Kamer:
not the necessity of making a marriage settlement but familiarity with the legal
aspects of the matter. In my opinion that need not be done by making a
marriage settlement or even by going to a notary, but by simply having the
Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages and Registered Partnerships provide
information about the proprietary consequences of the marriage or the
registered partnership when notice is given of the marriage or the registered
partnership: even if it is only a leaflet.
3 MAKING A MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT
When it later appears that a marriage settlement is desirable after all, the
question is in what way this should be realized. The law on family property
and therefore also the contents of a marriage settlement change as circum-
stances in society change.
That also applies to the perception of the continuing performance contract
that a marriage settlement is.2
In principle a marriage settlement is made for a whole life or at any rate
for a whole marriage. But what if the internal or external circumstances of
the marriage change?
In my opinion there are two ways to deal with that: either the marriage
settlement is so flexible that it already provides for the change in those circum-
stances, or an arrangement is included in the marriage settlement that the
marriage settlement will be revised if the circumstances change.
Both cases will be discussed in more detail.
4 THE PREAMBLE
Several times3 I have advocated the inclusion of a preamble in the marriage
settlement. While the marriage settlement must naturally be clear, it may still
be advisable to begin the marriage settlement with the considerations of the
parties, stating why precisely they chose this settlement and how this settle-
ment is to be interpreted.
What exactly is a preamble? My dictionary gives as the meaning for the
Dutch word for preamble: ‘a motive, an introductory paragraph of a law, a
judgment, giving the considerations on which they are based’. A Latin diction-
2 See T.J. Mellema-Kranenburg, ‘De houdbaarheidsdatum van huwelijksvoorwaarden’,
Tijdschrift Relatierecht en Praktijk 2010, p. 175.
3 See also Mellema-Kranenburg loc. cit.
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ary gives as the meaning for the same word: ‘reflect on, take into consideration,
be aware of’. In my view all these cases may be grouped under the concept
of an explanation of another item. The preamble is not a component of the
marriage settlement, but rephrases what the parties on both sides4 may expect
of the contents of the marriage settlement.
Naturally good information by the notary is essential on that occasion.
Sending the clients a questionnaire beforehand to prepare for the discussion
of the marriage settlement is indispensable in that context. This is not a plea
for always including a preamble in every marriage settlement. The main rule
remains that the wording of the marriage settlement should be clear and not
capable of more than one interpretation. The exceptional thing about the
marriage settlement contract is, however, that its significance often only
becomes an issue many years later. As long as the marriage proceeds smoothly,
the marriage settlement is kept in the bottom drawer, but only when the first
cracks appear in the marriage, does the significance of the marriage settlement
become relevant and may it be that the texts drawn up twenty years ago are
suddenly not as clear anymore as they appeared to be at that time. In case
law we see that an important role is played by the fact that the parties are
aware of the consequences of a construction chosen when the marriage is
entered into, see for instance the judgment of the Dutch Supreme Court of
15 February 2008, NJ 2008, 110.
This concerned the question whether the right of compensation due to the
husband on the strength of moneys withdrawn from the community for the
construction of the marital home – built on a plot acquired privately by the
wife by virtue of a testamentary disposition – had to be set at a nominal
amount.
The Dutch Supreme Court held:
‘The right to compensation in principle refers to the same amount as the one
withdrawn from the community in the past. On the grounds of reasonableness
and fairness that govern the relationship between the co-owners an exception may
be made for this in such a way that (part of) the increase in value realized by this
amount must also be compensated to the community. According to standards of
reasonableness and fairness it is unacceptable that the wife merely returns to the
husband the amount received in the past without any increase in the value of the
dwelling’.
Subsequently the Dutch Supreme Court lists the relevant circumstances, with
several considerations attributing an important role to the circumstance that
the parties had or had not intended a certain legal consequence or had been
aware of it.
4 Dutch Supreme Court 13 March 1981, NJ 1981, 635, with commentary from CJHB (Haviltex).
62 5 – How flexible must a marriage settlement be?
‘When a nominal obligation of compensation of the wife is taken as a starting-point,
the husband cannot benefit from this contribution. In that way the husband would
actually have relinquished a future increase in value of the first joint home to enable
the wife to build the relevant dwelling as private property, so that only she benefits
from the dwelling. It has neither appeared nor been stated that the parties had been
aware of this consequence.
The acquisition of the land and the dwelling by the woman in private follows
from the last will of her father and is not based on a deliberate choice of the parties;
they were married in the statutory community of property, from which it follows
that they share equally in the increase/decrease in value of the goods that are part
of the community.’ [italics TJMK]
These considerations show that the Dutch Supreme Court attaches importance
to the parties’ awareness of the legal consequences of their community property
system for the applicability of statutory (in this case community of property
with nominal rights of compensation) or contractual rules of community
property law. Whether this awareness is present may be inferred from a
properly formulated preamble in which, apart from certain rules from the
marriage settlement, especially the legal consequences attaching to them are
emphasized.
Furthermore it may be true that the spouses have meanwhile got into
different circumstances, for instance have gone to to live in another country,
in which case the marriage settlement may have to be assessed by a foreign
court. Then, too, the text in the preamble can play an important role in the
interpretation of the marriage settlement. This will especially be the case in
countries that are accustomed to provisions resembling the preamble, such
as in Anglo-Saxon countries. But the preamble may play a significant role also
in our country, where reasonableness and fairness are gradually beginning
to play a role in existing marriage settlements.
The preamble may make the meaning of the marriage settlement clearer
to the foreign court than the wording alone, leaving aside the translation link
that must be made with the marriage settlement.
5 THE REVISION CLAUSE
It is also possible, however, to evaluate the marriage settlement after a few
years by including a revision clause5 in the marriage settlement. The preamble
could include, for instance, that the parties intend to reconsider the marriage
settlement five years after the start of the marriage and to adjust it to the
circumstances in which the parties are then. The circumstances could for
instance have changed in the sense that after the birth of children the wife
5 See Mellema-Kranenburg, loc. cit. p. 176; See also L.H.M. Zonnenberg, Het verrekenbeding
(thesis Open University of the Netherlands), Deventer: Kluwer 2009, p. 327.
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(or the husband) has started to work considerably less, as a result of which
he or she generates less income. That could, for instance, lead to making a
change in the way that incomes are settled. But even less foreseeable circum-
stances, such as the loss of a job or occurrence of occupational disability, could
make a reconsideration desirable. It is also conceivable that tangible circum-
stances are listed that must lead to reconsideration of the marriage settlement.
The question is, however, how much such an intention is worth. Let us assume
that the wife wants to reconsider, but the husband does not. In that case the
intention is not enforceable. In principle the intention only has a moral value,
a natural obligation that people impose on each other, but is not enforceable.
The intention could be strengthened by formulating it in the form of a
condition in the marriage settlement (article 3:38 Dutch Civil Code, hereinafter
DCC). Then the condition will have to be given substance, though, for instance
that the contents of the marriage settlement must be reconsidered if one of
the parties no longer receives income from employment. If subsequently one
of the parties defaults, the parties now agree for that future event to reach
a solution by means of a mediator. Such a condition could be formulated in
the article about the costs of the household or the settlement of income.
As such the reconsideration is given much more weight, but if things
should get this far between the spouses, the days of the marriage also appear
to be numbered.
On the other hand: precisely with a view to an impending divorce it may be
very important for (one of) the parties to put everything into perspective.
6 REVISION ON THE STRENGTH OF THE LAW
Should it be so that the intention uttered in the preamble is not enforceable
on the strength of the marriage settlement or that no preamble or revision
clause has been included in the marriage settlement at all, one may wonder
whether an alteration of the marriage settlement is not possible on the strength
of the law.
7 THE SUPPLEMENTARY AND LIMITING EFFECTS OF REASONABLENESS AND
FAIRNESS
In the first place consideration may be given to the supplementary effect of
reasonableness and fairness (article 6:248(1) DCC). Let us assume that the parties
have concluded a marriage settlement in which the husband takes the costs
of the household for his account. The husband becomes occupationally dis-
abled. I believe that in that case the interests of each of the parties and the
circumstances of the special case (occupational disability) may entail that the
marriage settlement is supplemented with the obligation for the wife to con-
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tribute to the costs of the household as well.6 Precisely in the continuing
performance contract of a marriage settlement the existence of reasonableness
and fairness will play a role. In my opinion that role of reasonableness and
fairness will decrease as more has been ‘spelled out’ in the marriage settlement
(or even the preamble). For that matter I believe that with the supplementary
effect of reasonableness and fairness the contractual provisions themselves
will remain intact; they will therefore not be altered, as in article 6:258 DCC,
to be discussed below.
Moreover, thought may be given to the limiting effect of reasonableness
and fairness (article 6:248(2) DCC). In this connection it must first be determined
what the contents of the marriage settlement are. If the contents are clear and
no problems of interpretation occur, it may still be true that observance of
the contents agreed may prove very bitter. An example of the applicability
of the limiting effect of reasonableness and fairness is the judgment of the
Dutch Supreme Court on 18 June 2004, NJ 2004, 399. The case was as follows:
the husband and wife made a marriage settlement during the marriage
exclusively to protect the joint property from possible future creditors of the
husband. They continued to behave, however, as if they were married in
community of property.
When it then came to a divorce, the Court of Appeal held that the marriage
settlement was clear and not susceptible of different interpretations. But then
the Dutch Supreme Court:
‘4.3 Insofar as the ground for appeal resists the consideration of the Court of Appeal
that even the demands of reasonableness and fairness cannot detract from the
marriage settlement agreed between the parties, it succeeds, because with this
judgment the Court of Appeal has failed to recognize that a rule in force between
the parties by virtue of a marriage settlement does not apply insofar as this is
unacceptable in the given circumstances according to standards of reasonableness
and fairness (cp. inter alia Dutch Supreme Court 25 November 1988, NJ 1989, 529
and Dutch Supreme Court 29 September 1995, NJ 1996, 88). In that connection it
should be noted that when answering the question whether in the settlement of
accounts between former spouses after dissolution of the marriage the marriage
settlement must be deviated from on the strength of reasonableness and fairness,
importance may definitely be attached to mutually corresponding behaviour during
the marriage, even if that behaviour deviated from the marriage settlement.’
Naturally a marriage settlement constitutes a very special type of contract with
its own statutory provisions of community property law. Nevertheless I should
6 For that matter it would also be possible here to rely on the limiting effect of reasonableness
and fairness because it is contrary to reasonableness and fairness to discover that reliance
is placed on the provision that the husband will take the costs of the households exclusively
for his account.
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not want to rule out the limiting effect of reasonableness and fairness under
certain circumstances.7
Even if reliance on reasonableness and fairness should succeed, that will
still not lead to an alteration of the marriage settlement, at most to not applying
a provision included in the marriage contract.
8 UNFORESEEN CIRCUMSTANCES (ARTICLE 6:258 DCC)
It is possible, however, to go one step further and assert that even if there is
no preamble and revision clause included in a marriage settlement at all, the
other spouse may ask the court for a revision of the agreement because of a
change of circumstances (article 6:258 DCC). Reasonableness and fairness may
then entail that a change of circumstances leads to an alteration of the marriage
settlement.8
In this connection a role is played by the question to what extent the
‘imprévision’ rule of article 6:258 DCC may be applied to the special agreement
of a marriage settlement.
Arguments pleading against change were already listed by Schoordijk in
1996:9
a. the public-law elements that the marriage settlement comprises are not
susceptible of change;
b. legal certainty is endangered by an alteration of the marriage settlement;
c. how heavily must changed circumstances weigh to justify an alteration
of the marriage settlement?
With regard to the public-law elements (a) I fully agree with Schoordijk: first
of all agreements with a public element are also susceptible of alteration,
secondly it is highly debatable how public a marriage settlement is. In my
view marriage itself contains elements of public law but the property law
system is purely a matter of private law.
With regard to legal certainty (b): naturally there is always a certain tension
between legal certainty and reasonableness and fairness but the legislator has
7 See also J. van Duijvendijk-Brand, Afrekenen bij (echt)scheiding (thesis Leiden), Deventer:
Kluwer 1990, pp. 120-121.
8 See Van Duijvendijk-Brand 1990, pp. 121-122; Asser/Hartkamp & Sieburgh 2010 (6-III*),
nr. 441; W.L. Valk, ‘De door de rechter te betrachten terughoudendheid in geval van
onvoorziene omstandigheden’, NTBR 1994, pp. 258-260; M. Antolskaia, B. Breederveld,
L. Hulst, W. Kolkman, F. Salomons & L. Verstappen, Koude Uitsluiting (Report by researchers
of the VU and the RUG), Den Haag: Boom Juridische uitgevers 2011, pp. 37-44; see also
Dutch Supreme Court 18 June 2004, NJ 2004, 399; Dutch Supreme Court 10 June 2010, RvdW
2010, 811; LJN BM4649; Dutch Supreme Court 29 September 1995, NJ 1996, 88 (milk quota
judgment).
9 See Schoordijk 1996, p. 15.
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an open mind if adherence to existing contracts leads to unacceptable conse-
quences, as appears inter alia from article 6:258 DCC.
From this it follows logically that the changed circumstances must be
reasonably drastic (c) and – especially – not anticipated. A next question is:
should one rather exercise restraint with the application of the rule from the
general law of obligations or is a more generous application appropriate here
in view of the nature and the contents of the marriage settlement? For the time
being case law practises restraint. Before the implementation of the new Civil
Code the future appeared to hold the use of reasonableness and fairness,
witness the Kriek/Smit judgment.10 In summary this concerned a dwelling
that had been registered in the husband’s name with the wife’s money. The
parties had been married with the exclusion of any form of community
property. After the divorce the house was sold with a substantial profit. In
principle the wife was only entitled to repayment of the same amount as she
had made available to the husband for the financing of the dwelling. The
surplus value would then have benefited the husband entirely. The Dutch
Supreme Court, however, considered a correction appropriate owing to the
unforeseen circumstances at the time of the purchase and stated:
‘In that connection it will depend on the question whether the relevant unforeseen
circumstances are of such a nature that the spouse in whose name the house is
registered may not expect in accordance with standards of reasonableness and
fairness that it will be enough for him to merely return the amount made available
in the past without any settlement of the increase in value of the dwelling.’
However, after this there have not been many feats to report in the field of
unforeseen circumstances in community property law. In case law a few
attempts were made on the subject, such as for instance in the ’Hilversum
catering’ judgment,11 but there the Dutch Supreme Court stayed with the
exclusion of every community agreed between the parties. Much is written
about this subject, however, especially in relation to the concept of ‘koude
uitsluiting’(i.e. exclusion under a matrimonial contract precluding any claim
by one spouse on assets accruing to the other spouse during the marriage,
hereinafter ‘cold exclusion’).
A difficult point when relying on unforeseen circumstances is to determine
when it is a matter of circumstances that were unforeseen when the agreement,
i.e. the marriage settlement, was entered into. In that connection the issue is
what supposition the parties took as a basis: did they or did they not want
to provide for the possibility of the occurrence of the unforeseen circumstances
10 Dutch Supreme Court 12 June 1987, NJ 1988, 150, with commentary from E.A.A.L. (Kriek/
Smit).
11 Dutch Supreme Court 25 November 1988, NJ 1989, 529.
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or, at any rate, did they tacitly take that possibility into account.12 As the
relevant circumstances are less remote from the imaginative powers or actual
conceptions of the parties, the belief will sooner be created that they were taken
into account (article 3:35 DCC).13 When we apply this to a marriage settlement,
it must therefore be true that the circumstances that cause inequities did not
already exist when the marriage settlement was concluded and that in the
agreement the parties did not reckon with the occurrence of the circumstances
either.
The expectations that the spouses had when entering into the marriage
settlement therefore play an important role.14
In view of my earlier suggestions concerning the preamble, the answer
to that question should be easy in the presence of a preamble.
In the Koude Uitsluiting (Cold Exclusion) report15 it is concluded that
in legal practice material problems occur in the event of ‘cold exclusion’ and
a number of solutions are presented.
There the specific fairness correction is also mentioned in the event that
owing to changed circumstances the provisions of the marriage settlement
had become unacceptably unfavourable for the former spouse who has or has
not undertaken (part of) the care for the children. There is also mention of
a more general fairness correction, consisting of the possibility of setting aside
or adjusting a marriage settlement comprising a ‘cold exclusion’, if it is un-
reasonable in view of all the circumstances of the case.
I count myself among the persons who believe that for such a fairness
correction a change of law is not necessary, but that application of article 6:258
DCC leads to the desired result. That does not only apply to the marriage
settlements that entail ‘cold exclusion’ but also to marriage settlements whose
shelf life has expired for other reasons.16
In the above I asked the question whether with regard to marriage settle-
ments the general imprévision rule of article 6:258 DCC should perhaps be
applied with restraint. I think the opposite is the case. A marriage settlement
constitutes a continuing performance agreement, concluded for a long period
whose course is hard to survey. Moreover, this concerns parties who have
an affectionate relationship with each other. Naturally the rule ‘contract is
12 See TM, Parl. Gesch. Boek 6, p. 98 and p. 973; Valk 2009 (T&C BW), art. 6:258 DCC, note 2.
13 See Asser/Hartkamp & Sieburgh 2009 6 III*, no. 441.
14 See the Koude Uitsluiting report, p. 37.
15 A report about the bottlenecks in Cold Exclusion (and unmarried cohabitation) issued by
order of the Ministry of Justice by lawyers of the University of Groningen and the Free
University.
16 See also Van Duijvendijk-Brand 1990, pp. 121-122; M.J.A. van Mourik, ‘Huwelijkse voorwaar-
den en de eisen van redelijkheid en billijkheid’, WPNR 1987 (5811), pp. 1-5; H.C.F. Schoor-
dijk, ‘Amerikaanse huwelijkse voorwaarden en koude uitsluiting’, WPNR 1989 (5914), pp.
251-255. See furthermore the Koude Uitsluiting report, p. 308 and the literature mentioned
in it in note 2.
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contract’ also applies there. Legal certainty demands it. Still, if there is a case
of unforeseen circumstances anywhere, it is here.17 Even if there is superb
information, with questionnaires, which I applaud, as said, and even if, as
suggested in the report on Cold Exclusion, every party has its own adviser,
nevertheless life and therefore also a marriage may turn out differently than
had been foreseen or was foreseeable. Hence my request to legal practitioners
but especially to the judiciary: please apply article 6:258 DCC generously here!
9 ALTERATION OF THE MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT ON THE GROUND OF A
NATURAL OBLIGATION
If the marriage settlement does not imply an enforceable alteration of the
marriage settlement and there is no legal ground for alteration either, there
may be a natural obligation to alter the marriage settlement on the ground
of a compelling moral duty (article 6:3(2)(b) DCC). Whether it is a question
of a natural obligation depends on social views and must be assessed in
accordance with objective criteria. Subjective standards play no role in this.18
In that connection the court must decide what the substance is of the views
generally held in society. Where duties of care are relevant, a role will be
reserved in particular for the existence of a natural obligation. See on the
subject the judgment of the Dutch Supreme Court of 9 November 1990, NJ
1992, 212 (Nahar/Cornes) and Dutch Supreme Court 15 September 1995, NJ 1996,
616.
On the ground of these duties of care one spouse may for instance have
the duty to ensure that the other spouse may continue to live in the matri-
monial home even if the house is registered in the name of the other spouse
and the spouses are married with the exclusion of any form of community
property.19
The problem at work here is that the natural obligation is not enforceable
(article 6:3(1) DCC). This means that co-operation of both spouses is required
to ‘convert’ the natural obligation into an obligation that is legally enforceable.
If such co-operation is not possible, it may be possible, after having estab-
lished that it is a question of a natural obligation, to ask the court for an
alteration of the marriage settlement. That, in turn, naturally raises the problem
that the circumstances must be unforeseen, which is not always the case with
the existence of a natural obligation. If we cannot rely on article 6:258 DCC
in this case, we might consider article 6:248 DCC.
If it is a question of a natural obligation between the parties, reasonableness
and fairness entail, taking account of the interests of both parties and the
17 Schoordijk, loc. cit. speaks in this connection about the vicissitudes of life.
18 See also the Koude Uitsluiting report p. 54.
19 See Dutch Supreme Court 17 October 1997, NJ 1998, 692.
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circumstances of the specific case, that the marriage settlement is supplemented
or limited to what is reasonable and fair between the parties.
10 CONCLUSION
Society is changing constantly. Persons change. The community property
system often needs maintenance. This may be done by the spouses revising
their marriage settlement or even their system of property. Often they will
need a little help for that purpose. This may be done by including a provision
in the marriage settlement that in the event of a change of circumstances they
will revise their marriage settlement.
If such a provision has not been included and/or spouses are not prepared
to co-operate in a revision of the marriage settlement, it is possible to rely on
reasonableness and fairness in certain circumstances. In that connection it is
possible to consider reliance on the supplementary or limiting effect of article
6:248 DCC, as a result of which the marriage settlement is supplemented or
some specific provision from the marriage settlement may not be relied on.
Even more drastic is reliance on article 6:258 DCC, on the strength of which
the court may alter the marriage settlement (possibly strengthened by the
existence of a natural obligation). So far, however, the courts have been very
reluctant in the application of article 6:258 DCC. I hope I have shown that under
certain circumstances they may definitely apply article 6:258 DCC.

6 Foreseeable and unforeseeable defects after
the transfer of immovable property
Clementine Breedveld-de Voogd
The taps started dripping, the pipes started leaking, the roof tiles started
breaking, and green mould started appearing on the walls.1
1 THE CONFORMITY REQUIREMENT AND THE MANIFESTATION OF HIDDEN
DEFECTS
Anyone who has ever bought a house knows one thing for sure: sooner or
later, they will be faced with repairs and major and minor defects, and have
to make more or less necessary alterations to bring the house into line with
modern life.2 The battle against the elements, including fire and water, is in
the buyer’s hands from the time of delivery (article 7:10(1) of the Dutch Civil
Code, hereinafter ‘DCC’),3 and that is why the date of delivery is the point
at which it is necessary to decide whether the seller has sold the buyer a prop-
erty which conforms to the contract.4 The seller is liable for defects which
existed before the delivery and which the buyer did not need to expect at that
point. It is generally accepted, on the basis of case law established in the lower
Clementine Breedveld-de Voogd is professor of private law, Leiden University.
1 Isabel Allende, The House of the Spirits (English translation by Magda Bogin, original title:
La casa de los espiritus), Jonathan Cape, 1982.
2 The conformity requirement of article 7:17 DCC, the provisions regarding the time of the
transfer of risk (article 7:10 DCC) and the obligation to notify of article 7:23 DCC apply
to the sale of both movable property and immovable property. This article was written
from the perspective of the sale of immovable property and does not deal with the rules
for consumer sales, in view of the fact that the sale of immovable property is by definition
not deemed to be a ‘consumer sale’ (article 7:5(1) DCC), even if the property was sold to
a consumer by a professional seller.
3 The time of delivery is the point at which the buyer is given possession of the property
(article 7:9(2) DCC). Opinions differ on the question when this is the case for immovable
property. According to Huijgen, this is prior to the transfer, viz. when the keys are handed
over, which is usually done when the deed of transfer of title is signed (W.G. Huijgen, Koop
en verkoop van onroerende zaken (Studiepockets Privaatrecht, no. 58), 3rd edition, Deventer:
Kluwer 2008, no. 21), but according to Reehuis this point usually coincides with the registra-
tion of the deed of transfer of title in the public registers (Pitlo/Reehuis Heisterkamp,
Goederenrecht, Deventer: Kluwer 2006, no. 205).
4 Asser-Hijma 5-I, Koop en Ruil, 2007, no. 332.
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courts,5 that when buying an existing property, not every imperfection means
that the house fails to conform to the contract. Thus, to a certain extent, a buyer
will have to take account of some maintenance or arrears that will need to
be performed immediately, even if the need for them was not immediately
visible when the contract of sale was signed.6 A buyer who fails to perform
such maintenance and who lets minor repairs become major arrears cannot
hold the seller responsible for this. This does not, however, alter the fact that
after the sale, it may be possible to stumble on defects which could not really
be considered the kind of problems a buyer could be expected to accept and
which therefore fall outside the scope of the conformity requirements of article
7:17 DCC. If such defects manifest themselves, the buyer can exercise against
the seller the rights and powers the law confers on him in the event that an
obligation under the contract has not been performed (article 7:22(4) DCC): he
may, for example, demand repair (article 7:21(1)(b) DCC), set aside the contract
of sale in whole or in part (article 6:265 DCC) or claim compensation (article
6:74 DCC). Confirmation that such a defect exists could also, for example, lead
to the conclusion that the buyer has been led astray upon the formation of
the contract of sale (error), and this offers him the possibility to annul the
contract (article 6:257 DCC).
By definition, a ‘conformity defect’ is one which the buyer should not have
been required to expect at the time of the delivery. However, does this also
mean that the buyer is justified in waiting to see whether such a defect
manifests itself following delivery? And is it then not too late to go back to
the seller with a claim on account of that defect? Article 7:23(1) DCC (which
can be classified as a lex specialis of article 6:89 DCC) makes it clear that, in legal
terms as well, a buyer cannot remain passive following delivery and must
give the seller notification of a defect ‘within a reasonable period after having
discovered or having reasonably been able to discover’ that defect. A buyer
who fails to comply with this obligation to notify the seller, loses all rights
under the claim that the purchased thing does not conform to the contract.
According to case law of the Dutch Supreme Court, this sanction not only
applies to claims concerning defects in purchased things based on nonconform-
ity to the contract, but also to claims for annulment of the contract on the
grounds of error and to claims arising from an unlawful act.7 The period
5 District Court of Arnhem 4 December 1997, NJkort 1998, 22 and District Court of Utrecht
17 December 1997, NJkort 1998, 26.
6 W.G. Huijgen, Koop en verkoop van onroerende zaken (Studiepockets Privaatrecht, no. 58),
3rd edition, Deventer: Kluwer 2008, no. 22a; Castermans & Krans 2009 (Text and Comment-
ary on the Dutch Civil Code), article 7:17 DCC, note 2; Asser-Hijma 5-I, Koop en Ruil, 2007,
no. 346d.
7 Dutch Supreme Court 29 June 2007, NJ 2008, 606, with commentary from Jac. Hijma and
Dutch Supreme Court 21 April 2006, NJ 2006, 272 (Inno v Sluis). For criticism of the applica-
tion of article 7:23 DCC in case of error, see Jac. Hijma, ‘Koop en ruil’, WPNR 5982 (1990),
pp. 738-739.
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within which the buyer was permitted to give notification of any defect in
purchased things is deemed an expiry period.8 This is then followed by a
period of limitation, which can be described as fairly brief compared with the
general periods of limitation provided for in Book 3 of the Dutch Civil Code.
Claims and grounds for defence which are based on nonconformity of the
purchased thing expire two years after the buyer gave the seller notification
in compliance with the obligation to do so (article 7:17(2) DCC).
The expiry period of article 7:23 DCC was designed to protect a seller
against late notifications which are then difficult to dispute.9 The principal
criticism of this ratio legis in legal literature is that article 7:23 DCC offers
insufficient justification for the far-reaching sanction which it imposes on the
buyer, viz. the expiry of all his rights on the grounds of nonconformity.10
Tamboer therefore argues in favour of making finer distinctions as to the
consequences of overdue notifications. In view of the fact that articles 6:89
and 7:23 DCC are elaborations of the doctrine of the forfeiture of rights and
are therefore based on the restrictive effect of the key principle of reasonable-
ness and fairness under Dutch law (redelijkheid en billijkheid), Tamboer believes
that article 7:23 DCC should also be elaborated in that light. She argues, for
example, that, although forfeiture of the right to claim the setting aside of an
entire contract is not unfair, it should remain possible to claim partial repay-
ment of the purchase price. She also believes that finer distinctions should
be possible as regards which party should be responsible for providing evid-
ence of the allegations and which party has the burden of proof.11
The applicability of the principles of reasonableness and fairness at the
end of the route, i.e. to claims that can be filed in the event of a breach of
contract, is an opportunity to avoid the unfair outcome of the obligation to
notify. The Dutch Supreme Court, however, seems to have opted for a different
approach: it has placed the question whether the buyer has notified the seller
in time in the ‘key context’ of contractual good faith and has allocated an
important role to the seller’s obligation to provide the buyer with information
and the buyer’s obligation to investigate, as is customary in the formation of
a contract.
8 Asser-Hijma 5-I, Koop en ruil, 2007, no. 543; regarding the question of whether this is an
expiry period under the rules of public order, see R.P.J.L. Tjittes, ‘De klacht- en onderzoeks-
plicht bij ondeugdelijke prestaties’, RMThemis 2007, p. 16.
9 TM, Parliamentary history, Parl. Gesch. InvW. Boek 7, p. 146.
10 J.G.H. Meijerink, ‘De klachtplicht in Europees perspectief’, NTBR 2010, para. 3; S. Tamboer,
‘De klachtplicht van de koper in het Nederlandse kooprecht’, Tijdschrift voor Consumenten-
recht 2008, p. 225 and p. 227; T. Hartlief, ‘De klachtplicht van de teleurgestelde koper’, Ars
Aequi 2008-5, pp. 363, 364 and 368.
11 S. Tamboer , ‘De klachtplicht van de koper in het Nederlandse kooprecht’, Tijdschrift voor
Consumentenrecht 2008, pp. 227 and 228.
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2 INVESTIGATION PERIOD AND NOTIFICATION PERIOD
The ‘reasonable period’ within which a buyer is required to notify a seller of
a defect commences at any rate at the point at which a buyer becomes aware
of the nonconformity. Hijma points out that this is not the point at which the
buyer has his first doubts, but the point at which he concludes that the pur-
chased thing does not conform to the contract.12 An example of a situation
in which the buyer’s suspicions hardened into certainty within a few months
can be found in the Fabels v Meenderink judgment.13 The buyer, Meenderink,
had applied for subsidy from the Nibag, the agency charged with implement-
ing the Soundproofing Facilities Scheme (Regeling geluidwerende voorzieningen),
for soundproofing his newly-purchased home. The Nibag, however, ruled that
Meenderink did not qualify for subsidy because some of the renovations
previously made by the seller, Fabels, did not comply with the soundproofing
standards applicable at the time. Meenderink then turned to the Soundproofing
Facilities Foundation (Stichting Geluidwerende Voorzieningen) to verify whether
the Nibag’s refusal to let the house qualify for government subsidy was correct.
The Foundation concurred with the Nibag, after which Meenderink turned
to Fabels. According to Fabels, the period for notifying him commenced at
the point at which Meenderink was informed of the Nibag’s refusal. According
to the Dutch Supreme Court, however, the applicable criterion was the point
at which Meenderink could or should be assumed to have had sufficient
certainty that the house did not conform to the contract. The Dutch Supreme
Court agreed with the Court of Appeal’s decision that the Nibag’s letter did
not offer sufficient certainty and that the reasonable period did not commence
until the point at which Meenderink received the decision from the Sound-
proofing Facilities Foundation.
Taking into consideration the seller’s interests, it is not unreasonable to
require a buyer to notify a seller that the purchased thing does not conform
to the contract within a reasonable period once the buyer has sufficient certain-
ty of the nonconformity. Aside from this is the issue of how a ‘reasonable
period’ should be interpreted in the case of the purchase of immovable
property.14 When applying article 7:23(1) DCC, the buyer’s problem is that
the seller might argue that the ‘reasonable period’ commenced before the actual
discovery of the nonconformity, i.e. at the point at which the buyer ought
reasonably to have discovered the defect. This implies that, after having
acquired the property, the buyer is not only required to inform the seller of
any defect he discovers, but also to inspect the property.15
12 Asser-Hijma 5-I, Koop en ruil, 2007, no. 544.
13 Dutch Supreme Court 25 February 2005, JOR 2005, 168 with commentary from J.J. Dam-
mingh (Fabels/Meenderink).
14 See legal ground [3.3.4] of the Pouw v Visser judgment, referred to below.
15 Asser-Hijma 5-I, Koop en ruil, 2007, no. 544a.
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The Pouw v Visser judgment demonstrates how the period of time available
to the buyer to investigate the property (investigation period) can be deter-
mined. It also provides clarity on the length of the period within which the
buyer should notify the seller (notification period).16 Pouw purchased a house
from Visser in Onderdijk on 26 May 2000 which house was built in 1987. This
property was transferred on 1 December 2000. Pouw moved in shortly after-
wards. In late June 2001 (more than six months after the transfer), Pouw
discovered that the paint on the wooden top rail on the window on the western
side of the house was starting to bubble. The painter called in by Pouw scraped
away the paint and discovered mould and wood rot in the entire rail and
window frame. Pouw then called in a building consultant to ascertain whether
the house had any other defects. The consultant’s report, which summed up
various other defects, was not made available until 26 September 2001. In a
letter dated 27 September 2001, Pouw notified Visser of those defects and
claimed compensation for damage on account of the property’s nonconformity
to the contract. Visser successfully contested this claim before the District Court
and based his defence on article 7:23 DCC. The Court of Appeal upheld this
defence, finding that Pouw had discovered or ought to have discovered the
defects in late June 2001. According to the Court of Appeal, the notification,
which was served twelve weeks later, could not be deemed to have been
served within a reasonable period. The Dutch Supreme Court subsequently
discussed in great detail the length of the investigation period (a) and the
notification period (b) (legal ground 3.3.3):
‘The length of the period referred to at (a) depends on the circumstances of the
case. In view of the seller’s interests protected by article 7:23(1) DCC, the buyer must
institute and carry out the investigation referred to at (a) with the expeditiousness
which could reasonably be expected of him in view of the circumstances of the
case. In that respect, the nature and visibility of the defect, the way in which it
becomes apparent and the buyer’s expertise are some of the relevant factors.’
The Dutch Supreme Court added that if an expert opinion is necessary, the
buyer is in principle entitled to wait for the outcome of that investigation. The
Dutch Supreme Court (legal ground 3.3.4) also found as follows in connection
with the notification period:
‘The third sentence of article 7:23(1) provides that notification made within a period
of two months of discovery is sufficiently prompt in terms of the length of the
period referred to under (b) in case of a consumer sale.
In case of a non-consumer sale, the question whether notification has been given
within a reasonable period must be answered by weighing up all the interests con-
cerned, with due consideration of all the relevant circumstances, including whether
16 Dutch Supreme Court 29 June 2007, NJ 2008, 606 with commentary from Jac. Hijma (Pouw
v Visser).
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the seller is prejudiced by the length of the notification period. It is not possible
to give a fixed period for this, even as a point of departure.’
The lower courts sometimes adhere to a notification period of, in principle,
two months for the purchase of immovable property (the same as for consumer
sales), but it is clear from the above that the Dutch Supreme Court is not in
favour of such standardisation.17
The buyer must inspect the property after the transfer and must conduct
this inspection reasonably expeditiously. Exactly how expeditiously this should
be done depends on the circumstances of the case, such as the nature and
visibility of the defect, the manner in which it becomes apparent and the
buyer’s expertise. The possible influence of acts or omissions by the seller is
not yet included in this enumeration of relevant circumstances. These elements
are articulated in another judgment: Ploum v Smeets & Geelen II, and the facts
of this case which gave rise to this judgment give every reason for their
inclusion.
This judgment followed on from a judgment delivered by the Dutch
Supreme Court on 23 November 2007 on the liability of the seller of a petrol
station built on a lot which turned out to be contaminated.18 These two judg-
ments were the result of the following dispute: Ploum sold a lot in Kerkrade
containing a petrol station to Smeets and Geelen Tankstations (hereinafter
‘Smeets’). Shortly after the transfer, Smeets discovered that the soil was serious-
ly contaminated and held Ploum liable for the damage it sustained, arguing
that Ploum had breached their contract and committed an unlawful act vis-à-
vis Smeets. Ploum rejected this claim contending, inter alia, that Smeets had
not notified Ploum of the property’s nonconformity (articles 6:89 and 7:23 DCC)
in due time. In its first judgment, the Dutch Supreme Court reiterated its
previous ruling in the Inno v Sluis judgment of 21 April 2006, namely that
articles 7:23 and 6:89 DCC apply to any legal claim by a buyer which is in fact
based on the purchased thing’s nonconformity to the contract, even if the buyer
bases his claim on an unlawful act.19 The Dutch Supreme Court also held
that articles 6:89 and 7:23(1) DCC aimed to protect a debtor in the sense that
the latter should be able to rely on the fact that a creditor who believes that
a performance does not conform to the contract should inform the debtor of
that fact expeditiously. A debtor/seller who becomes aware of a defect in any
other way therefore continues to have an interest in the creditor actually
performing its obligation to notify. In legal proceedings, the buyer is required
17 Asser-Hijma 5-I, Koop en ruil, 2007, no. 545a.
18 Court judgment, 23 November 2007, NJ 2008, 552 with commentary from H.J. Snijders to
Dutch Supreme Court NJ 2008, 553 (Ploum v Smeets & Geelen I) and Dutch Supreme Court
25 March 2011, LJN BP8991 (Ploum v Smeets & Geelen II).
19 Dutch Supreme Court 21 April 2006, NJ 2006, 272 (Inno v Sluis).
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to submit and provide evidence that he notified the seller of the defect in due
time, describing the manner in which he did so.
The Dutch Supreme Court referred the case back to the Court of Appeal
in Arnhem, which was charged with deciding whether Smeets had notified
Ploum in due time. A few months after the transfer it came to Smeets’ attention
that the lot was included in the provincial decontamination programme, it
wrote to BP, the petrol station’s tenant, asking why the property had been
included in that programme. After a number of reminders to BP, Smeets finally
received an answer a year later, the essence of which was that the soil under
the petrol station was seriously contaminated. Smeets immediately notified
Ploum in writing. This particular investigation had therefore taken one year.
The Arnhem Court of Appeal ruled that once it had become aware of the
decontamination programme, Smeets merely needed to conduct a brief invest-
igation by writing to BP enquiring into the reason for inclusion in the pro-
gramme. This was sufficient because, partly on the basis of the statements
made by Ploum, Smeets was entitled to presume that the soil was not con-
taminated. The fact is that the deed of transfer referred to a previous soil
survey and guaranteed that no government agency or public utility had
required the seller to make any obligatory amendments to the property at that
point.
Ploum lodged a second Supreme Court appeal against this judgment. In
the Ploum v Smeets & Geelen II judgment, the Dutch Supreme Court rejected
the grounds for appeal lodged against the Court of Appeal judgment on the
following ground (legal ground 3.3.2):
‘(...) The more a buyer is entitled to be confident that a purchased thing conforms
to the contract on the basis of the contents of the contract of sale and the other
circumstances of the case, the less he can be expected to proceed with an (ex-
peditious) investigation, because, in general, a buyer may rely on the accuracy of
the statements made by a seller in this connection, certainly if these statements
may be interpreted as reassuring statements regarding the presence or absence
of certain characteristics of the purchased thing.’
The Dutch Supreme Court then went on to comment on the requisite degree
of expeditiousness of the buyer’s obligation to investigate: if it was a simple
matter for the buyer to establish whether a suspected defect actually existed,
that investigation could be brief. If, however, such certainty could only be
obtained after a lengthy or expensive investigation, the buyer would have to
be allowed sufficient time to conduct it. In this regard, the Dutch Supreme
Court held that in determining the requisite degree of expeditiousness, any
third-party assistance required, would also have to be taken into account. The
absence of (prompt) assistance from third parties is not always automatically
the buyer’s responsibility. Finally, the Dutch Supreme Court listed the circum-
stances to be taken into account in protecting the seller’s interests, for which
7:23 DCC was intended:
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‘In this connection (…) the extent to which the seller’s interests have or have not
been prejudiced is the guiding principle. If those interests have not been prejudiced,
there is not likely to be sufficient reason to accuse the buyer of a lack of
expeditiousness. The seriousness of the failures could be such that an omission
by the buyer cannot be used against him.’
In his commentary on the Pouw v Visser judgment, Hartlief carps at the absence
of a firm guideline regarding the various factors which could affect the length
of the investigation period. This is underlined by the fact that articles 6:89 and
7:23 DCC are placed in the key of the principle of legal certainty.20 At first
sight, it would seem that in the Ploum v Smeets & Geelen II judgment, the Dutch
Supreme Court only exacerbated this vagueness by introducing yet another
element into the debate, i.e. ‘all the circumstances’, but on closer consideration
it is clear that this does not involve an open and unstructured weighing-up
of the parties’ interests in which more and more new factors can be added
to the catalogue of circumstances. The debate about the buyer’s obligation to
notify the seller of a defect is a contractual debate on the purchased thing’s
conformity to the contract. As is the case in the formation of a contract of sale,
the buyer’s legitimate expectations and the legal relationship between the
parties, which is subject to good faith, play a key role following the delivery
of the purchased thing as well.
3 THE OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE INFORMATION AND THE OBLIGATION TO
INVESTIGATE UPON THE FORMATION OF A CONTRACT OF SALE
A purchased thing conforms to the contract of sale if it has the characteristics
which the buyer is entitled to expect upon its delivery. These expectations
regarding the purchased thing are largely formed by what the buyer knows
about it. If he has any doubts about the presence of certain characteristics, he
must investigate them. To quote the first sentence of article 7:17(5) DCC, ‘The
buyer may not invoke nonconformity of the thing to the contract if he was,
or reasonably ought to have been, aware of it at the time the contract was
concluded.’ When forming these expectations, the buyer may rely on the
statements made by the seller about the purchased thing (first sentence, article
7:17(2) DCC). But there is more. In forming his expectations, the buyer is also
entitled to expect that the seller will inform him of any defects of which he,
the seller, is aware. This implies that the seller is charged with a certain
obligation to provide information.
Much has been and will continue to be written about the relationship
between the seller’s obligation to provide information and the buyer’s obliga-
20 T. Hartlief, ‘De klachtplicht van de teleurgestelde koper’, Ars Aequi 2008-5, p. 367.
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tion to investigate.21 Current case law would seem to be clear: the seller’s
obligation to provide information prevails over the buyer’s obligation to
investigate. This rule became a standard criterion when the Dutch Supreme
Court addressed the buyer’s right to invoke error. Subsequently, in the Van
Dalfsen v Kampen judgment, the Dutch Supreme Court ruled that this principle
can also be used as point of departure in the test against the conformity
requirement of article 7:17 DCC. This judgment, however, emphasised that this
principle is subject to exceptions in certain special circumstances. In its role
as seller of an old building, the municipality of Kampen had breached its
obligation to provide information to the buyer, by failing to give the buyer,
Van Dalfsen, a calculation of the load-bearing capacity, which was still in the
archives of the council’s buildings inspection department. Van Dalfsen, who
wished to convert the old building into a restaurant with a functions room
on the first floor, had however been warned by others that the load-bearing
capacity on the first floor was going to be a problem. Given his plans, he had
also called in an architect with whom he had viewed the building on a number
of occasions. It was furthermore clearly visible that the timber beams on the
first floor were sagging. This fact and the nature and age of the building could
have been reason to conclude that the load-bearing capacity of this floor would
be inadequate. For this reason, the Dutch Supreme Court upheld the decision
by the Court of Appeal that, despite the fact that the municipality had breached
its obligation to provide information, it could nevertheless invoke the buyer’s
own obligation to investigate.
Valk has rightly criticised the Dutch Supreme Court’s formulation of this
judgment, which created the impression it was an exception to the main rule
– an exception in which the buyer’s obligation to investigate should suddenly
prevail on account of the special circumstances. He points out that in the
doctrine of nonconformity, as well as in in other doctrines of contract law,
the obligation to provide information goes hand in hand with the principle
that parties to a contract should be protected in their legitimate expectations.22
Within the scope of article 7:17 DCC, the position of the seller’s obligation to
provide information vis-à-vis the buyer’s own obligation to investigate must
21 See inter alia A.G. Castermans, De mededelingsplicht in de onderhandelingsfase, PhD thesis
Leiden, Deventer: Kluwer 1992; J.H. Nieuwenhuis, ‘Wat mogen koper en verkoper van
elkaar verwachten? Digitale en analoge werking van redelijkheid en billijkheid’, WPNR
6304 (1998); P. Klik, ‘De verhouding tussen spreek- en onderzoeksplicht’, NTBR 1998, pp.
295-300, no. 8; J. Dammingh, ‘De mededelingsplicht van de verkoper en de onderzoeksplicht
van de koper’, WPNR 6327 (1998); W.L. Valk, ‘De rol van de mededelingsplicht in gevallen
van non-conformiteit’, NTBR 2009-18, pp. 137-144; T.H.M. van Wechem, ‘Gelijkschakeling
van mededelingsplichten en onderzoeksplichten bij vraagstukken van non-conformiteit
en dwaling?’, WPNR 6790 (2009), p. 222-226; Kasper Jansen, ‘De gulden middenweg’, in:
A.G. Castermans, Jac. Hijma, K.J.O. Jansen, P. Memelink, H.J. Snijders & C.J.J.M. Stolker
(eds.), Ex libris Hans Nieuwenhuis, Deventer: Kluwer 2009, pp. 337-351.
22 W.L. Valk, ‘De rol van de mededelingsplicht in gevallen van non-conformiteit’, NTBR 2009-
18, no. 9.
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always be determined on the basis of the following criterion (of which the
obligation to provide information is ‘merely a corollary’): did the purchased
thing conform to what the buyer was entitled to expect? If the buyer was aware
of a possible defect, as in the Van Dalfsen v Kampen judgment, he cannot insist
that he was entitled to expect the purchased thing not to have this defect. In
such a case the court would not even consider the issue of the seller’s obliga-
tion to provide information. In these circumstances, I doubt even whether the
municipality could have been assumed to have been required to provide the
information in question at all.
4 THE OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE INFORMATION AND THE OBLIGATION TO
INVESTIGATE; FROM A PRE-CONTRACTUAL TO A POST-CONTRACTUAL PER-
SPECTIVE
To what extent can the various theories on the obligation to provide infor-
mation and the obligation to investigate during the formation of a contract
play a part in answering the question whether, after a purchased thing is
delivered, a buyer can be required to inspect a property and, if so, with what
degree of expeditiousness he must conduct this investigation. The point of
departure must be the purchased thing’s nonconformity to the contract, because
otherwise the notification obligation and the obligation to investigate would
not require any consideration. A purchased thing does not conform to a
contract if it does not have the characteristics which the buyer is entitled to
expect on the basis of that contract. Logically, this means that, from the time
of delivery, the buyer is entitled to expect that the purchased thing has the
agreed characteristics. It seems illogical that as of the point at which the buyer
is entitled to have these expectations, he is charged with an obligation to
investigate the existence of any defects. A distinction ought to be made here.
The buyer’s legitimate expectations determine the substance of the contract
and therefore the seller’s contractual obligations. This does not imply that the
buyer should close his eyes to the possibility that the purchased thing does
not conform to the contract and that the seller has defaulted in complying with
the contract. If he wishes to exercise his contractual rights vis-à-vis the seller,
the buyer must, from the outset, take account of the possibility that compliance
(or proper compliance) with contracts is not always a given. The inspection
of a newly-acquired thing has since time immemorial been the concern of a
new buyer:23
‘But one by one they started making excuses. The first said, “I have just bought
a field which I need to inspect; I regret I cannot accept the invitation.”. And another
23 Luke 14:18 and 19 (The Holy Bible, revised standard version, Wm. Collins Sons & Co. Ltd,
1971).
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said: “I have bought five yoke of oxen and I go to examine them; I regret I cannot
accept the invitation.”’
In the first instance, a buyer will look at and inspect a property out of a sense
of self-interest, but, when safeguarding his own contractual rights, he will also
have to take into account the other party’s interests. Even when exercising
these rights, the buyer and seller remain locked in a legal relationship which
is governed by good faith and which entails that their behaviour must, in part,
be governed by the other party’s legitimate interests.24 Hijma believes that
this rule forms the basis for the obligation to notify the seller in the case of
nonconformity: the seller has an interest in the fact being established that the
purchased and delivered thing indeed does conform to the contract within
a reasonable period following delivery.25 And that is the more understandable
in case of the sale of immovable property. The passage of time can mean that
minor defects, which would not have amounted to nonconformity upon
transfer, might become major defects which could impede the property’s
normal use in the course of time. The Ploum v Smeets & Geelen II judgment
demonstrates that the seller’s interests play a key role when determining the
investigation period, as in this judgment the Dutch Supreme Court finds that
the question whether the seller’s interests have been prejudiced is a decisive
factor.
What is the relationship between the obligation to provide information
and the obligation to investigate in the post-contractual period – the period
in which the buyer is obliged to notify the seller of any defects? Are these
obligations also an elaboration of the buyer’s legitimate expectations? The Pouw
v Visser judgment makes it clear that it is reasonable to expect a buyer to
conduct the investigation with the expeditiousness which could reasonably
be expected of him in the light of the circumstances of the case. The following
factors are relevant: the nature and visibility of the defect, the manner in which
it became apparent and the buyer’s expertise. In the Ploum v Smeets & Geelen II
judgment, the Dutch Supreme Court posed the question whether and how
the buyer should conduct an investigation within the framework of his expecta-
tions that the purchased thing complies with the contract (see the legal ground
cited in para. 2). This is a matter of greater or lesser expectations: the more
the buyer is entitled to rely on the property’s conformity, the less quickly he
24 Dutch Supreme Court 15 November 1957, NJ 1958, 67 with commentary from L.E.H.R. (Baris
Riezenkamp).
25 Asser Hijma 5-I, Koop en Ruil, 2007, no. 541; see also Castermans& Krans 2009 (Text and
Commentary on the Dutch Civil Code), article 7:23 DCC, note 2, in which reference is made
to the ‘pre-contractual’ Baris/Riezenkamp and Booy/Wisman judgements (Dutch Supreme Court
21 January 1966, NJ 1966, 183) also in connection with post-contractual obligations to notify
the seller of defects in order to determine the relationship between the buyer’s own obliga-
tion to investigate on the one hand and incorrect information provided by the seller or
the breach of the seller’s obligation to provide information on the other.
82 6 – Foreseeable and unforeseeable defects after the transfer of immovable property
can be expected to conduct an (expeditious) investigation’. This does not mean,
however, that the outcome of this weighing-up cannot yield a ‘digital’ result.26
Once it has been decided what investigation period is reasonable in the given
case, the outcome of a breach of that period will be all or nothing: the loss
of rights and powers based on the property’s nonconformity. As in the pre-
contractual period, the statements made by the seller determine to a large
extent the degree to which expectations are legitimate. As to these statements,
the Dutch Supreme Court finds that the buyer is in general entitled to rely
on their accuracy. As far as the obligation to notify the seller of defects is
concerned, this presents nothing new. After all, article 7:23(1), second sentence
DCC states:
‘Where, however, it is established that the thing lacks a characteristic which accord-
ing to the seller it possessed, or where the variance pertains to facts of which the
seller was or ought to have been aware but has not communicated, the notification
must take place promptly after the discovery.’
There is, however, a notable difference between the Dutch Supreme Court’s
legal ground and the second sentence of article 7:23(1) DCC: according to the
statutory provision, the seller is not under any obligation to investigate the
existence of defects, and therefore no investigation period applies, if the seller
has informed the buyer that the property had a certain characteristic. In that
case, the notification period does not commence until the buyer discovers that
such characteristic is in fact lacking. The Dutch Supreme Court’s ground thus
offers more scope for applying certain qualifications, and that is, in my view,
rightly so. Suppose that when the contract of sale was concluded the seller
informed the buyer that there was no damp in the cellar, but that, three years
after the transfer, when clearing out his tools, the buyer discovers that there
is half a centimetre of water under the linoleum. This explains the rust on his
hammers, saws and drills. A subsequent investigation shows that the damp
was caused because, after the formation of the contract of sale, but two months
before the transfer, the drainage authority had decided to permanently raise
the ground water level. Was the buyer exempt from the obligation to invest-
igate the property after the transfer, on account of the seller’s statement before
the formation of the contract? This question about the buyer’s own obligation
to investigate is even more pressing in view of the fact that in article 7:23 DCC
not only the seller’s factual statements seem to rule out the buyer’s own
obligation to investigate, but also any failure to report characteristics of which
the seller was aware (or even unaware), but of which he ought to have been
26 Regarding ‘digital’ and ‘analogue’ patterns in questions on nonconformity, see Kasper
Jansen, ‘De gulden middenweg’, in: A.G. Castermans, Jac. Hijma, K.J.O. Jansen, P. Memelink,
H.J. Snijders & C.J.J.M. Stolker (eds.), Ex libris Hans Nieuwenhuis, Deventer: Kluwer 2009,
pp. 339-341.
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aware. In my opinion, the information which the buyer should have about
the property increases with the passage of time and, at a certain point, he can
no longer claim that the seller ought to have been aware of a defect while
believing that he should not have been required to discover it himself.
The criticism of the second sentence of article 7:23 DCC is essentially the
same as the criticism of the Van Dalfsen v Kampen judgment: the rule that the
obligation to provide information prevails over the obligation to investigate
is not a main rule to which exceptions are permitted, but merely a rule of
thumb which must be applied within a certain context. But it is important not
to lose sight of the main principle: to what extent was the buyer entitled to
expect that the immovable property had certain characteristics? In the post-
contractual phase, these expectations are in the first place established on the
basis of the substance of the contract (see also the first sentence of legal ground
3.3.2 of the Ploum v Smeets & Geelen II judgment), but, as time passes, these
expectations will be increasingly influenced by the facts of which the buyer
becomes aware in the course of time.27 Not only the statements made by the
seller, but also the factors which the Dutch Supreme Court previously summed
up in the Pouw v Visser judgment (the nature and visibility of the defect, the
manner in which it becomes apparent and the buyer’s expertise) can be placed
within the contractual framework sketched in the Ploum v Smeets & Geelen II
judgment: what was the buyer entitled to expect?
5 CONCLUSION
A contract of sale is not a continuing performance contract. This applies to
the sale of immovable property as well. Upon transfer the buyer has paid the
purchase price and the seller has transferred the property. They go their
separate ways, each having performed his part of the contract. However, the
post-contractual period will prove whether the seller has indeed transferred
a property which conforms to the contract, and this applies in particular to
any hidden physical defects which manifest themselves after the transfer. The
legal relationship, which is governed by good faith and which commenced
when the parties started negotiating, has not ended. More than that, that
relationship will truly be put to the test in this post-contractual phase if the
property does not entirely satisfy the buyer’s expectations. It is clear from the
Ploum v Smeets & Geelen II judgment that, with regard to the post-contractual
requirements which may be imposed on a buyer, the buyer’s perspective of
the property is decisive. As with the formation of the contract, everything
eventually turns on the question what the buyer was entitled to expect. In this
post-contractual period, these expectations are readjusted by the manifestation
27 Castermans & Krans 2009 (Text and Commentary on the Dutch Civil Code), article 7:23,
note 2.
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of major and minor defects, which require further investigation. There is no
other party that can be charged with this responsibility: at this point the buyer
is, after all, the owner of the property. The relationship between the seller’s
obligation to provide information and the buyer’s post-contractual obligation
to investigate, can only be understood in terms of the buyer’s expectations.
Both in the pre-contractual and in the post-contractual phase, the rule that
the obligation to provide information prevails over the obligation to investigate
must be used as a rule of thumb only: a rule which can be a useful aid when
establishing the buyer’s legitimate expectations. Presumably, even more so
than in the pre-contractual phase, the buyer will have to attach greater import-
ance to his own findings and observations.
7 Success and new technologies as unfore-
seen circumstances in intellectual property
law
Dirk Visser & Paul van der Kooij
1 INTRODUCTION
Unforeseen circumstances do not play a role in a large part of intellectual
property law. Important aspects of intellectual property (hereinafter called:
IP) law, such as the object of protection (invention, trademark, design, work,
plant variety, trade name, etc.), the procedural and substantial conditions for
protection, the contents of protection and the limitation, duration and termina-
tion of rights, have been defined by (inter)national laws and treaties, and are
interpreted in case law in a rather clear and predictable way.
However, agreements between interested parties have always been an
important issue in this part of law too, e.g. in licensing contracts, contracts
commissioning an order to an artist (to make a portrait, to write a book, etc.),
employment contracts containing certain IP elements such as provisions with
regard to secrecy, employee inventions and copyright, as well as contracts
dealing with the transfer of IP rights.
In this article we would like to focus on current regulations and case law
with regard to two important contracts containing IP elements, in particular
employment contracts in which provisions concerning employee inventions
have been laid down (para. 2), and copyright contracts dealing with the rights
and obligations of authors vis-à-vis their works of literature, science or art
(para. 3).
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2 EMPLOYEE INVENTIONS
2.1 The Netherlands
In the year 2011, by far most inventions are performed by individual
employees, working single-handedly or in a team, but specifically engaged
in order to search for new products or processes or for improvements (on
improvements on improvements) on existing products and processes. Despite
the fact that these inventors totally outnumber the self-employed, independent
inventors, the Dutch Patent Act of 1910 (as well as its successor, the Patent
Act of 1995) contains only one provision dealing with inventions by
employees.1 According to the text of this provision (formerly article 10(1),
nowadays article 12(1) of the Patent Act 1995), in short, if an employee is the
inventor of a new product or process, he is entitled to the patent, unless this
person has particularly been engaged to work ‘as an inventor’ (e.g. in a labor-
atory or on a research department of the company in question). In the latter
case (in fact: in 99 per cent of all cases) the fruits of his R & D endeavours
will be enjoyed by the employer, who, as a result, will be entitled to the patent.
Article 12(2) and (3) contain similar provisions regarding inventions real-
ized during an internship and inventions at university locations or in other
research institutions. Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of article 12 are of a facultative
nature: the parties involved are entitled to make other arrangements (see article
12(5)).
Through this provision, the legislator has tried to reconcile two different
points of view put forward by interested parties: on the one hand those who
favour the inventor to be granted the exclusive right as a reward for his/her
creative and inventive work; on the other hand those who hold the opinion
that only the company should be entitled to protection, because the company
has in fact hired the employee against a certain salary which – in most cases –
already takes into consideration the possibility that the employee will achieve
patentable inventions during the term of his employment. Moreover, it is
argued that to a certain extent the company’s continuing existence may be
dependent on the contents of its patent portfolio.
Be that as it may, article 12 of the Patent Act 1995 also takes into consider-
ation the possibility that – maybe just once in a lifetime – an employee invents
something which turns out to be extremely profitable for the company’s
1 As far as European patents are at stake, see Article 60 of the European Patent Convention.
Paragraph 1 of this Article reads as follows: ‘The right to a European patent shall belong
to the inventor or his successor in title. If the inventor is an employee, the right to a
European patent shall be determined in accordance with the law of the State in which the
employee is mainly employed; if the State in which the employee is mainly employed cannot
be determined, the law to be applied shall be that of the State in which the employer has
the place of business to which the employee is attached.’
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revenues. For such cases, article 12(6) contains provisions which are obligatory
(see article 12(7)): in short, they read as follows: if an employee has come up
with an invention, and according to this article the employer is entitled to the
patent, the former is entitled to an equitable remuneration (on top of his
normal salary), if otherwise (without the extra remuneration) he would not
receive sufficient compensation for the loss of the patent. This additional
allowance shall take into account the financial value of the invention and all
other circumstances of the case, especially the circumstances which accom-
panied the development of the invention as such. The employee must file his
claim on equitable remuneration within a period of three years after the date
of the granting of the patent to the employer.
There are a number of rather indefinite elements in this provision. They
will be discussed below.2 First, where the legislator refers to the financial
interest of the invention, it is unclear whether the interest for the employer
is meant or for the employee (if the latter would have been entitled to the
patent). There is, of course, a big difference between these two options. For
the employee in most cases the interest would be considerably lower, because
he would have to invest a lot of money in order to finish the invention himself
into a product ready to be marketed. This seems to be the correct interpreta-
tion, taking into account the text of the provision, which refers to a period
of three years after the granting of the right, during which the employee must
file his claim: to calculate the interest for the employer would often take a
much longer period of time. This interpretation has also been suggested in
the literature.3 However, the Dutch Supreme Court once held, that it was the
intention of the legislator to provide the employee/inventor with a reasonable
part of the benefits of the invention for the employer.4
Secondly, article 12(6) does not clarify whether the value of the invention
must be fixed on the date of the granting of the patent, or on a later date.
Following the Perquin decision mentioned above (footnote 4) it would be
necessary to deal with this matter after many years, perhaps even at the end
of the term of the patent. This would of course be very unsatisfactory for the
employee, having to await the outcome of such a calculation. In other and
more recent case law, however, it has been decided that the value of the
invention must be established (retroactively) on the date on which the patent
was granted.5 Although this seems to be the better approach, it is not without
2 See also E.A. van Nieuwenhoven Helbach/J.L.R.A. Huydecoper, C.J.J.C. van Nispen,
Industriële eigendom, deel 1, Bescherming van technische innovatie, 2002, p. 289 et seq.
3 See e.g. B.M. Telders & C. Croon, Nederlandsch Octrooirecht, 1946, p. 100; C. Croon, De rechts-
positie van de ontwerper, de maker en de uitvinder in dienstbetrekking, 1964, pp. 11-12. See also
District Court of Den Haag 5 March 1971, NJ 1974, 326 (Van Kleffens/Instituut voor Tuinbouw-
techniek).
4 Dutch Supreme Court 30 June 1950, NJ 1950, 52, BIE 1950, 77 (Perquin/Perfra).
5 District Court of Den Haag 5 March 1971, NJ 1974, 326 (Van Kleffens/Instituut voor Tuinbouw-
techniek); Hof Den Bosch 4 June 1980, NJ 1982, 30 (X/Lips). See also C. Croon, op. cit., p. 12.
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disadvantages either, as it may be quite difficult to estimate the gain of a patent
at such an early stage, and the result of such estimation could often be open
to dispute.
Thirdly, article 12(6) is rather vague with regard to the circumstances that
accompanied the development of the invention, and which must also be taken
into consideration in order to establish the additional payment, once it has
been accepted that the employee is entitled to such payment. This should of
course always be decided on a case by case basis; consequently, the outcome
will often be highly uncertain. In the Lips case referred to above (footnote 5),
the Court of Appeal enumerated the following parameters: a) the nature of
the activities of the employee, as well as his salary and other (e.g. financial)
benefits he has enjoyed in connection with these activities; b) the question
whether other employees have also been involved in the development of the
invention, and if so, to what extent; c) the question whether the employer has
provided the employee/inventor with special facilities and possibilities in order
to simplify his research activities; d) the question to what extent the organiza-
tion of the company enables the commercial exploitation of the invention; e)
the question of how the value of invention can be estimated and to what extent
additional technical difficulties can be overcome.
It may have become clear from the above that the legal status of employee/
inventors in the Netherlands has always been quite obscure. This can also be
illustrated by a court decision from 1994 which has become rather notorious,
at least among employees. As of 9 October 1969 Mr. Hupkens was employed
as a ‘development engineer’ by the company Schuurmans & Van Ginneken.
The employment contract contained a provision which stated that the employer
would be entitled to patent protection with regard to inventions realized by
the employee, and furthermore, that if the employer would apply for pro-
tection, the employee would be entitled to an appropriate remuneration,
pursuant to (at that time) article 10 of the Patent Act.
In general, with regard to contracts like the one referred to, two further
uncertainties may arise: a) first, the question whether the employee must be
considered to be an employee/inventor as defined in article 10(1); in this case
there was no discussion on this point, as the contract itself referred to the
remuneration mentioned in article 10(2) (nowadays article 12(6)); in other court
proceedings, a number of criteria have been developed to answer this ques-
tion;6 b) even if there is no doubt about article 10/12 being applicable, the
decision whether or not to apply for patent protection lies in the hands of the
employer only, see also the employment contract in the Hupkens case cited
above. In other words: so long as the employer (for whatever reason) does
6 See e.g. District Court of Arnhem 2 March 1933, BIE 1933, p. 60 (Van Dartelen/Algemeene
Kunstzijde Unie); OR AvB (Board of Appeal of the Dutch Patent Office) 3 December 1949,
BIE 1950, 4. See also B.M. Telders & C. Croon, op. cit., pp. 106-107.
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not apply for protection, the right of the inventor to receive an extra remunera-
tion does not yet become operational.
Be that as it may, what happened in this case was that Mr. Hupkens came
up with an invention (already in October 1969!) which, in short, turned out
to be very profitable for the company. In 1982 the company was granted a
patent for this invention. In the meantime, Mr. Hupkens had already left the
company in 1973. After the grant of the patent he applied for the remuneration
referred to in article 10 Patent Act (and mentioned in his former employment
contract). Employer and employee were not able to reach an amicable settle-
ment of their dispute, and therefore they went to court. The Cantonal Court
appointed three experts to provide advice on the height of the remuneration.
One of these experts advised paying Mr. Hupkens fl. 50,000.- (approximately
C= 22,500.-), but the other two experts came to the conclusion that he should
receive fl. 585,000.- (approximately C= 265,000.-) plus an additional amount of
money, on an annual royalty basis, for the period starting in 1989. The
enormous gap between these two results was caused by the fact that the
experts had used a different basis for their calculations (in short: the value
of the invention for the employee and the value for the employer, respectively).
The Cantonal Court accepted the advice given by the two experts. In the appeal
proceedings, however, the District Court set that decision aside. According
to the latter Court, article 10 Patent Act provides rules with regard to an
additional remuneration, which will apply only rarely, because in most cases
the salary of the employee/inventor will be sufficient as it will already take
into account the fact that the employee was specifically hired to do inventive
work. The advice given by the two experts was based on the wrong principle:
it should not have followed the view that the value of the invention must be
calculated on the basis of the assumption of a licence agreement concluded
between employer and employee. The Dutch Supreme Court upheld the latter
decision. It held that according to article 10(2) Patent Act the financial value
of the invention is only one of several circumstances which must be taken into
account. Moreover, according to the Dutch Supreme Court, equity does not
dictate that the employee’s loss of the patent should be geared to the ad-
vantages obtained by the company as a result of the use of the invention in
a manner decided by that company.7 Thus, Mr. Hupkens received a remunera-
tion much smaller than the one referred to above; in fact that remuneration
was not even enough to compensate for the costs of legal proceedings taking
more than a decade.
7 Dutch Supreme Court 27 May 1994, NJ 1995, 136 (Hupkens/Van Ginneken).
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The Hupkens decision has both been welcomed8 and criticized9 in the
doctrine. Since then, no important developments in this field of law can be
reported. In a more recent decision the Dutch Supreme Court repeated its
decision in the Hupkens case, and, in addition, held that in order to accept the
right to an extra remuneration it is ‘neither sufficient nor necessary’ that no
specific component of the salary can be attributed to the employee’s loss of
the patent.10
With a view to the relatively scarce Dutch case law on this topic, the
conclusion might be that, in general, employment contracts concluded in the
Netherlands between employers and employees/inventors deal with the
problem in a satisfactory manner. On the other hand, the absence of case law
might also (at least in part) be caused by a certain fear to start litigation against
an employer, as this may have a negative impact on the employment relation-
ship in question. In fact, in the majority of published cases on employee
inventions, this relationship had already been ended as a result of the conflict
arisen between the two parties. Therefore, it could be interesting to investigate
employee invention systems applicable abroad. In this context, the German
approach differs considerably from the Dutch approach.
2.2 Germany
In 1957 the German Parliament enacted the Arbeitnehmererfindungsgesetz
(Employee Inventions Act).11 It has been operational ever since, and was only
slightly amended in 2009 (see hereafter). The Act’s two main objectives are
of an economic (to stimulate employees to come up with inventions) and of
a social nature (to protect employees/inventors). As a result, the Act contains
a considerable number of provisions, dealing with all kinds of conflicts which
may arise in this context.
The central notion in this Act is the so-called Diensterfindung (service
invention). To qualify as a ‘Diensterfindung’, pursuant to § 4(2) a service inven-
tion must have been achieved during the employment period, and either came
into being from the employee’s incumbent activity or was largely based on
experiences or activities of the enterprise. All other inventions are so-called
freie Erfindungen (free inventions), which the employee may exploit himself,
after the fulfillment of a number of obligations, laid down in § 18 and § 19.
8 See e.g. J.H. Spoor, comment with regard to the Hupkens case (footnote 7), NJ 1995, p. 527
et seq.; Van Nieuwenhoven Helbach et al., op. cit., pp. 293-294.
9 See e.g. A.A. Quaedvlieg, ‘De betrekkelijke waarde van een werknemer voor de vooruit-
gang’, BIE 1996, p. 121 et seq.; A. Rijlaarsdam, Octrooi en dienstbetrekking, 2005, p. 84 et seq.
10 Dutch Supreme Court 1 March 2002, NJ 2003, 210 (TNO/Termeulen).
11 See <http://www.arbeitnehmererfindungsgesetz.de/> (accessed June 2011).
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An employee who has made a ‘service invention’ has a duty to immediately
inform the employer about this invention through a specific form. The
employer must confirm the date of receipt of the notification to the employee
promptly in writing. In the notification the technical problem, the solution
and the realization of the service invention must be described (§ 5(1) and (2)).
Pursuant to § 6, the employer has the right to claim the service invention. As
of 1 October 2009 (cf. § 43(3)), this claim shall be deemed to have been made
if the employer does not release the invention within four months from the
date of the notification referred to in § 4: this new provision reduces the
administrative burden for the employer compared to the situation before the
entering into force of the revised Act.
As a result of the claim, all rights related to the service invention shall pass
to the employer (§ 7(1)). Once the employer has claimed the service invention,
the employee is entitled to a reasonable remuneration. In assessing the compen-
sation, in particular the economic usefulness of the invention, the role and
position of the employee within the enterprise and the share of the company
in the realization of the invention shall be taken into consideration. Elaborate
guidelines have been drawn up to determine the amount of the remuneration
(§ 11).12
With regard to service inventions, as a general rule the employer is obliged
to file a patent application in Germany, and he is entitled to do so in other
countries (§ 13(1) and § 14(1), respectively). The Act contains a number of
provisions dealing with several difficulties (exceptions, differing opinions, etc.)
which may result from the said obligation, see in particular § 13(2), (3) and
(4), § 14(2) and (3), § 15-17.
Pursuant to § 28 all disputes between the employer and the employee
arising from this Act shall be settled, free of charge (§ 36), by a special Arbitra-
tion Board, to be established at the Patent Office (see also § 37 et seq. with
regard to further judicial proceedings).
In the past, the system laid down in the German Act was sometimes
criticized, e.g. because of the administrative burden it places on the employer,
or because the big differences between the German system and legal systems
applicable in other countries might be an obstacle for international (intra-
company) cooperation in the field of R & D.13 However, on the whole, the
German Act has been accepted by the interested parties and has been judged
positively by several authors. The system is considered to contribute to a good
working climate, as well as to the technical development and the competitive
12 See e.g. <http://transpatent.com/gesetze/rlarberf.html> (accessed June 2011).
13 See e.g. K. Meier, ‘Bewährtes deutsches Arbeitnehmererfinderrecht?’, GRUR 1998, p. 779
et seq.; R. Kockläuner, ‘Bewährtes deutsches Arbeitnehmererfinderrecht?’, GRUR 1999, p. 664
et seq.; Deutsche Vereinigung für gewerblichen Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht, ‘Stellung-
name zu einer Revision des Gesetzes über Arbeitnehmererfindungen,GRUR 2000’, p. 385
et seq.; H. Vieregge, ‘Aktuelle Berichte – February 2005’, GRUR 2005, p. 132.
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power of the national industry. Finally, it has not given rise to many court
proceedings, and to a certain extent it has also inspired the French and Swiss
legislators.14
In conclusion, comparing the Dutch and the German approach to employee
inventions, it seems rather difficult to deny the higher degree of legal certainty
provided by the latter. This might induce the Dutch government also to
consider the German Act as a source of inspiration for future legislative
measures.
3 COPYRIGHT CONTRACTS
Most authors and many publishers and producers believe, or at least hope,
that the publication or other exploitation of their works will be a success.
Therefore, the success of a work protected by copyright can, as such, hardly
ever be considered a really unforeseen circumstance. Copyright law as it stands
has come into existence in response to new technologies, starting with the
invention of the printing press, followed by many other (audio/video, ana-
logue/digital) recording, reproduction and distribution technologies. Therefore,
new (recording, reproduction and distribution) technologies can as such never
be considered to be really unforeseen circumstances either.
Due to the fact that producers and publishers usually have a stronger
position in negotiations on copyright contracts, there is the recurring idea that
authors should be protected against one-sided contracts, such as too broad
transfers of rights against one-off lump sum payments. To a certain extent
this takes the shape of a general iustum pretium concept for authors: authors
should always have the right to an equitable remuneration for the use of their
work. More specifically it leads to the idea that in case of (unexpected) success
or in case of exploitation through new technologies, authors should have a
right to additional remuneration. The idea behind this is that it is unjust not
to take this ‘unforeseen’ success of these technologies into account in determin-
ing ex post what is an equitable remuneration for the use of the author’s work.
Obviously, there is a lot of opposition from the side of producers and
publishers against the iustum pretium idea and against the idea that unforeseen
success and unforeseen new technologies should always give rise to additional
payments. Success is rarely completely unforeseen. And even if it is unforeseen,
it should not automatically give rise to additional payments, just as failures
and losses do not give producers or publishers the right to get part of their
payments back from the authors. Part of the deal is that producers take the
operating risk, with all the advantages and disadvantages it entails.
14 See e.g. A. Rijlaarsdam, op. cit., p. 47 et seq., with further references.
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New technologies might be unforeseen in some cases, but more often they
replace existing technologies and modes of exploitation, thereby cannibalizing
the existing technologies and not giving rise to additional turnover or profits.
Nevertheless, there is a tendency to create rules of copyright contract law
to strengthen the position of authors, especially where (unforeseen) success
or (unforeseen) new technologies are concerned. In this part of this article we
look into the situation in the Netherlands, the situation in Germany and the
draft proposal for new copyright contract law in the Netherlands.
3.1 The Netherlands (current situation)
Dutch Copyright Act
Currently, the Dutch Copyright Act (DCA) contains only two general rules of
copyright contract law in favour of the author, which are contained in article
2.2 DCA:
Article 2 DCA
1. Copyright passes by succession and is assignable wholly or in part.
2. The delivery required by whole or partial assignment shall be effected by means
of a deed of assignment. The assignment shall comprise only such rights as are
recorded in the deed or necessarily derive from the nature or purpose of the title.
Assignment can only be affected by a deed. Therefore, an oral or implicit
agreement can not constitute a valid transfer of copyright. And any assignment
of copyright must be interpreted narrowly in favour of the author as it only
includes ‘such rights as are recorded in the deed or necessarily derive from
the nature or purpose of the title’. The majority opinion is that this clause is
not a ‘purpose-of-transfer rule’ and does not exclude the possibility of assigning
rights to future technologies, but there is quite some debate on this issue.15
The Dutch Supreme Court was never called upon to decide on this controversy
about the purpose-of-transfer doctrine. Case law on article 2.2 DCA by the lower
courts is also rare.16
Dutch copyright does not provide the author or performer with a general
right to an equitable or proportional remuneration. An exception, however,
is included in the film rights section of the Dutch Copyright Act. For authors
of films, the Dutch Copyright Act contains a separate and specific provision
on the right to remuneration.
15 See: B.J. Lenselink, De verlening van exploitatie-bevoegdheden in het auteursrecht, Den Haag:
Sdu 2005, pp. 441-523.
16 See: District Court Haarlem 3 December 2003, AMI 2004-3, p. 111 (Knudde): in accordance
with Article 2 DCA the exploitation rights that were unknown at the time of the transfer,
do not fall under the transfer of copyright.
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Article 45d DCA
Unless otherwise agreed upon in writing by the authors and the producer, the
authors shall be deemed to have assigned to the producer [all exploitation rights]
[…]. The producer is indebted an equitable remuneration to the authors or their
successors in title for all forms of exploitation of the cinematographic work. The
producer is also indebted an equitable remuneration to the authors or their
successors in title if he effects exploitation in a form that did not exist or was not
reasonably foreseeable at the time referred to in article 45c or if he gives the right
to effect such exploitation to a third party. The remunerations referred to in this
article shall be agreed upon in writing. The right to an equitable remuneration for
rental cannot be waived by the author.
The much debated issue is whether article 45d DCA allows the payment of
a single lump sum for all existing and future technologies, or whether it
requires a specification in a contract of which amount of remuneration covers
which existing form of exploitation, or whether a single lump sum for future
forms of exploitation is possible at all. There is, however, no decisive case law
on these issues.17 The current article 45d DCA has very little influence on the
contractual practice in the Netherlands. Most authors and actors get a single
lump sum payment for the transfer of all rights. Only the entitlement to
collectively administered levies is usually exempted from this transfer.
What case law on article 45d DCA and the equitable remuneration can be
mentioned? One of the few cases about the equitable remuneration is Poppenk
v. NCF.18 Film producer Nature Conservation Films (NCF) had film material of
the nature filmmaker Hugo van Lawick. Poppenk, a freelancer who had
sometimes worked with NCF, was instructed to edit a film with this material.
Poppenk carried out the instruction, but he also had the idea of making a film
with the remaining material about all the animals in Serengeti National Park
in Tanzania. He wanted to present this material on the basis of the letters of
the alphabet. Then NCF produced the English film ‘Serengeti A to Z’ and two
Dutch versions. In addition, the broadcasting rights were granted to EO and
Canal+. Poppenk received a remuneration of NLG 60,000.- for editing activities.
Poppenk, however, also wanted an equitable remuneration in accordance with
article 45d DCA, because NCF started to apply different forms of exploitation.
He was of the opinion that he was entitled to an equitable remuneration,
because he delivered a contribution of a creative nature. NCF denied this. There
were no agreements in writing. According to the Court of Appeal Poppenk
delivered a creative contribution by developing the idea of the alphabet,
inventing the titles and selecting the scenes and creative employees. Thus
17 See: B.J. Lenselink, De verlening van exploitatie-bevoegdheden in het auteursrecht, Den Haag:
Sdu 2005, pp. 441-523.
18 District Court Amsterdam 24 October 2001, AMI 2002, p. 17, Court of Appeal Amsterdam
18 September 2003, nr. 1293/01 (not published) and District Court Amsterdam 22 September
2004, nr. 212361/H01.0099 (not published) (Poppenk/NCF).
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Poppenk was designated as a filmmaker and therefore he was entitled to claim
an equitable remuneration. The Court of Appeal also ruled that Poppenk had
a right to a percentage of the gross profits. And what was the result of three
years of litigation? An amount of only C= 881.89.
In another more recent case, someone (hereinafter: X) who recorded voice-
over texts for the series of Gewoon Jannes by order of Noordkaap TV Producties,
had more success.19 These series were broadcast by RTV Oost. X received a
remuneration for his work. However, Noordkaap also had the series broadcast
by another local broadcaster, RTV Drenthe, and distributed the series on DVD.
X wanted to receive an equitable remuneration of C= 4,000.- for these uses of
the voice-over texts, but Noordkaap relied on the oral agreement that the
remuneration that was paid earlier also included the use for other purposes.
It was established in the proceedings that X had transferred his rights to
Noordkaap and that X had a right to an equitable remuneration for every form
of exploitation. In accordance with article 45d DCA an oral agreement that
excludes an equitable remuneration is not valid, because a restriction on this
remuneration must be in writing. The defense by Noordkaap that they earned
nothing was unsuccessful. A producer is obliged to pay remuneration even
when he granted the exploitation right to a third party for free, because this
producer had the power to demand a fee from that third party. Noordkaap
did not dispute the level of the equitable remuneration, therefore the Court
of Appeal awarded the full amount as claimed (C= 4,000.-).
In practice many problems arise around the question whether remuneration
is equitable. In the case of De Kleine Waarheid20 the court had to decide on
the amount of an equitable remuneration for a performer. Distributor Bridge
Rights distributed the well-known television series De Kleine Waarheid on DVD
in 2005. The performers received a remuneration varying from C= 150.- to C= 500.-
depending on the size of their part. Every performer accepted the remuner-
ation, except Van Selst. He claimed a remuneration of C= 7,000.-. Bridge refused
to pay this remuneration. The court decided that article 45d DCA did not give
clear guidance and that market value should determine the amount of the
remuneration. Van Selst did not have concrete market data to prove the need
for the higher remuneration, therefore the court had to rely on the market
survey of Bridge. It was evident from this survey that it is usual to pay an
all-in lump sum remuneration and no royalty for a supporting role. Further-
more, the remuneration is smaller when the number of participants is bigger.
In this case the fact that there were 92 people who participated in De Kleine
Waarheid and the fact that they all accepted the same remuneration, convinced
the court to consider the remuneration of C= 250.- as reasonable.
19 Court of Appeal Arnhem 6 January 2009, LJN BG9938 (X/Noordkaap TV Producties; Gewoon
Jannes).
20 District Court ’s-Gravenhage 8 July 2009, IEF 8049 (Acteur/Bridge Rigts; De Kleine Waarheid).
96 7 – Success and new technologies as unforeseen circumstances in intellectual property law
In the Bassie & Adriaan-case21 no additional remuneration was rewarded
at all. A group of performers with small parts in the Bassie & Adriaan series
claimed an equitable remuneration for exploitation of the series on DVD and
for the repeats on television from the companies of the leading actors Bassie
and Adriaan, which had taken over the production rights to the series. Not
all performers had agreements in writing. Claims related to series dating from
before 1 August 1985 were denied because article 45d DCA entered into force
on that date and was not given retroactive effect. In some contracts it was
explicitly agreed upon that the remuneration paid included the remuneration
for repeats, video cassettes and sale of television rights. According to the court
these performers only had a right to a one-off lump sum payment as equitable
remuneration, which they already had received. Just one claim remained in
this case. Bassie and Adriaan pleaded that the costs of the productions were
much higher than the proceeds would ever be. The performer had not disputed
the financial statements with any contrary evidence. According to the court
these circumstances were relevant for the amount of the remuneration. Because
of the additional circumstances, the contribution of the performer was minimal
and the remuneration that the performer had received earlier had been con-
siderable, the court decided to award no additional remuneration at all. Finally,
the court also ordered this performer to pay the costs of the proceedings.
Reliance on article 45d DCA in court has not brought much to actors and
authors in the Netherlands.
3.2 General civil-law concept of imprévision
Article 258 of Book 6 of the Dutch Civil Code (DCC) contains the following
provision:
1. Upon the demand of one of the parties, the court may modify the effects of a
contract or it may set it aside, in whole or in part, on the basis of unforeseen
circumstances of such a nature that the other party, according to standards of
reasonableness and fairness, may not expect the contract to be maintained in
unmodified form. The modification or setting aside may be given retroactive effect.
2. The modification or the setting aside shall not be pronounced to the extent that
it is common ground that the person invoking the circumstances should be account-
able for them or if this follows from the nature of the contract.
3. For the purposes of this article, a party to whom a contractual right or obligation
has been transmitted, is treated as a contracting party.
21 District Court Rotterdam 5 August 2009, B9 8103 (Stobbe c.s./Adrina Produkties en Bassie
Produkties).
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This provision is mandatory pursuant to article 25022 and elaborates on article
223 and article 24824 of Book 6 of the Dutch Civil Code (reasonableness and
fairness). Authors could possibly rely on this legal provision in case of special
unforeseen circumstances, such as special unforeseen new technological forms
of exploitation. However, there is as yet no case law indicating that such a
claim could be made successfully. There also is no evidence that article 258
of Book 6 of the Dutch Civil Code has had any influence on the contracting
practice in the Netherlands.
3.3 Germany
Between 1965 and 2002 the German Copyright Act contained a so-called
‘Bestseller’ provision in article 36 of the German Copyright Act (GCA):
‘If an author has granted an exploitation right to another party on conditions which
cause the agreed consideration to be grossly disproportionate to the returns and
advantages from the use of the work, having regard to the whole of the relationship
between the author and the other party, the latter shall be required, at the demand
of the author, to assent to a change in the agreement such as will secure for the
author some further equitable participation having regard to the circumstances’.
This clause was seldom applied because the condition of ‘gross disproportional-
ity’ was taken to be very strict. Through case law of the German Supreme
Court it was also decided that the ‘Bestseller’ provision could only apply if
the ‘gross disproportionality’ was unforeseen.25 This condition of ‘unforesee-
ability’ was criticized because it meant that only ‘naïve’ authors could profit
from the bestseller provision. Where an informed author clearly foresaw the
22 Article 6:250 DCC: ‘A contract may derogate from the following articles of this Section,
with the exception of articles 251, paragraph 3, 252, paragraph 2, to the extent that the
requirement of a notarial deed is concerned, and paragraph 3, 253, paragraph 1, 257, 258,
259 and 260.’
23 Article 6:2 DCC: ‘1. An obligee and obligor must, as between themselves, act in accordance
with the requirements of reasonableness and fairness.
2. A rule of law, usage or a juridical act which would otherwise bind them shall not apply,
insofar as, in the given circumstances, this would be unacceptable according to standards
of reasonableness and fairness’.
24 Article 6:248 of the Dutch Civil Code: ‘1. A contract not only has the juridical effects agreed
to by the parties, but also those which, according to the nature of the contract, result from
law, usage or the requirements of reasonableness and fairness.
2. A rule binding upon the parties as a result of the contract does not apply to the extent
that, in the given circumstances, this would be unacceptable according to standards of
reasonableness and fairness’.
25 German Supreme Court 27 June 1991, GRUR 1991, 901 (Horoscope-Calendar) and German
Supreme Court 22 January 1998, GRUR 1998, p. 680 (Comic-translations).
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later success of a work, but was not strong enough to negotiate a correspond-
ing remuneration, reference to the bestseller provision was useless.26
In 2002, together with the introduction of a general right to an equitable
remuneration for authors, the ‘Bestseller’ provision was changed into a ‘Fair-
ness’ provision in article 32a GCA:
‘If an author has granted an exploitation right to another party on conditions which
cause the agreed consideration to be conspicuously disproportionate to the returns
and advantages from the use of the work, having regard to the whole of the
relationship between the author and the other party, the latter shall be required,
at the demand of the author, to assent to a change in the agreement such as will
secure for the author some further equitable participation having regard to the
circumstances. It is not relevant whether the contracting parties foresaw or could
have foreseen the level of such returns or advantages’.
‘Gross disproportionality’ was replaced by ‘conspicuous disproportionality’
and an extra sentence was added stating that foreseeability was no longer
relevant. This new provision must be viewed in relation to the preceding article
32 GCA, which was also new in 2002 and introduced a general right to an
equitable remuneration:
‘For the grant of exploitation rights and permission to use a work the author is
entitled to the remuneration contractually agreed. If the rate of remuneration is
not settled, the remuneration shall be at an equitable level. If the agreed remunera-
tion is not equitable, the author may require from his contracting partner assent
to alter the contract so that the author is assured an equitable remuneration’.
Article 32 GCA contains the right of the author to revise a copyright contract
ex ante if the agreed remuneration is not equitable. Article 32a GCA contains
the right of the author to revise a copyright contract ex post if the agreed
remuneration turns out ‘conspicuously disproportionate’ (after the exploitation
has taken place and the profits have been made), and probably therefore ‘not
equitable’ either. ‘Unforeseeability’ is no longer relevant.
There is now some case law from the courts in Germany. So far the new
provisions of copyright contract law in Germany seem to have had little effect,
but have led to many questions and legal uncertainty.27 Must the ‘conspicuous
disproportionality’ be determined by comparing the remuneration of the author
with the net profit made by the producer or with the gross income by the
same? Can there only be ‘conspicuous disproportionality’ if the remuneration
26 A. Dietz, ‘Amendment of German Copyright Law in Order to Strengthen the Contractual
Position of Authors and Performers’, IIC 2002, p. 828.
27 See for example: N. Reber, ‘Der ‘Fairnessparagraph’, § 32a UrhG’, GRUR Int. 2010, p. 708
(709) and: C. Berger, ‘Sieben Jahre §§ 32ff. UrhG – Eine Zwischenbilanz aus Sicht der
Wissenschaft’, ZUM 2010, p. 90.
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of the author is below the level of ‘equitable remuneration’? Does the level
of ‘equitable remuneration’ depend on ‘the returns and advantages from the
use of the work’ aggregated by the producer? Is there always ‘conspicuous
disproportionality’ if the remuneration is not ‘equitable’? Is every author or
actor, including stand-ins, extras, make-up artists and all other people men-
tioned in the credits at the end of a film entitled to equitable remuneration
or revision of a contract on the basis of ‘conspicuous disproportionality’? The
Court of Appeal of Munich recently ruled that the graphic designer of the
introductory sequence of a police series on television cannot rely on the ‘con-
spicuous disproportionality’ clause.28
In another case, based on article 32 GCA, the German Supreme Court has
ruled recently that translators of books have a right to an equitable remunera-
tion on top of the agreed lump sum payment per page, consisting of a royalty
of 0.8% of the net sales price of hardcover editions and 0.4% of the net sales
price of pocket editions, after more than 5,000 copies have been sold.29 The
Court also ruled that translators always have a right to one fifth of the re-
muneration the original author receives. Does this mean the 5 x 0.4% = 2%
is(always) an equitable remuneration for original authors for sales over 5,000
copies of a hardcover edition? What does this mean for lump sum payments
or royalties for sales under 5,000 copies? Can those payments or royalties be
set at will by the publisher, taking account of the royalties for more than 5,000
copies? It seems quite unpredictable what the consequence of these kind of
decisions will be in the long run.
3.4 The Netherlands (proposed legislation)
On 1st of June 2010 the Dutch government released a preliminary draft for
a new system of copyright contracts in the Netherlands.30 This preliminary
draft contained several proposals including the abolition of the transferability
of ownership of copyright during the lifetime of the author and a maximum
duration of five years for exclusive licence agreements. These two far-reaching
proposals have been dropped by the spring of 2011, and will not be discussed
here. The preliminary draft is based to a large extent on the German example
described above.
This preliminary draft also contained a proposed article 25c.1 DCA contain-
ing a general right to an equitable remuneration:
28 Court of Appeal Munich 10 February 2011, 29 U 2749/10 (Böttrich-Merdjanowa/Bayerische
Rundfunk).<http://www.justiz.bayern.de/gericht/olg/m/presse/archiv/2011/02919/index.
php>.
29 German Supreme Court 20 January 2011, I ZR 19/09 (Destructive Emotions).
30 See <http://www.internetconsultatie.nl/auteurscontractenrecht/document/146> (accessed
June 2011).
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‘The author has a right to an equitable remuneration for the granting of an exclusive
licence for the exploitation of his work, in whole or in part.’
This preliminary draft also contained a bestseller or fairness paragraph31 (also
known as a disproportionality rule):32
Article 25d
1. Upon request of the author a court can change an exclusive licence agreement
in favour of the author, if the remuneration the author receives shows a serious
disproportionality with the profits in the exploitation of the work, in view of the
mutual performance of the parties. The court will also take into account the nature
and the further contents of the agreement, the way in which the agreement came
into existence, the mutual interests of the parties and all other circumstances of
the case.
2. To the aforementioned change can be given retroactive effect.
In the explanatory memorandum for this draft law33 it is mentioned that,
for a successful appeal based upon this disproportionality rule, there must
be a serious disproportionality with the profits in the exploitation of the work,
in view of the mutual performance of the parties. This serious disproportion-
ality must be established objectively. The subjective feeling of the author is
not relevant.
This disproportionality rule has a broad scope, in the sense that it applies
to situations in which the level of a lump sum payment has been too low, as
well as to situations with an insufficient royalty rate. That being said, according
to the draft explanatory memorandum, the rule will in practice be applied
less frequently with royalty agreements because the remuneration of the author
is then related to the number of copies sold. Not every disproportionality is
immediately a ground for a change by the courts of an exclusive licence
agreement. There must be a serious disproportionality. According to the draft
explanatory memorandum this will ensure that the producer or publisher will
have sufficient opportunity to recoup his investment. It also ensures, according
to the memorandum, that a producer or publisher, who is prepared to take
the entrepreneurial risk of exploiting the work, can make a profit. That is
necessary in order to be able to offset losses on other investments.
This disproportionality rule does not require that the serious disproportion-
ality was unforeseen at the time when the agreement was concluded. The rule
therefore also applies to agreements which were seriously disproportionate
31 Implementation of the bestseller paragraph has already been recommended in the past,
cf. P.B. Hugenholtz, Sleeping with the enemy, inaugural lecture University of Amsterdam
1999.
32 The provision will also apply to (the Dutch Law of) related rights, see preliminary draft
Article 2b.
33 See <http://www.internetconsultatie.nl/auteurscontractenrecht/> (accessed June 2011).
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from the beginning. That is the added value of this rule compared to article
258 of Book 6 of the Dutch Civil Code. The imprévision rule in that article could
be set aside easily by adopting a standard clause to cater for the possibility
of a large commercial success, without any upside for the authors or per-
formers.
The disproportionality rule only applies to authors as natural persons, not
to legal entities which can be titleholders on the basis of the employer right
or on the basis of article 8 DCA. The rules also apply to heirs who are natural
persons.
Producers and publishers cannot invoke the disproportionality rule. If the
exploitation of the work flops, they cannot ask the courts to change the agree-
ment to make the author share in the losses. A flop is part of the entrepreneur-
ial risk taken by the producer or publisher. According to the draft explanatory
memorandum a producer or publisher can limit the risk of a successful appeal
to the disproportionality rule by applying a royalty-based payment system.
Obviously, the big difficulty is to determine objectively whether the com-
pensation for the author is disproportionate, just as it is very difficult to
determine what an equitable remuneration is.34 What is a balanced division
between author and publisher or producers, is the fundamental question which
SEO Economic Research, the Amsterdam-based centre for scientific economic
research, rightly asks.35 Partially, the revenues of a copyrighted work are
determined by its market value, which is dependent on the talent of the author
or the preference of the buying public or the audience. But revenues also follow
from the investment made, usually by the producer or the publisher, in the
production, distribution and marketing. However, these values cannot exist
independently. The intrinsic value of a copyrighted work cannot be achieved
without production, distribution and marketing. Investments in production,
distribution and marketing lead nowhere if there is no valuable copyrighted
work. A royalty-based model seems attractive, because both the author and
the publisher or producer share in the profits. But royalties mean uncertainty
and an author being generally the more risk-averse person might want to
replace this uncertain income by a fixed fee to be paid by the less risk-averse
publisher or producer. According to SEO, the disproportionality rule is mainly
disproportionate for the publisher or producer. Producers want to be the
exclusive residual claimants and do not want to cut into their managerial
freedom. Artists usually have nothing but their human capital for a living and,
like ordinary workers, do not want to bear market risks. The publisher or
producer must recoup his investment and compensate for his losses in other
34 See e.g. SEO Economic Research, Prova d’Orchestra, Een economische analyse van het voorontwerp
auteurscontractenrecht, December 2010, p. 17, see: <http://www.seo.nl/uploads/media/dp59_
prova_d_orchestra.pdf> (accessed June 2011).
35 SEO Economic Research, Prova d’Orchestra, Een economische analyse van het voorontwerp
auteurscontractenrecht, December 2010, p. 17.
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investments. The only way to do so is to invest in many works, to ensure that
some of them are successful. The ‘equitability’ of the remuneration of bestseller
X depends on the flops of Y and Z, according to SEO. The question is how to
determine equitability. On the basis of the profitability of the publisher or
producer? Over which year or years? How far back do you go in time to
establish ‘equitability’? Do the flops in 1980 still count in 2010? Apparently,
there is very little sound economic basis for the proposed copyright contract
law.
It seems that the Dutch legislator wants to introduce copyright contract
law which is almost entirely based on the example of Germany. It is highly
questionable whether that is a wise decision, because it is clear that this model
has led to much uncertainty and many as yet unanswered questions in Ger-
many. The proposed legislation will create much legal uncertainty and will
leave it entirely to the courts to decide what is to be understood by ‘equitable
remuneration’ (for every mode of exploitation) and what is to be understood
by a ‘serious disproportionality’ between the remuneration the author receives
and the profits on the exploitation of the work, in view of the mutual perform-
ance of the parties, thereby taking into account the losses incurred by the
producer in other projects.
The creation of rules which allow parties to ask the courts to revise the
contract and ask for additional payment whenever the project involved turns
out to be a success, based on vague concepts such as ‘equitable remuneration’
or ‘serious disproportionality’, creates legal uncertainty.
This legal uncertainty may lead to fewer producers or credit-facilitators
in the Netherlands willing to invest in films and thereby to fewer films being
produced. In such a scenario the proposed legislation might turn out to be
counterproductive and lead to less work and less income for authors and actors
in the Netherlands.
4 CONCLUSION
In contract law the legislator must try to find the proper balance between socio-
economic equity and legal certainty and between general and vague concepts
and detailed legislation. As far as employee inventions are concerned Dutch
case law shows that employees/inventors will very seldom get additional
equitable remuneration. Authors and actors also very seldom get additional
remuneration on top of what has contractually been agreed upon, despite the
existence of a specific rule in article 45d DCA. The Dutch legislator seems to
want to follow the German example in the field of copyright contract law.
Because of the economic realities of the market place and the limited success
of the German example there is some doubt whether there is going to be any
benefit to actors and authors.
8 The Material Adverse Change clause from
a Dutch perspective: a solution for the




The recent economic and financial crises have set lawyers a difficult task: how
to make contracts crisis-proof? The M&A practice has long sought refuge with
the Material Adverse Change (MAC) clause; a boilerplate clause used to relieve
a buyer (or seller) from his contractual obligations in case the target company
suffers a MAC. Case law on the MAC clause is scarce,1 even in Delaware, where
most corporate cases in the United States are brought to court. The case law
currently available shows that judges are reluctant to accept that a material
adverse change has occurred and so the MAC clause has yet to prove its use
in court. However, the Nixon Peabody survey shows that a stunning 90% of
all M&A deals surveyed contain a MAC clause of some sort.2 So in practice,
the MAC clause is used extensively as a standard clause in M&A agreements.
This can be explained by the assumption that the MAC clause is not so much
used in court, as it is used as a bargaining tool for renegotiation.
The Dutch legal system codified the possibility for judges to ‘… modify
the effects of a contract or (…) [to] set it aside, in whole or in part, on the basis
of unforeseen circumstances of such a nature that the other party, according
to standards of reasonableness and fairness, may not expect the contract to
be maintained in unmodified form…’.3
This creates uncertainty for both parties. Does, for example, the economic
crisis constitute an unforeseen circumstance? Can a property developer walk
away from his contractual obligations by calling upon the unforeseen circum-
Vincent Engel is a master student company law at Leiden University.
1 Examples are: Delaware Ch. Court, IBP inc. v. Tyson Foods inc, (2001); Tennessee Ch. Court,
The Finish Line inc. v. Genesco inc (2007); and District Court of New York, Lasker v. UBS
Securities LLC (2008). A Dutch example is: Dutch Supreme Court 7 September 2007, LJN
BA2014 (Phoenix Acquisition Company Sarl v. Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V.).
2 9th Annual MAC Survey, Nixon Peabody LLP, New York, 2010, (<www.nixonpeabody.com/
linked_media/publications/MAC_Survey_2010.pdf>).
3 Article 258 of Book 6 of the Dutch Civil Code.
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stance exemption, when a sudden decrease in housing prices confronts him
with a deal that is no longer profitable? An equitable solution will sometimes
be hard to find as either the property developer or the seller will have to bear
the risk of these developments. It is questionable whether the codification of
the unforeseen circumstances exemption alone will be able to provide the
solution to this uncertainty. Rather, one might look towards the MAC clause
for an answer.
The MAC clause can be – and is being – used outside the M&A field.4 It
is a practical way to allocate risk between parties during the period between
the signing and closing of an agreement and can possibly provide a solution
for the uncertainty caused by relying solely on the unforeseen circumstances
exemption. This paper will examine the (dis)advantages of using the MAC
clause, its use as a tool to allocate risk between parties, as a means to give
parties additional ways out of a deal and as a method for better risk assess-
ment. I will then move on to the question whether it might prove to be a
solution to the uncertainty problem. Before doing so, recent developments
in the use of the MAC clause will be analysed. To illustrate the uncertainty that
the unforeseen circumstances doctrine can bring, two recent Dutch cases will
be discussed. Finally, I will argue that the MAC clause and the unforeseen
circumstances doctrine should complement each other to provide a reasonable
and fair outcome in the event of unforeseen circumstances.
2 HISTORY OF THE MAC CLAUSE5
The MAC clause is a standard clause used in almost every merger or acquisition
agreement.6 Although the specific wording and scope of the clause can differ
greatly from one contract to another, the goal is always the same: relieving
the buyer (or in some cases the seller) from a deal when a material adverse
change has occurred. The period of time between signing and closing of an
M&A deal may span three months or even a year. This is caused by e.g. waiting
for permission from regulatory institutions and/or due diligence reports. In
this period, many changes can occur to either the target company or the buyer.
The target company can lose important clients, key personnel, or suffer unfore-
seen losses. On the side of the buyer financing problems could occur.7 In the
event that such a change materializes, the buyer will want to walk away from
the deal, preferably without having to pay the usual walk-away fee. The MAC
4 For example in loan agreements.
5 As the MAC clause is most commonly used in M&A agreements, for reasons of simplicity,
this introduction will primarily use examples from the M&A practice.
6 9th Annual MAC Survey, Nixon Peabody LLP, 2010.
7 This became a more likely problem during the credit crunch. Think for example of the
bankruptcy of investment bank Lehmann Brothers in the fall of 2008.
Vincent Engel 105
clause seeks to facilitate both parties in determining when a party is relieved
from his contractual obligations, or when he is not.
The MAC clause was first used as a boilerplate clause in general wording
meant to include most unforeseen circumstances. During the negotiation
process the MAC clause did not get much attention. In recent years, however,
it has moved from a catch-all standard to a highly negotiated and specifically
designed clause with carve-outs and exceptions.8 In other words, the MAC
clause, originally designed to circumvent problems with unforeseen circum-
stances, has changed from an unforeseen circumstances clause to a clause that
specifically mentions what does and what does not constitute an (unforeseen)
material adverse change.9 The paradox is obvious.
A governmental judicial organ has still to decide a case allowing a MAC.
In Hexion Specialty Chemicals, Inc. et al. v. Huntsman Corp., C.A. No. 3841-VCL
(Sept. 29, 2008) the Delaware Chancery court states that:10
‘Many commentators have noted that Delaware courts have never found a material
adverse effect to have occurred in the context of a merger agreement. This is not
a coincidence. The ubiquitous material adverse effect clause should be seen as
providing a backstop protecting the acquirer from the occurrence of unknown
events that substantially threaten the overall earnings potential of the target in a
durationally-significant manner.’
This led the International Bar Association, at the Conference in October 2010,
to conclude that it is ‘Game over for MAC clauses’.11
The ‘new’ MAC clause and the uncertainty as to what actually can be
defined as a MAC, has perhaps taken away some of its core function: relieving
a party from its contractual obligations in case of a material adverse change.
To counter this problem, corporate lawyers now try to specify what, by its
nature, cannot be specified: an unforeseen circumstance.
By distinguishing between the function of a material adverse change clause
and the function of the unforeseen circumstance exemption, one might find
a solution for the current uncertainty.
8 R.J. Gilson & A. Schwartz, ‘Understanding MACs: Moral Hazard in Acquisitions’, The Journal
of Law, Economics, & Organization 2005, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 330-331.
9 This paper will not go into the many changes the MAC clause has undergone in recent
years, as it would exceed its scope. Comparing the yearly editions of the Nixon Peabody
Survey will provide a rough idea of recent trends and developments. Also, see: A.C. Elken,
‘Rethinking the Material Adverse Change Clause in Merger and Acquisition Agreements:
Should The United States Consider the British Model?’, Southern California Law Review 2008-
2009, Vol. 82, pp. 291-339.
10 Hexion Specialty Chemicals, Inc. et al. v. Huntsman Corp., C.A. No. 3841-VCL (Sept. 29, 2008)
at II.B.
11 International Bar Association 2010 Conference, ‘Game over for MAC clauses’, IBA Daily
News, 6 October 2010, p. 4.
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3 UNFORESEEN CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE SALE OF PROPERTY
Property developers face a difficulty when buying property: will current
housing prices increase or decrease? The 2007 crisis caused housing prices
to drop dramatically. In some cases this meant that prospected benefits turned
into losses. Although every property developer knows, or at least should know,
that housing prices can drop, there are examples in Dutch case law where the
buyer argued that he should be relieved from his contractual obligations as
the economic crisis was to be considered an unforeseen circumstance. They
called on Article 258 of Book 6 of the Dutch Civil Code and asked the court
to dissolve the contract or at least be exempted from liability for damages.
Two recent cases will be analysed here. The first case is between the muni-
cipality of Zutphen and the State of the Netherlands.12 Combined with the
second example, it will show that it is not always clear to parties when unfore-
seen circumstances can exempt the buyer from having to fulfil his contractual
obligations. Also, I will argue that the use of the MAC clause could have taken
away some of this uncertainty and might contribute to a more efficient deal.
3.1 Municipality of Zutphen v. State of the Netherlands
In July 2006 the State of the Netherlands signed an agreement with (among
others) the municipality of Zutphen, the local court, and the local office of
the public prosecutor. In summary, the agreement held that the State would
buy land and develop a new building to be occupied by the local office of
the public prosecutor. In a letter dated May 31, 2010 the municipality was told
that the new office would not be built, and that the office of the public prose-
cutor would be relocated outside the municipality.
The dispute focussed on the fact that the State refused to fulfil its con-
tractual obligations. It stated that as unforeseen circumstances occurred, it
could not reasonably be required to uphold the agreement. The office of the
public prosecutor has to cut cost and as such needs to reorganize. The office
in Zutphen will be merged with and relocated to a different municipality,
which results in the new building becoming redundant. The municipality, on
the other hand, points out that the State could have foreseen this change in
policy. As the planning for the reorganization started before the signing of
the agreement, the possibility of a change should be considered as already
having been taken into account.
The court decided that the State of the Netherlands could not and did not
have to take into account the possible changes that might occur after signing
the agreement. As nothing has been negotiated on the subject, the change in
policy and the changes that occurred due to the reorganization constitute
12 District Court of Den Haag 21 February 2011, LJN BP5123.
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unforeseen circumstances. The court then goes on to ask the question whether
these unforeseen circumstances should lead to the conclusion that the agree-
ment cannot reasonably remain unchanged. It considers that although the
municipality has a great interest in fulfilment of the contract, the State has
an even greater interest in not building the new office. The court concludes
that the State does not have to fulfil its contractual obligations, especially since
it offered to compensate the municipality for possible damages.
3.2 Plaintiffs v. Nieuwwaerde Projecten BV13
On March 14, 2009 the plaintiffs sold a property to Nieuwwaerde Projecten
BV, a property developer. The property was to be delivered and paid for on
July 1, 2009. A few days before the contract was to be concluded, the property
developer notified the plaintiffs of the fact that he would not be able to fulfil
his obligation to pay the purchase price. As renegotiations went nowhere, the
case came before the District Court of Zutphen. The plaintiffs requested that
the property developer should pay the fine as agreed upon in the sale agree-
ment and, in addition, should be held liable for damages. The damages claim
is based on the fact that due to the credit crunch, housing prices dropped and
so the property lost its original value. It is the plaintiffs’ view that the property
developer should bear this risk and as such he should be held accountable
for damages. The property developer should also bear the risk and responsibil-
ity for the fact that he could not get any financing for the deal, as this was
not a condition for closing the deal.
The property developer pleaded that he had started a procedure consider-
ing the realization of twelve apartments. Due to the economic crisis the market
for these apartments had collapsed. As a consequence the plans that had been
made for the property were no longer feasible. The long period of time
between signing and closing made it seem unnecessary, if not impossible, to
agree on a financing arrangement clause as a condition for closing the deal.
As the property developer was also held liable in person, he argued that at
the time when he agreed to his personal liability the risks were smaller. The
unforeseen circumstances have altered the implications of this agreement.
Therefore he cannot be held liable in person, nor should the current agreement
remain unchanged.
The court considers that the economy in general and the property market
in particular are subject to changes.14 Being a property developer, the defend-
ant should have known this fact. As such, the economic situation in which
13 District Court of Zutphen 30 September 2009, LJN BK3761.
14 ibid. § 4.4.
108 8 – The Material Adverse Change clause from a Dutch perspective
housing prices drop cannot constitute a truly exceptional, nor unforeseeable,
circumstance.15 As a result, Nieuwwaerde Projecten BV – and the property
developer personally – are ordered to pay the fine and damages to the plain-
tiffs.
When comparing these cases there is one important observation to be made.
The different outcomes in the cases do not look surprising and there appear
to be sufficient differences to justify the different outcomes. However, the
economic crisis plays an important role in both cases and the two courts both
needed to answer the question whether the change of circumstances was
unforeseeable. While the District Court of Zutphen argued that it is a well-
known fact that changes in the economy occur, the District Court of The Hague
considered the change in policy as a result of cutting costs to be unforeseeable.
Nevertheless, it is unclear why one situation is foreseeable and the other is
not. If the property developer cannot be exempted from liability for damages
because the dramatic drop in housing prices was foreseeable, should the State
then not know that a change in the economy could result in the need for
cutting cost? And was the possibility of a reorganization of the office of the
public prosecutor not foreseeable? If we were to assume that the economic
crisis does not constitute an unforeseeable circumstance in Plaintiffs v. Nieuw-
waerde Projecten BV, then the fact that the State offered compensation for
damages can, in my opinion, not justify the fact that the contract was dissolved
by calling upon Article 258 of Book 6 of the Dutch civil code.
The main focus point in these cases concerning unforeseeable circumstances
seems to be the (un)foreseeability of the change of circumstances. The apparent-
ly inconsistent rulings from the District Court of The Hague and the District
Court of Zutphen illustrate that there is much uncertainty regarding the scope
of the unforeseen circumstances exemption.
4 COULD THE MAC CLAUSE PROVIDE A SOLUTION?
Whether or not the State could have foreseen the change of circumstances,
difficulties and litigation could have been prevented by making express provi-
sions in the agreement. Also, Nieuwwaerde Projecten BV could have sought
protection by negotiating these same express provisions. Borrowing from the
M&A practice, the MAC clause is probably the most obvious example of such
a provision.
The MAC clause has two functions that could benefit parties in situations
such as those mentioned above. First, it gives parties the possibility to provide
for other ways out of a contract than those offered by the general provisions
15 To a certain degree the same argument has been made in the United Kingdom by Mr Justice
Coulson in Gold Group Properties Ltd v. BDW Trading Ltd, 2010, EWHC 323 (TCC).
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of contract law.16 Secondly, it is being used as a tool to allocate risk between
parties.17
The first function is perhaps the most obvious one. As contract law pro-
vides only a general framework to facilitate contracting between parties, it
cannot and should not regulate every possible contingency. This does mean,
that in some cases the frustration, force majeure, or unforeseen circumstances18
provisions provided by contract law – whether codified or not – do not provide
contracting parties with the possibility to expressly agree on a change of
circumstances they want to account for in their agreement. Thus, when parties
rely solely on contract law to solve future differences when a change of circum-
stances occurs, they might be surprised by the outcome of their conflict.
This is where the MAC clause’s first function becomes more apparent. By
making use of the MAC clause, parties have the opportunity to expressly agree
on certain circumstances that should be considered as unforeseen circum-
stances, or a material adverse change. By doing so, they take away at least
some of the uncertainty that arises from a conflict in which parties rely solely
on contract law.
The project developer could, for example, negotiate a MAC clause that
protects him from a deterioration of the property market by agreeing on a
certain level of profitability of the project. If this level of profitability cannot
be reached, he would then have the right to walk away from the deal. Parties
could also agree that any change in the economy does not constitute a material
adverse change. Carve-outs or exceptions to this clause could further specify
what does and what does not constitute an unforeseen circumstance or material
adverse change. By making explicit what parties understand by unforeseen
circumstances or a material adverse change, the MAC clause could prevent
litigation over the (un)foreseeability of a change of circumstances.
This brings us to the second function of the MAC clause, which is, to a
certain extent, a consequence of the first function. As parties actively negotiate
the MAC clause they immediately assign the risks for the period between
signing and closing. It does not matter who bears the risk in the end, for as
long as parties know which risks they are taking, they can assess these risks
more easily and thus take better-informed decisions. Also, if the property
developer had fully assumed the possible risks of what could happen in the
16 L. Alpren-Waterman, ‘Frustration and Material Adverse Change – The Secret to Avoiding
Contracts in Troubled Times?’, Barlow Lyde & Gilbert LLP 2010, p. 3. (<http://www.blg.co.
uk//pdf/Gold%20Group.pdf>)
17 A.J. Macias., Risk Allocation and Flexibility in Acquisitions: The Economic Impact of Material-
Adverse-Change (MACs) Clauses (AFA 2009 San Francisco Meetings Paper), 17 April 2009,
p. 31 (<ssrn.com/abstract=1108792>).
18 Although subtle differences between these terms exist, it would exceed the scope of this
paper to go into these differences. These are just some examples of more or less the same
principle trying to adjust for a change of circumstances that was unforeseeable and makes
a contractual obligation impossible or much more onerous to perform.
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two years between signing and closing, he might have negotiated a different
price. When risk is assigned to the buyer, he will be less likely to offer the
full price for the property. If risk is assigned to the seller, he will want a higher
price as the property becomes more valuable when risk is almost non-existent.
The allocation of risk to either party will be reflected in the price.19
In short, the MAC clause offers explicitly stated possibilities for a way out
of a contract other than those offered by contract law. It also allocates risk
between parties and thus allows them to take these risks into account when
negotiating a price.
The question that needs answering now is how the MAC clause can be
incorporated into the Dutch legal system that codified the possibility for judges
to
‘… modify the effects of a contract or (…) [to] set it aside, in whole or in part, on
the basis of unforeseen circumstances of such a nature that the other party, accord-
ing to standards of reasonableness and fairness, may not expect the contract to
be maintained in unmodified form…’.
Some might fear an overlap with Art. 258 of Book 6 of the Dutch Civil Code
and argue that the MAC clause puts in a contractual form what corporate law
already provided for. Despite a possible overlap, the MAC clause distinguishes
itself by being more specific and allowing parties to evaluate their risk in
advance. The codified unforeseen circumstances exemption and the MAC clause
complement each other. Since the MAC clause moved from a general catch-all
solution to a more specific and more negotiated clause it has gained in clarity
what it has lost in protection. One cannot account for the unforeseeable and
by specifying certain risks one is bound to exclude others. Instead of opting
for the unforeseen circumstances doctrine or the MAC clause exclusively, we
should combine the strengths of both. Contracting parties should find a balance
between unforeseen circumstances provisions and the MAC clause.20 By speci-
fying and therewith allocating certain risks in a MAC clause, parties have less
uncertainty and should be able to assess their risks more accurately. For those
circumstances that cannot be accounted for – because they are simply unfore-
seeable – they can rely on the unforeseen circumstances provision and find
a fair and reasonable solution for the new situation.
19 See: Macias 2009, p. 17, who grounds this thesis for mergers and acquisitions on empirical
research.
20 While keeping in mind that those circumstances described in the MAC clause can, by
definition, not be regarded as unforeseen.
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5 CONCLUSION
The MAC clause has undergone a make-over in recent years. It has moved away
from a boilerplate solution to a heavily negotiated, specific and complex clause.
These changes and the lack of affirmative case law has led scholars and law-
yers to believe that perhaps the MAC clause can no longer achieve its goals
and has become obsolete. The Nixon Peabody survey shows that the MAC
clause is still an important contractual tool to allocate risk and provide a way
to walk away from a deal.
The two cases mentioned above illustrate the paradoxical, if not contra-
dictory, way the unforeseen circumstances doctrine, as codified in the Dutch
Civil Code, can work. It is my belief that in both cases the use of a MAC clause
could have prevented litigation, or at the least have accommodated a better
assessment and allocation of risk. Bearing a risk one knows of is to be preferred
to possibly bearing a risk one does not know of.
The combination of the unforeseen circumstances exemption and the MAC
clause, not competing with, but complementing each other, could provide for
more certainty in the period between signing and closing.

9 Change of circumstances: the Trento project
Ewoud Hondius
1 INTRODUCTION
The financial crisis has raised a number of legal questions, one of which is
whether or not contracts may be modified or abrogated1 in case of a change
of circumstances.2 The issue is not wholly novel. It has been the subject of
debate ever since medieval times.3 Do all contracts contain an implicit clause
that they are only valid when the circumstances remain unchanged: the clausula
rebus sic stantibus? European jurisdictions provide different solutions to this
question. But do they in fact diverge where practical issues are concerned?
That is the question which one of the Trento/Torino common core of European
private law working groups has set out to answer. The group’s report was
published last year;4 its main findings are set out below in nrs. 3-9. Before
doing so, this paper purports to give some insight into the group’s method-
ology in nr. 2.
2 THE COMMON CORE OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW PROJECT
The Common core of European private law project is based on the combined ideas
of ‘the two Rudi’s’: Rodolfo Sacco and Rudi Schlesinger. Sacco (1923-) is the
godfather of Italian comparative law5 and the author who coined the idea
of ‘legal formants’.6 Having held a chair in Trieste and Pavia, since 1971 he
has been associated with the University of Torino. Schlesinger (1909-1996) was
Ewoud Hondius is professor of European Private Law, University of Utrecht, and founder
of the BW-krant (1970), the predecessor of the BW-Krant Jaarboek (E.H.Hondius@uu.nl).
1 A similar question is whether parties may be obliged to renegotiate the contract. This
question is taken up by Rodrigo Momberg in his contribution to this volume.
2 This paper will use the words ‘change of circumstances’ interchangeably with ‘unexpected
circumstances’.
3 Famous cases include the French Canal de Craponne case (DP 76.1.195, Grand arrêts nr. 94)
and the English coronation cases Krell v Henry, [1903] 2 KB 740 and Herne Bay Steam Boat
v Hutton, [1903] 2 KB 683.
4 Ewoud Hondius, Hans Christoph Grigoleit (eds), Unexpected Circumstances in European
Contract Law, Cambridge: University Press, 2011, 692 p.
5 Witness his Introduzione al diritto comparato (1979) and his I Grandi sistemi giuridici (1996).
6 Rodolfo Sacco, ‘Legal formants: a dynamic approach to comparative law’, 39 American Journal
of Comparative Law 1-34 and 343-401 (1991).
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an American of German extraction who taught in Cornell, where he came up
with the theory of the common core of legal systems. According to this theory
jurisdictions may have widely diverging points of departure, but in fact the
outcome of litigation is often the same. Thus, even if specific performance is
the prevailing remedy in continental law, in fact courts will often award
damages, just like in common-law jurisdictions. Schlesinger set out to test his
ideas in a celebrated research project on formation of contract.7 It was in Italy
that the project was to be continued on a much larger scale. In 1993, two young
(at the time) Professors at the University of Trento, Mauro Bussani and Ugo
Mattei, founded the Common core of European private law project.8 There
were to be three groups, on Contract, Property and Tort. All three are taken
in a very wide sense, including for instance Environmental liability and ecological
damage9 and The enforcement of competition law in Europe.10 The three groups
have annually come together, first in Trento, and then – when the two
convenors continued their careers elsewhere – in Torino. Apart from the
meetings of the three working groups there are also plenary sessions, where
not only general issues are discussed but outsiders are also invited to critically
evaluate the group’s methodology.11 There is open access to the three groups,
which provides a rare chance for young graduates to mingle with old diehards
of comparative law.
It was the Contract group chaired by James Gordley which in 2000 invited
the author of this paper to chair a working group on Change of circumstances.
The group was to elaborate on the work of an earlier working group on Good
faith, which had included one question on change of circumstances.12 Ten
years later, the work came to fruition. How come the elaboration lasted so
long? Several arguments may be advanced. First, the common core project
has no standardised procedure how to arrive at a questionnaire. Usually it
is the general reporter who submits a draft to e.g. the Contract group. In other
cases, such as in the present project, the questionnaire was arrived at in meet-
ings of the working group, the members of which therefore first had to be
7 Rudi Schlesinger (ed.), Formation of Contracts/A Study of the Common Core of Legal Systems,
Dobbs Ferry: Oceana, 1968, 2 vols., 1 727 p.
8 See among their various publications Mauro Bussani and Ugo Mattei (eds.), Opening up
European law, Bern: Stämpfli, 2007, 283 p.
9 Monika Hinteregger (ed.), Environmental liability and ecological damage, Cambridge:
University Press, 2008, 697 p.
10 Thomas Möllers and Andreas Heinemann (eds.), The Enforcement of Competition Law in
Europe, Cambridge: University Press, 2008, 713 p.
11 See for instance Günter Frankenberg, How to do projects with comparative law – notes
of an expedition to the common core, 6 Global Jurist 2006, issue 2 (this critical appraisal
of the Trento group at the time highly annoyed some of the project’s staunch supporters
such as James Gordley).
12 Reinhard Zimmermann and Simon Whittaker (eds.), Good Faith in European Contract Law,
Cambridge: University Press, 2000, pp. 557-577.
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appointed.13 Also, a second general reporter, Hans Christoph Grigoleit,
presently from the University of Munich, was proposed and accepted. All of
this took time: democracy has its price. Second, the project itself provided no
incentive to establish sharp deadlines; on the contrary, why finish a project
which each year invites its participants to a conference in a wonderful Italian
city, with a precious mix of old established comparative lawyers and fresh
graduates, East and West, practitioners and academics. Third, within this
working group policy-oriented issues – and more particularly the question
whether they should be taken up at all – took up quite some discussion time.
Should the group remain neutral vis-à-vis the aversion of some jurisdictions
to at least providing for the opportunity to open up contracts? As opposed
to most other projects, the Trento Common core of European private law team
does not have any (outright) political programme, such as harmonisation of
private law. Instead, it focuses on one central issue. This is the contention of
Rudolf Schlesinger that much as the various jurisdictions may differ from one
another when it comes to the starting point, the end results are often the same
or at least very similar.
Fourth, as the readers of Perlmanns Schweigen14 will know, the obligation
to render a manuscript can become problematic. What to do when an author
ignores the deadline set by the group? This depends on the Chapter. It may
well be conceivable to have a comparative study without Denmark or Finland,
without the Netherlands or Portugal. Such jurisdictions may be left out without
causing major problems to the project as a whole. But a project without Eng-
land and France? That is precisely what threatened in the case of the change
of circumstances project. When the original English and French reporters had
to resign, it had to be decided to look for stand-ins. We were fortunate to get
the help of Denis Philippe, who not only contributed the missing chapter on
his native Belgium, but also that on French law (which actually is very close
to Belgian law). English law also happens to be close to a jurisdiction for which
we fortunately did have a report, namely Ireland. Like their Belgian counter-
part, the Irish reporters undertook to write the national report on English law,
which was familiar to them because it provided the foundation of Irish contract
law.
The last element which caused some delay was the production process.
First, the publisher had to decide whether or not to publish the work at all.
We were quite unaware that at Cambridge University Press this decision is
a collective one taken by ‘the Syndicates of the Press’, all, we understand,
13 In the end Odavia Bueno Diaz, Marta Cenini, Robert Clark, Júlio Gomes, Carsten Herresthal,
Cliona Kelly, Bert Lehrberg, Barbara Luppi, Brigitta Lurger, Francesco Macario, Laura
Macgregor, Luz Martínez Velencoso, Valentinas Mikelenas, Kim Oestergaard, Francesco
Parisi, Denis Philippe, Antonio Pinto Monteiro, Andreas Thier, Raphael Thunhart, Luboš
Tichý, Matjaž Tratnik, Anastassios Valtoudis and Willem Wiggers participated in the final
text.
14 Pascal Mercier, Perlmanns Schweigen, München: Knaus, 1995.
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academics affiliated with Cambridge University. Then, the manuscript had
to be adapted to the publisher’s guidelines. Finally the text was handed over
to a copy editor, who – it must be said – did a splendid job, once again,
however, at the cost of time.
Apart from the time element involved in team work, several other of the
group’s experiences could be analysed. The selection of cases for the question-
naire was of course of primary importance. The change of circumstances group,
as opposed to some other groups, tried to be as concise as possible, which
resulted in leaving out some specific contracts. This was also the reason why,
unlike our original plans, we did not include chapters on American law,
administrative law and (public) international law as some other volumes –
we did, however, include chapters on legal history and law & economics. Other
issues which had to be solved were to what extent the solutions to the cases
should be preceded by general descriptions of the various national jurisdictions
and the question which general notions, which may also provide relief, should
be covered. Notions such as abus de droit, force majeure, good faith, impossibility,
interpretation, mistake, unfair contract terms and unjust enrichment may
indeed be of relevance.
3 ‘OPEN’ VERSUS ‘CLOSED’ LEGAL SYSTEMS15
Now coming to the substance of the matter, during the research, the group
drew a distinction between ‘open’ and ‘closed’ legal systems. The distinction
is based on the criterion whether or not a jurisdiction recognizes a general
rule under which the contract can be adjusted to unexpected circumstances
by the courts. The distinction led to the following groups: as ‘open’ legal
systems we qualified those of Austria, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, the
Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden. We characterized as ‘closed’ jurisdictions
those of Belgium, Denmark, England, France, Ireland, Scotland and Slovenia.
To a certain extent this distinction goes along with the classic division into
legal families. Not very surprisingly, the common law tradition and the French
influence (‘closed’ jurisdictions) led to similarities in the doctrinal approach
to cases on the one hand, as did the German tradition (‘open’ jurisdictions)
on the other hand.16
However, the distinction between ‘open’ and ‘closed’ jurisdictions did not
survive the test wholly unscathed as far as the outcome of our cases is con-
cerned. Thus, the distinction between ‘open’ and ‘closed’ jurisdictions is a
15 The following is to a large extent based on the book Unexpected circumstances in European
contract law, referred to above.
16 Rodrigo Momberg in his PhD thesis The Effect of a Change of Circumstances on the Binding
Force of Contracts (PhD thesis Utrecht 2011, Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2011) arrives at a similar
distinction between ‘receptive’ and ‘non-receptive’ systems.
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rough doctrinal approach rather than a clear indication of differences with
regard to the result of a certain case. It is fair to say that the recognition of
a general and flexible rule providing for relief in cases of unexpected circum-
stances may make it easier for the courts to set aside a contract. Yet, the strict
requirements for relief and the variety of other legal concepts dilute the effects
of any particular doctrine. In a jurisdiction such as the Netherlands, for
example, where a provision in the Civil Code allows adjustment of the contract
in case of a change of circumstances, this provision is used so rarely that one
may occasionally ask whether this is not rather a ‘closed’ system. Likewise,
Slovenia, which we qualified as a ‘closed’ jurisdiction, seems to be on the
borderline with the ‘open’ systems. The distinction was drawn based on
doctrinal aspects and the differences between the two groups remain on a
doctrinal level.
This rather diffuse picture with regard to results in the ‘open’ and ‘closed’
legal systems can be explained by the complex interference of different legal
concepts that are applied to cases involving unexpected circumstances. Even
if a jurisdiction does not recognise an ‘exceptional’ doctrine allowing for an
adjustment of the contract, ‘conventional’ doctrines may be applied with similar
results. In addition, in many jurisdictions specific legislation exists that is
directed at dealing with the consequences of certain exceptional events on the
contractual exchange. This complex interference of concepts complicates
conclusions on a general level and makes a clear distinction between the
groups difficult as far as the results are concerned.
Yet, it seems fair to say that the recognition of a general and flexible rule
providing for relief in cases of unexpected circumstances may make it easier
for the courts to set aside a contract. Across all the cases, the ‘open’ juris-
dictions actually seem to be more open towards equitable relief than the
‘closed’ ones, while the latter systems express a higher esteem for the principle
of pacta sunt servanda. It is also interesting to see that this division corresponds
remarkably with the distinction between fault liability (‘open’ jurisdictions)
and strict liability (‘closed’ jurisdictions17).
4 CONVERGENCE AS TO THE GENERAL ISSUE OF THE BINDING CHARACTER
OF THE CONTRACT TERMS
Before I turn to a more systematic analysis of the doctrinal concepts, it is
remarkable to observe that in most cases there is a clear tendency as far as
the results are concerned, i.e. whether or not a certain unexpected event
justifies suspending the binding character of the terms of contract and to limit
the principle of pacta sunt servanda. It should be noted, however, that these
17 See case 14 below.
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tendencies only relate to the suspensory effect as such while the legal con-
sequences (adjustment or termination) may vary in detail. I shall examine these
tendencies in the four different groups that we have established for our cases:
a) Equivalence of exchange is substantially affected
1) With regard to the first group of cases in which the ‘equivalence of the
exchange has been affected’ we can conclude that under the law of all juris-
dictions long-term agreements can lose their binding effect if, in the course
of time, the initially fixed price grows out of proportion to the value of the
object.18 In many jurisdictions, the right to terminate long-term contracts is
an essential element of their contract law. Such a right is, in effect, based on
the rationale that in the course of long-term agreements unexpected effects
can occur that cannot be provided for by the parties in advance. This cor-
respondence becomes evident under the German rules on unexpected circum-
stances which contain a separate section dealing with the effects of unexpected
events on long-term contracts (§ 314 BGB) besides the general provision on
Störung der Geschäftsgrundlage (§ 313 BGB).
2) There is generally much reservation as to the question whether extra-
ordinary inflation can affect credit agreements. Only some of the ‘open’ juris-
dictions mitigate the consequences for the burdened party while applying very
strict standards.19 This reservation can be referred to the nominal value prin-
ciple under which the amount of a monetary debt is based on its nominal and
not on its ‘real’ value. Inflation is a ubiquitous phenomenon of the economy
and distinctions between regular and excessive conditions are hard to draw.
18 Case 1 ‘Canal de Craponne’: Long-term agreement – devaluation of the price agreement.
Early in the 20th century, the farmers A and B entered into a contract under which A
promised to build and maintain an irrigation channel; B was entitled to extract water at
a fixed price. The contract was concluded for an unlimited period of time. Almost 100 years
later, A’s successors ask for an increase in the price arguing that due to inflation and a
rise in the cost of maintenance as well as labour the agreed price has become completely
inadequate.
Is the claim by A’s successors justified? Are they, alternatively, entitled to terminate the
contract?
19 Case 2 Extraordinary inflation: Hardship due to extraordinary inflation; hardship resulting from
a foreign currency agreement (Extraordinary inflation).
A receives a loan from the B-Bank. Under the agreement, the interest rate is fixed at 10
percent for five years. In the last 20 years before the agreement, the rate of inflation had
been relatively stable within a range of one to six percent. In the third year after the
conclusion of the agreement, the economic situation begins to destabilize and inflation rises
quickly to 50 percent.
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Unsurprisingly, due to its speculative nature, the jurisdictions are even more
reluctant to grant relief in the case of a foreign currency agreement.20
3) We can observe a tendency towards relief in cases, in which government
intervention has strongly affected the contractual equilibrium, even though
the ‘closed’ jurisdictions are more reluctant to grant relief. This trend can be
attributed to the consideration that government action is often elementary to
the parties’ interests and evidently beyond their control.
4) Under a majority of jurisdictions, unexpected benefits do not trigger any
form of relief, even if the benefits are out of proportion with the considera-
tion.21 It appears that one-sided windfall profits arising from the contract
do not elicit the same inclination for equitable compensation as excessive losses.
b) Recipient’s use of goods or services is substantially affected
1) In the cases from group B where the ‘recipient’s use of goods or services
is substantially affected’, government intervention seems to be, again, a clear
example for judicial intervention: relief is predominantly granted if the lease
of a petrol station becomes worthless to the lessee as petrol is no more avail-
able due to confiscation in wartime.22 However, in the majority of the juris-
dictions an export ban that is already present at the time of contracting does
not justify relief for the burdened party even if both parties expected that the
20 Case 2B: B-Bank asks for an adjustment or for a termination of the contract (Variation: foreign
currency agreement).
The loan agreement between A and the B-Bank provides for repayment and interest in
a foreign currency. In the last 10 years before the agreement, the relevant exchange rate
had been relatively stable within a range of 20 percent. Subsequently, the national currency
is devaluated by 80 percent compared to the foreign currency.
A asks for an adjustment or for a termination of the contract.
21 Case 4 Unexpected benefit: Long-term lease – extraordinary increase of the rental value
B leases business premises from A for a fixed period of 15 years. Shortly after concluding
the contract, the character of the area changes strongly and unexpectedly: A military airport
located nearby is shut down and an enormous amount of public funds is invested in the
area (infrastructure etc.). As a consequence, B´s business soars and his profits are 500%
of what he could reasonably have expected. By the same token, the rental value of compar-
able business premises in the same area rises to 500% of the amount A and B have agreed
upon. A claims that the leasing price is to be adjusted accordingly or, alternatively, that
the agreement is to be terminated.
Is A’s claim justified?
22 Case 6 Confiscation of petrol: Government intervention makes the use of a rented petrol station
impossible
A leases a petrol station from B. Due to the outbreak of war, the government confiscates
all petrol in that area and it is impossible for A to obtain petrol from any source. As a result,
A can make no use of the petrol station. He stops the payment on the lease.
Is A’s refusal to pay the rent justified?
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ban would be suspended.23 The reason for upholding the contract in this case
is that the parties knew about the risk of the ban and the misjudgement of
an identified risk is held not to justify a relief.
2) When a promised work of construction (in our case: a cellar) becomes
useless to the client due to a natural disaster (destruction of the rest of the
building), all legal systems give him the right to cancel the completion of the
work because it has become useless. With regard to the question of compensa-
tion, the jurisdictions are basically divided into two groups: according to one
approach, the contractor remains entitled to the full contract price less the
expenses he saves by not having to carry out the work, e.g. wages, material
etc (Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, France and Slovenia). Thereby the
contractor is awarded his contractual profits and the risk that the contract has
become useless is allocated to the client. The argument for this is that the house
is in his sphere of risk and control. In other jurisdictions, the contractor’s claim
for his contractual profits is reduced by some form of equitable adjustment
and therefore the risk is distributed between both parties (e.g. Germany, the
Netherlands, Portugal, England and Ireland). This solution is based upon the
notion that the risk in question is not rooted in the house itself but in the
natural disaster which is beyond either party’s control.24
23 Case 10 Export ban: Purchaser of technical equipment is affected by export ban
Firm A purchases technical equipment which is to be produced by firm B. The parties know
that firm A plans to resell the equipment to Iraq. At the time of contracting, exports to
Iraq are illegal but the parties expect that the status quo will change before the time of
delivery. The parties are aware that the equipment can only be sold to Iraq at a reasonable
price. When firm B has completed production and offers delivery, exports to Iraq are still
illegal and no change is in sight. Firm A refuses acceptance and payment.
Is A’s refusal to accept and pay justified?
24 Case 5 Destruction of cellar: Renovation of cellar becomes useless due to the destruction of the
building by a natural disaster
A agrees to refurbish B’s cellar into a wine cellar. The work is scheduled to start one month
after the agreement. Before the work has started, B’s house is completely destroyed during
a violent summer storm. However, the cellar of the house remains fully intact. B immediate-
ly informs A and asks him not to perform. A insists on the agreement. He argues that B’s
cellar is still intact, that he has reserved two weeks to carry out the work and that he has
already purchased the necessary materials.
Is B obliged to pay the contract price or, alternatively, to compensate A for his losses?
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3) In the hotel reservation case the four events presented25 display different
tendencies: there is broad correspondence with regard to the conclusion that
the frustration of individual purposes (exhibition cancelled26) and disturbances
in transport (strike27) do not relieve the customer from his contractual obliga-
tions as these risks fall in the sphere of the customer. There is a certain
tendency towards relief in the case involving terrorist threats;28 however,
much seems to depend on the facts (e.g. the probability and the foreseeability
of the attacks). A clear tendency for relief can be stated in the coronation case:
the fact that the price reflects the procession leads most reports to conclude
that the hotel owner has to bear the risk.29
4) With regard to the shop rental case, a clear majority of the jurisdictions
denies relief to the shop owner who claims that the business environment has
developed unfavourably. This risk is considered not to be unusual and there-
fore the shop owner could and should have provided for it by implementing
a protective term.30 The jurisdictions under scrutiny are more likely to grant
relief, however, if the owner of a bar is bound under a long-term supply
agreement to sell only one kind of beer and this beer turns out to be unpopular
among the guests.31 Here, the long-term character of the contract may
25 Case 7 Hotel reservation: Individual purpose of the visit frustrated; strike by airport personnel;
general safety endangered; coronation case
A booked a room at B’s hotel, but:
a) The exhibition he wants to visit is cancelled at the very last moment.
b) A terrorist movement declares that it is to launch a campaign against tourists in that
town.
c) An unforeseeable strike by airport personnel prevents A from travelling to the city where
the hotel is located at the specified time.
d) The coronation procession scheduled on the respective date is cancelled. The room has
a view of the street where the procession was supposed to take place. Due to the extra-
ordinary event, the agreed price is ten times higher than the regular price.
Is A entitled to cancel the reservation?
26 Case 7 (a).
27 Case 7 (c).
28 Case 7 (b).
29 Case 7 (d).
30 Case 8 Shop rental: Renting a retail outlet; unexpected business environment at a shopping centre
A is the owner of a bookshop. He contracts with B to rent business accommodation in B’s
shopping centre. The fixed period of the lease is 5 years. The shopping centre has just been
built and a large part of the accommodation is still unoccupied. Both parties expect at the
time of contracting that a variety of shops (the hotel and catering trade, retail sales) will
be located there. One year later almost all the accommodation is rented, but ¾ of the
shopping centre consists of restaurants and cafes. For that reason most potential customers
visit the shopping centre after A closes the doors of his bookshop.
Is A entitled to an adjustment or to a termination of the contract?
31 Case 9 Beer supply agreement: Long-term supply of beer; beer sales are far below expectations
A, the owner of a bar, enters into an exclusive supply agreement with beer brewery B for
a fixed period of 15 years. Pursuant to the contract, A is obliged to accept and pay for a
specific quantity of beer on a monthly basis, while he is allowed to use technical equipment
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strengthen the case for relief as well as the fact that the risk in question (the
popularity of the beer) might be qualified as falling within the sphere of the
brewery.
c) Failure of a specified purpose (other than a) and b))
Both of the cases that were dealt with under the heading ‘specified purposes’
show a tendency in favour of relief:
1) The assumption that the sold property will be used for cultural purposes
will suffice for setting aside the agreement if it is used for other purposes
because this assumption is – similarly to the coronation case – reflected in the
price.32 Here, the requirements of equity can quite easily be reconciled with
the principle of pacta sunt servanda on the basis of ‘conventional’ doctrines
(especially constructive interpretation).
2) In the case of divorce, the investment of one spouse in the property of the
other one can give rise to a claim for compensation in most jurisdictions if
divorce law does not provide for just results.33 This solution can be based
on the consideration that the reliance on the durability of the marriage should
be legally protected.
and furnishings owned by B. The consumption of beer, however, remains far below expecta-
tions. The bar is well attended but the ‘B beer’ is unpopular amongst customers at A’s bar.
A requests an adjustment or the termination of the agreement.
Is A’s claim justified?
32 Case 11 Sale of real estate involving expectation of cultural use: Use of real estate by transferee
does not comply with expectations of the transferor
A sells his family home to B at a price far below its market value. Both parties assume
that B would dedicate the house to cultural purposes only. However, this assumption was
not inserted in the contract as an explicit condition. B changes his mind and gives it to
one of his daughters instead.
Is A entitled to ask for the difference between the agreed price and the market value or,
alternatively, to reclaim the house?
33 Case 12 Investment in spouse’s house is frustrated by divorce: Equitable compensation if
divorce laws lack a basis for compensation. Before A and B marry, they enter into a prenuptial
agreement, in which they agree on the separation of property. During the marriage A buys a
house and A and B use the house as their family home. The price of the house is C= 500,000.
A is the sole proprietor of the house, but B has contributed C= 100,000 to the purchase price.
In addition, B carries out extensive renovation work before they move in. The renovation
would have cost C= 50,000 if professional services had been employed. After A and B have
lived together in the house for one year, they separate and then divorce. Divorce law does
not provide a basis for compensation.
Is B entitled to compensation for his contributions to the family home?
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d) Mutual mistake and miscellaneous issues
1) A clear tendency can be stated in the case in which the parties of a share
deal were mutually mistaken concerning the market value of shares.34 Here,
the burdened party is generally entitled to set aside the agreement on the fixed
price, as both parties share the responsibility for the mistake. Another tendency
is that the party burdened by the false price fixing is not entitled to enforce
a price agreement that reflects the ‘true value’ because the other party’s reliance
on the written price agreement must equally be taken into account. Notable
exceptions are the common-law jurisdictions of England and Ireland where
no remedy is granted and thereby the risk of the mutual mistake is allocated
only to the party burdened by the ‘false’ price calculation in the written
contract.
2) In Case 14,35 the effect of unexpected circumstances on the respective rules
on breach of contract was analysed. The question here is whether the seller
would be excused from his liability in damages due to the unexpected nature
of the impediment. Even though many jurisdictions tend to solve this case
on the basis of their (‘conventional’) doctrines on breach of contract, a clear
distinction between the ‘open’ and ‘closed’ jurisdictions can be observed. The
main reason for this is that the distinction between the ‘open’ and the ‘closed’
jurisdictions is in line with the division between systems that apply a fault
liability regime with regard to contractual damages and those jurisdictions
that provide for strict liability. On the basis of their strict liability regime, there
is a clear tendency to holding A liable for damages among the ‘closed’ juris-
dictions. The findings of the ‘open’ jurisdictions remain somewhat vague due
to the limited factual basis of the given case. However, it becomes quite clear
that, subject to the factual details of the case, A has strong arguments to
challenge his liability in many of the ‘open’ jurisdictions. The lack of a clear
34 Case 13 Share deal – mutual mistake: False determination of the market value in a share deal.
A holds shares of X corporation. He agrees to sell the shares to B at the current price as
listed by the stock exchange on the day of contracting. In the written contract, the parties
set a price of C= 10 per share. However, the actual price per share on the day of contracting
is C= 12. The Internet service from which the parties derived the price had displayed an
incorrect number. When A discovers the correct price, he demands that the purchase price
be increased to C= 12. Can A ask for a price of C= 12 per share? Can he, alternatively, terminate
the contract?
35 Case 14 Impediments of production beyond seller’s control: Production of contractual goods
is inhibited by a strike/ restriction of electricity supplies
A agrees to deliver some goods to B on a certain date, but:
a) The workers of a subcontractor go on strike.
b) Due to problems with the State energy production and distribution system the Govern-
ment decides to cut the electricity supply at night thereby making it impossible to work
at night.
As a result, A cannot deliver the goods for an uncertain period of time.
Is B entitled to terminate the contract and to ask for damages?
126 9 – Change of circumstances: the Trento project
tendency reflects the division as to the liability regime, but also the ambi-
valence of the risks in question. While neither strikes nor the energy supply
are under the complete control of the seller, one may argue that he is closer
to these sources of risk than the purchaser.
3) With regard to Case 15,36 it is remarkable to note that a general disclaimer
will predominantly be regarded as invalid in both the ‘open’ and in the ‘closed’
jurisdictions. There are, however, some exceptions (Belgium and France from
the group of the ‘closed’ and Germany, Portugal and Spain from the group
of the ‘open’ jurisdictions). The rationale for the majority perspective is that
unexpected events are beyond the parties’ imagination and thus beyond their
dispositions. One may also draw the conclusion that the equity principles from
which the doctrines governing unexpected circumstances are derived are
qualified as ius cogens.
5 THE PREFERENCE FOR OPENLY ADDRESSING THE ISSUE
Let us now turn to the doctrinal distinction between ‘conventional’ and ‘ex-
ceptional’ concepts. The doctrines that specifically address the issue of un-
expected circumstances and identify the unexpected event as the source for
relief (e.g. Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage, doctrine of assumptions, clausula rebus
sic stantibus) have been referred to as ‘exceptional’ doctrines. ‘Conventional’
doctrines, on the other hand, are the traditional doctrines of contract law,
which are based on the parties’ (hypothetical) intentions or on flaws in the
mechanism of contracting. Such doctrines can address unexpected events with
reference to the contractual agreement (e.g. interpretation, mistake, impossibil-
ity of performance and laesio enormis;
In favour of the ‘conventional’ concepts one may argue that they are in
harmony with the principle of pacta sunt servanda: if the parties’ (hypothetical)
intentions can be referred to as the basis of relief or if flaws can be identified
in the contracting process, there is no conflict between the contract and an
equitable allocation of risks. The harmonising character of the ‘conventional’
concepts may make it easier for the courts to set the contract aside.
36 Case 15 Disclaimer: Disclaimer concerning the rights arising from unexpected circumstances; other
clauses related to unexpected circumstances
The construction company A agrees to build a double-floor building on B’s land for the
price of C= 2,000,000. In the contract the parties stipulate a disclaimer which excludes ‘all
the rights of both parties arising from unexpected circumstances’. Two weeks after the
construction work has begun a granite rock, which could not have been detected by the
parties before the conclusion of the contract, is revealed on B’s land. As a result the costs
of the construction increase by 300 %.
Can A ask for an adjustment of the contract or can he terminate the contract in spite of
the disclaimer?
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However, quite often the ‘conventional’ concepts provide no precise and
persuasive rationale for relief in cases of unexpected circumstances – even if
they are referred to by the courts. If the contract does not address the un-
expected event explicitly or by clear implication, relief cannot be based on
the parties’ actual intentions. Hence, ‘conventional’ concepts are always dealing
with hypothetical assumptions as to what the parties would have agreed upon
if they had foreseen the event. This reconstruction of the parties’ hypothetical
intentions will often be fictional. If the parties have not foreseen the risk in
question, it is equally fictional to qualify their non-perception as a mistake.
Therefore, in many cases of unexpected circumstances the application of a
‘conventional’ doctrine amounts to concealing the essential equitable conflict
between the (flawless but silent) contract and the extrinsic effect caused by
the unexpected event in question.
The ‘exceptional’ doctrines, on the other hand, openly address the conflict
between the contract and the requirements of equity in the light of the un-
expected event in question. These doctrines and their application reveal that
in most cases the problem of unexpected circumstances cannot be solved with
reference to the intention of the parties and that an external standard of law
is to be applied in the assessment of the event and its consequences for the
contract. This becomes evident in the ‘open’ jurisdictions, where on the basis
of a general ‘exceptional’ doctrine the contractual agreement itself can be
adjusted to match the requirements of equity.
The European model rules on contract law presented so far all propose
to recognize such a general ‘exceptional’ doctrine. The conflict between the
principle of pacta sunt servanda and the requirements of equity is particularly
evident in the rules of the DCFR (Draft Common Frame of Reference), which
are based on the PECL (Principles of European Contract Law). In Art. III.-1:110
DCFR and Art. 6.111 PECL the principle of sanctity of the contract is confirmed
as the general rule. However, at the same time, it is confronted with the
relevant exceptions in the case of a change of circumstances.
6 MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR SETTING ASIDE THE CONTRACT
As I have already mentioned and as the national reports illustrate there are
various ‘exceptional’ doctrines, i.e. concepts specifically addressing the issue
of unexpected circumstances both in the ‘open’ and in the ‘closed’ jurisdictions.
In the ‘open’ jurisdictions, these doctrines will allow for termination as well
as adjustment of the contract, while in the ‘closed’ jurisdictions termination
is generally the only remedy available.
Even though the different concepts vary strongly in detail, we can identify
three basic prerequisites for the application of such ‘exceptional’ doctrines,
as far as their doctrinal justification is concerned:
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1) The transaction must have been affected fundamentally by a certain event.
This requirement expresses the general idea that the principle of pacta sunt
servanda and the stability of the contract may only be disregarded in ex-
ceptional cases.
2) The event affecting the transaction must not have been provided for in the
contract or foreseen by both parties at the time of the conclusion of the contract.
This requirement reflects the prevalence of the parties’ specific dispositions
within the scope of their foresight.
3) The burden resulting from the event may not be attributed to one party by
any particular legal rule. This postulate accounts for the principle of lex specialis
derogat legi generali: the law provides rules for certain unexpected events and
these rules demand priority over a general doctrine on unexpected circum-
stances.
These requirements can be characterized as ‘minimum conditions’: even though
further restrictions may (and often do) apply under the law of the individual
jurisdictions, these requirements must be met in any case if the contract is to
be challenged successfully.
Evidently, the ‘minimum conditions’ are phrased in general and ambiguous
terms and they cannot guarantee convergence with regard to the findings in
a certain case, as the complementary rules vary throughout the jurisdictions.
But this ambiguity and divergence often reflect the ambiguous and manifold
character of the problem of unexpected circumstances rather than diverging
concepts in the different legal systems which admittedly exist as well. Even
if the complementary rules were identical, the question of what amounts to
a ‘fundamental effect’ or which contractual risks are provided for in the
agreement or by a particular rule of law is largely based on the individual
appreciation of the event in question. The fundamental conflict between legal
security and the binding force of contract on the one hand and equity on the
other hand will always leave room for diverging judgements.
7 DISTINCTION BETWEEN ISSUES OF INITIAL MISTAKE AND OF UNEXPECTED
EVENTS ARISING AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONTRACT
A mistake of one party or a mutual mistake of both parties with regard to
factors that were already present before or at the time the contract was con-
cluded differs significantly from the occurrence of unexpected events arising
after the conclusion of the contract. A clear distinction between pre-existing
and supervening factors is meaningful for the doctrinal treatment of un-
expected circumstances, because it is generally easier for the parties to recog-
nize and control pre-existing factors than future developments. Furthermore,
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by submitting themselves to a contractual agreement, the parties are aware
that they generally assume the risk of future changes and they may only be
relieved from this risk under exceptional circumstances. A lack of information
about pre-existing factors, on the other hand, will in most jurisdictions allow
parties to terminate a contract even if they are not heavily burdened by the
contract. The absence of a relevant mistake is a precondition for the binding
effect of the contract and the assumption of risks provided therein. Hence,
if a party is mistaken about certain factors that were present at the time of
contracting, the case should only be treated according to the respective rules
on mistake.
If some jurisdictions tend to apply their ‘exceptional’ doctrines on un-
expected circumstances in cases of mistakes as to pre-existing factors, this can
mainly be explained with certain deficiencies in their respective law of mistake.
Germany, where the rules on Geschäftsgrundlage are applied in cases of mutual
mistakes, may serve as an example because the rules on mistake in the BGB
were only designed for cases of one-sided responsibility for the mistake and
the principles on Geschäftsgrundlage offer a more flexible instrument that is
necessary in cases of mutual mistake. From a doctrinal point of view, these
problems can be solved more adequately by refining the rules on mistake.
However, the fact that the problem of initial mistake and the issue of
supervening unexpected circumstances both tend to be approached on the
same doctrinal basis shows that they are in fact similar with regard to the issue
of remedies. In both types of cases, the binding force of the agreement is
disregarded because one or both parties have failed to take into account certain
factors that were of relevance for the contract. And both cases can essentially
be solved with two remedies: the contract can either be discharged or it can
be adjusted to take into account the relevant aspect. A legal system therefore
has to answer this question with regard to both constellations discussed. It
is suggested that, in a rational legal system with a systematic approach, both
problems should be addressed in the same way.
8 LEGAL CONSEQUENCES – THE UNSOLVED MYSTERY OF ‘ADJUSTMENT’
The convergences of the court findings (see under 2) and the similarities in
the doctrinal approach (see under 4) only concern the primary issue whether
or not the contract is suspended due to unexpected circumstances. With regard
to the secondary issue, i.e. the precise definition of the legal consequences,
it is very hard to identify convergence between the different jurisdictions. Upon
a closer look, this obscurity is not due to the comparative perspective; rather,
the cause for this can be traced back to the legal systems themselves, neither
of which presents a clear, systematic, complete and convincing concept with
regard to the legal consequences that apply once an unexpected event suspends
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the binding effect of the contract terms. The same holds true for the various
European model codes of contract law.
The remedy of termination is quite simple and does not involve much
judicial discretion. It is not surprising that this remedy is widely available in
cases of unexpected circumstances in all jurisdictions. However, in a large
number of cases termination does not achieve fair results, as it may distribute
the losses arising from the unexpected event arbitrarily to one party. Therefore,
it can be said that the recognition of a mechanism of adjustment is a postulate
of equity if the contact is set aside due to unexpected circumstances.
This conclusion is explicitly drawn in the ‘open’ jurisdictions and in the
model codes (e.g. Art. III. – 1:110 DCFR; Art. 6:111 PECL, Art. 92 Feasibility
study), as there are established sets of rules under which the burdened party
may seek adjustment of the contract in cases of unexpected circumstances.
Even in the ‘closed’ jurisdictions, where there are no such mechanisms estab-
lished as a general rule, the reports show that the courts may find a way to
reach results that amount to adjustment of the contractual terms, e.g. on the
basis of constructive interpretation or by granting ad-hoc compensation based
on the standards of equity and good faith. Also, the development of the
doctrine of frustration in England shows that the all-or-nothing approach of
termination (or discharge) is inadequate for dealing with all the issues of
unexpected circumstances. In England, the strict effects of the common-law
doctrine of frustration leading to a discharge of the contract had to be amended
by an obligation to compensate in the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act
1943, granting the judge a great extent of discretion in order to achieve just
results.
The details of adjustment, however, involve a number of difficult issues:
1) The relation between termination and adjustment (i.e. the conditions under
which termination or adjustment is the appropriate remedy): this aspect also
includes the question whether the party that is not burdened by the unexpected
circumstance in question is entitled to object to the adjustment and can thereby
compel termination.
2) The form of adjustment: it must be determined whether the adjustment may
interfere with the contractual obligations in kind or whether there is only
monetary compensation available.
3) The standard for determining the extent of adjustment: this issue raises the
difficult question of whether the burdened party has to bear the losses from
the unexpected circumstances up to a reasonable extent or whether – alter-
natively – the losses are to be divided equally among both parties.
4) The technical implementation of adjustment: it must be determined whether
adjustment comes into force by operation of law (determined by the court)
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or whether the burdened party has a right to claim adjustment by specifying
the contents of the adjustment. In addition, it must be decided whether adjust-
ment must be preceded by a renegotiation process and whether and how such
a renegotiation process can be governed by rules of law.
The reports show that these issues have not yet been fully resolved in any
one of the jurisdictions explored in this volume. Hence, it is unsurprising that
convergent and convincing solutions cannot be identified from the comparative
perspective. It appears that the conditions for adjusting the contract are the
unsolved mystery of the legal rules on unexpected circumstances. This un-
resolved issue is of great influence for the entire problem as the willingness
to grant relief depends very much on reliable consequences of the remedy
available.
In order to provide fair solutions it is unavoidable to recognise a legal
regime for the adjustment of a contract that is affected by relevant unexpected
circumstances. One may resort to judicial discretion which is relied upon by
all of the ‘open’ as well as the ‘closed’ jurisdictions to a certain extent. How-
ever, if more precise guidelines are required, the material is inconclusive. Thus,
the conditions of adjustment appear to be the most important topic for further
research in the field of unexpected circumstances.
9 BY WAY OF CONCLUSION: UNCERTAINTY, THE LACK OF PRECEDENTS AND
HARMONISATION BY ADVANCING THE LEGAL DISCOURSE
As was mentioned above, the uncertainty of judgements on unexpected circum-
stances is an unavoidable characteristic of the conflict between legal security
and the binding force of contract on the one hand and the requirements of
equity on the other. There are possibilities for strengthening certainty on the
comparative level by further harmonisation with regard to the doctrinal
background in general and the mechanism of adjustment in particular. Yet,
there is another structural source of uncertainty that is particularly important
in cases of unexpected circumstances. That is the lack of reliable precedents
in many jurisdictions.
Many cases in which relief on the basis of unexpected circumstances is
discussed are quite eccentric and rare. Some national reporters have had
difficulties identifying precedents similar to our cases at hand and some may
have had to go back several decades. Especially in continental countries, the
question may be raised whether ‘old’ precedents still have – persuasive – value
as they reflect an antiquated legal and social background and could arguably
be overruled if they were submitted to the respective Supreme Court today.37
37 Ewoud Hondius (ed.), Precedent and the law/Les précédents et le droit, Bruxelles: Bruylant,
2007, p. 19.
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Further harmonisation of the law in Europe may enlarge the basis of
precedents. It would mean that instead of a meagre trickle of cases, every
member state would fully profit from the case-law of the other member states
of the European Union. However, the harmonisation on the basis of precedents
does not necessarily depend on a common Civil Code.38 The American
example shows that the various states of the Union refer to the case law of
other states. The process of harmonisation by precedents may be enhanced
by a restatement of European contract law without binding effect. In fact, in
Europe several such restatements are available such as the DCFR, the PECL, the
Principles of the Association Henri Capitant des Amis de la Culture Juridique
Française and the Société de Législation Comparée, the Acquis-Principles, the
Gandolfi Code, the Feasibility study of the European group of experts (art.
92),39 the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on a Common European Sales Law (art. 89),40 as well as other inter-
national instruments, such as the UNIDROIT Principles for International Com-
mercial Contracts.
We have already seen that there is a considerable amount of similarity
between the different European legal systems both in terms of the results
achieved as well as in terms of their doctrinal approach (cf. 2 and 4). Hence,
even without a uniform mandatory European rule on unexpected circum-
stances, courts and practitioners may profit from an analysis of cases from
other European legal systems. Such an exchange is particularly important in
cases of unexpected circumstances as, due to the variety of the potentially
relevant factors, the legal doctrines applied and their requirements are neces-
sarily vague and as it may always be argued that the solution will greatly
depend on the facts of the individual case. Furthermore, it should be stressed
again that, as far as precise doctrinal guidelines are concerned, no legal systems
seem to have presented an comprehensively convincing approach to the
problem of unexpected circumstances so far. Therefore, the volume Unexpected
circumstances in European contract law is intended to serve as a guide that may
help to improve the understanding between the different European legal
systems and to refine the rules on unexpected circumstances, either on the
level of the national jurisdiction or with regard to harmonisation projects.
Of course, the process of harmonisation on the basis of precedents involves
the problem of languages. An Estonian case on change of circumstances will
have little impact in Portugal if it is not available in a language which is
accessible to Portuguese lawyers. A database in the present European lingua
38 See Ilka Klöckner, Grenzüberschreitende Bindung an zivilgerichtliche Präjudizien, PhD thesis
Freiburg 2005, Tübingen: Mohr, 2006, 254 p.
39 A European contract law for consumers and businesses: publication of the results of the
feasibility study carried out by the Expert Group on European contract law for stakeholders’
and Legal practitioners’ feedback, May 2011. See Reiner Schulze and Jules Stuyck (eds.),
Towards a European Contract Law – An Introduction, München: Sellier, 2011.
40 COM(2011) 635 final.
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franca – and ideally in more than just one language – would therefore be
necessary. This need not necessarily be a database in the formal sense, such
as the former CLAB.41 A more user-friendly option is ECTIL’s Yearbook of Tort
Law, which is discussed at annual meetings in Vienna.42 Likewise, Torino
could be the platform, long after the Common Core project has finished, for
annual updates as to national case law on the various topics, such as un-
expected circumstances. An alternative would be Vienna, the newly selected
site of the European Law Institute, founded in 2011. But then, why not remain
in Torino?
41 DG SANCO’s one time database on unfair contract terms (clauses abusives) – see Thomas
Wilhelmsson, in: Torbjörn Andersson, Bengt Lindell (eds.), Festskrift till Per Henrik Lindblom,
Stockholm: Iustus, 2004, pp. 781-800.
42 This year’s 10th annual conference was held in Vienna from 28-30 April 2011.

10 Change of circumstances in Latin
American law. A comparative overview
Rodrigo Momberg
1 INTRODUCTION
Latin American law is without any doubt part of Western law. Besides this,
Latin American jurisdictions are, to a great extent, civil-law systems. Tradi-
tional comparative law places Latin America within the Romano-Germanic
legal family, attached to the French group of influence.1 With a different
terminology, Zweigert and Kötz categorize Latin America in the Romanistic
legal family, i.e. those legal systems which adopted the French Civil Code as
a main source of inspiration.2
Therefore, the links between Latin American private law and European
private law cannot be denied, particularly with regard to its origins. However,
the originality of Latin American law has also been stressed because of the
variety and selection of its sources:3
‘Latin America is original in a first sense, and it is interesting to study, because
it has adopted in whole neither French law, nor Spanish law, nor Portuguese law,
nor Italian law, nor German law. It has made the effort to take the best of each
from those laws (…).’
The special and typical features of Latin American legal systems have been
sometimes oversimplified in terms of their public law being ‘more North
American than European’ and their private law ‘more European than North
American’.4 In the end, although being placed undoubtedly in the civil-law
tradition, Latin American jurisdictions should be regarded as systems with
Rodrigo Momberg is assistant professor at the Faculty of Law, Austral University of Chile
and honorary lecturer at the Molengraaff Institute of Private Law, Utrecht University.
1 See R. David, Traiteì eìleìmentaire de droit civil compareì: introduction aÌ l’eìtude des droits
eìtrangers et aÌ la meìthode comparative, LGDJ, Paris, 1950.
2 K. Zweigert, and H. Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, Clarendon Press Oxford,
Oxford, 1998, p. 73.
3 R. David, L’Originalité des Droits de l’Amérique Latine; cited by J.L. Esquirol, ‘The Fictions
of Latin American Law’ (Part I), Utah Law Review (1997), 425, p. 463.
4 J.H. Merryman, and D.S. Clark, Comparative Law, Western European and Latin American Legal
Systems: Cases and Materials, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1978, p. 207.
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unique and particular features, and not as simple replicas of one or more
European legal systems.
This paper has the aim to present to the reader an introduction to the
subject of change of circumstances or imprevisión as it is provided by the main
Latin American jurisdictions. To this end, a comparative overview will be
presented with regard to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, Peru
and Uruguay (section 3), followed by special reference to Argentinian private
law, which both in legal doctrine and case law has developed a complex and
comprehensive system for the application of the subject (section 4). Previous
to the comparative survey, a brief historical approach is introduced as a means
to give an idea of the development of the subject in Latin America (section 2).
2 HISTORICAL REMARKS
After independence from Spanish colonization in the early nineteenth century,
one of the first objectives of the new republics was the enactment of civil codes,
as a consolidation of their new status:5
‘the very act of establishing new national law was an assertion and validation of
national identity and power.’
Additionally, Spanish colonial law was a symbol of the old regime and was
also based on a complex system of sources, which included a lack of uniformity
and contradictory rules, making it difficult to know and apply the law.6 As
to the task of codification, the French Civil Code was the main source of
inspiration for the drafters of Latin American codes. On the one hand, from
a legal perspective, because of its strong links with Roman law, this does not
represent a complete break with the previous colonial sources such as Las Siete
Partidas or the Fueros; and it was the only available model of a national and
unifying Code at that time.7 On the other hand, from a philosophical perspect-
5 M.C. Mirow, Latin American Law: A History of Private Law and Institutions in Spanish America,
University of Texas Press, Austin, 2004, p. 104. The invasion of Spain by Napoleon in 1808
was the starting point for the independence process of Latin America. For instance, Argen-
tina declared its independence in 1816 and Chile in 1818.
6 M.C. Mirow, ‘Individual Experience in Legal Change: Exploring a Neglected Factor in
Nineteenth-Century Latin American Codification’, Southwestern Journal of Law and Trade
in the Americas 11, 301, p. 304 (2005).
7 Zweigert and Kötz, supra note 2, p. 113. The Prussian General Land Law of 1794 and the
Austrian Civil Code of 1811 were also available at that time, but both were linked to
absolute and monarchical regimes and had a conceptualism and abstraction which was
not familiar to Latin American jurists. Besides, regarding their structure, both instruments
included not only private-law but also public-law provisions and also considering the huge
volume of the Prussian General Land Law (almost 20,000 articles), these were decisive
factors to exclude them as main sources of inspiration.
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ive, it was considered a reflection of the ideals of the French Revolution as
individual freedom, equality under the law, private property and the separa-
tion of powers.8 Finally, in practical terms, it was easily accessible for Latin
American jurists and for the elites who were at that time highly competent
in the French language.9
The influence of the French Code Civil on the 19th-century Latin American
codifications, and more important, of the liberal doctrine on which it was
based, were the main reasons for the great relevance given by that Civil Code
to the pacta sunt servanda principle, including provisions on supervening
circumstances only in cases of impossibility and force majeure. The analysis
of the two most influential Latin American Civil Codes of the 19th century
confirms this assertion. Thus, in its original version, the Argentinian Civil Code
did not include a general provision on imprevisión, and on the contrary, article
1197 stated that ‘Agreements made in contracts are for the parties a rule to
which they should conform as to the law itself’’.10 The notes of the drafter
of the Code, Dalmacio Vélez Sarfield explained the provision on the ground
that ‘the free consent of the parties, given without fraud, mistake or duress
and in accordance with the legal formalities, should make contracts irrevoc-
able’.11 In the same sense, article 1545 of the Chilean Civil Code, which is
based on article 1134 of the Code Civil, provides that ‘Contracts lawfully entered
into are a law for the contracting parties and cannot be invalidated except by
mutual consent or for causes authorized by law’.12
However, as it will be analysed in the following sections, the severe eco-
nomic circumstances and social changes of the 20th century, as well as the
influence of modern civil codes and the reception of new legal theories such
as the socialization of private law and solidarity in contract law led to the
inclusion of rules on change of circumstances in the reform of the Latin Ameri-
can civil codes.
8 M. Murillo, ‘The Evolution of Codification in the Civil Law Legal Systems: Towards
Decodification and Recodification’, Journal of transnational law policy 11, 163-182, p. 5 (2001).
9 Mirow, supra note 6, p. 305, adding that ‘France served as a model in mid-nineteenth century
Latin America not only in politics and legislation, but also in culture, fashion, language
and intellectual outlook.’
10 Art. 1197: ‘Las convenciones hechas en los contratos forman para las partes una regla a
la cual deben someterse como a la ley misma’. Author’s own translation.
11 Cited by A. Alterini, Teoría de la imprevisión y cláusula de hardship (2007). Available at <https:/
/www.u-cursos.cl/derecho/2007/2/D122A0311/1/.../150228>.
12 Article 1545: ‘Todo contrato legalmente celebrado es una ley para los contratantes y no
puede ser invalidado sino por su consentimiento mutuo o por causas legales’. Author´s
own translation.
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3 COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW
As stated above, provisions on change of circumstances or imprevisión were
included in Latin American civil codes during the 20th century. The main
exception to this trend has been the Chilean Civil Code, whose Book IV on
‘Obligations in General and Contracts’ remains without any significant amend-
ment to its original draft.
However, the non-existence of an express legal provision does not neces-
sarily imply the rejection by a given legal system of change of circumstances
as a ground for relief for the affected party. In this sense, a distinction will
be made between receptive and unreceptive legal systems, based on the
readiness (or not) of the legal system to recognise situations of changed circum-
stances as being legally relevant, granting the possibility to the affected party
to rely on a system of remedies in that case.13
3.1 Receptive legal systems
3.1.1 Argentina
The imprevisión theory was introduced in the second part of article 1198 of
the Argentinian Civil Code by Act 17.711 of 1968. The provision was based
mainly on the rules of the Italian Civil Code of 1942, and has been the model
for subsequent reforms in Paraguay and Brazil. Because of its relevance,
Argentinian law will be analysed in detail in section 4.
3.1.2 Brazil
Although the subject of change of circumstances was not recognised by the
Brazilian Civil Code of 1916, the legal doctrine and an important number of
judicial decisions had accepted its application based on the principle of good
faith.14 The new Brazilian Civil Code of 2002 regulates the subject under the
title of ‘Termination by excessive onerousness’ (Resolução por onerosidade exces-
siva). The provisions are based on the corresponding provisions of the Italian
and Argentinian Civil Codes. Thus, the affected party has the right to claim
13 For a similar approach see E. Hondius, H. Grigoleit, (eds.), Unexpected Circumstances in
European Contract Law, Cambridge, University Press, 2011, where the legal systems are
grouped in ‘open’ and ‘closed’, based on the criterion whether or not a jurisdiction recog-
nises a general rule under which the contract can be adjusted to unexpected circumstances
by the courts.
14 S. Sanches, Questões relevantes sobre a resolução de contratos por onerosidade excessiva no direito
brasileiro, available at <http://www.fiesp.com.br/download/assessoria_juridica/artigo_
sydnei_sanches.pdf>; and J. Neves, A nova dimensão dos contratos no caminho da pós-modern-
idade, Doctoral thesis, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, 2006, p. 239.
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the termination of the contract in case of excessive onerousness derived from
extraordinary and unforeseeable events (article 478) and the other party may
prevent the termination of the contract by offering its equitable modification
(article 479). In case of unilateral contracts, i.e. those with obligations for only
one of the parties, the affected party may claim the reduction or modification
of his performance, in order to reduce the effects of the excessive onerousness.
These provisions are the consequence of the express recognition by the new
Civil Code of the ‘social function of contract’ as a parameter for the perform-
ance and interpretation of contracts as well as a complement of the general
principle of freedom of contract.15
Before the enactment of the new Civil Code, change of circumstances was
already included in the 1990’s Code for the Defence of the Consumer (Codigo
de Defensa do Consumidor), providing as a basic right of the consumer the
revision of the contract terms ‘in case supervening circumstances make their
performance excessively onerous for the consumer’ (article 6.V). Brazilian legal
doctrine has stressed that this provision is far less strict than the Civil Code’s
rules on the subject, this being justified by reason of the position of the con-
sumer as the weaker party in the relationship.16
3.1.3 Colombia
The Colombian Civil Code, like its Chilean model, does not provide a legal
rule on change of circumstances. However, the Colombian Supreme Court
has expressly recognised imprevisión as a general principle of law (principio
general del derecho). Besides, the Colombian Commercial Code of 1971 includes
in its article 868 a provision on excessive onerousness which is applicable to
commercial contracts with periodic or deferred performance. Under that
provision, the affected party is entitled to request the adaptation of the contract
and the court has the power to revise the contract based on equity parameters.
If the revision is not possible, the court may terminate the contract. With regard
to that article, Colombian legal doctrine has stated that such a provision is
applicable vis-à-vis civil contracts.17
15 Article 421 of the new Brazilian Civil Code states that ‘Freedom of contract should be
exercised considering and within the limits of the social function of the contract’. Author’s
own translation.
16 J.H. Neto, ‘A resolução por onerosidade excessiva no novo código civil: uma quimera
jurídica?’, Revista da Escola Superior da Magistratura de Sergipe, n° 04, 41-56 (2003).
17 W. Jiménez, La teoría de la imprevisión ¿Regla o principio general del derecho? Available at
<http://www.docentes.unal.edu.co/wjimenezg/docs/LA%20TEOR%3FA%20DE%20LA%
20IMPREVISI%3FN.pdf>; and L. Moisset de Espanés, ‘Imprevisión: legislación de América
del Sur’, Anuario de Derecho Civil, 1147-1182 (1996).
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3.1.4 Paraguay
In 1876 Paraguay integrally adopted the Argentinian Civil Code which, as
stated above, did not contain any general rule on changed circumstances. The
work for reforming the code started in the middle of the 20th century and
finally in 1987 a new Civil Code was adopted. The new Code includes an
express rule on imprevisión (article 672), which is almost a literal translation
of the provisions on eccessiva onerosità (articles 1467 and 1468) of the Italian
Codice Civile.18
3.1.5 Peru
The Peruvian Civil Code of 1984 contains a complete and innovative regulation
of the subject, devoting six articles under the title of the ‘excessive onerousness
of the obligation’ (excesiva onerosidad de la prestación, articles 1440 to 1446). The
rules are applicable to bilateral and aleatory contracts whose performance has
become excessively onerous because of unforeseeable and extraordinary
circumstances. The affected party is entitled to request the adaptation or
termination of the contract and his claim (action) is subject to a brief pre-
scription period (three months since the occurrence of the event which has
given rise to the excessive onerousness).19
3.2 Unreceptive legal systems
3.2.1 Chile20
The main obstacle to the application of imprevisión in Chilean private law has
been the above-cited article 1545 of the Civil Code, which strongly affirms
the principle of sanctity of contracts. Based on that provision, traditional
Chilean legal doctrine rejects the possibility of a revision of contracts in cases
of imprevisión and in any other case which is not expressly regulated.21 On
18 And therefore, also very close to the provisions of the Argentinian Civil Code. See M.
Liksenberg, and A. Maine, La teoría de la imprevisión en el ámbito del Mercosur, Academia
Nacional de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales de Córdoba (2009). Available at <http://www.
acaderc.org.ar/doctrina/articulos/la-teoria-de-la-imprevision-en-el-ambito-del/?
searchterm=ciencias>.
19 See Moisset de Espanés, supra note 17.
20 For an extensive analysis of the subject in Chilean law, see R. Momberg, The Effect of a
Change of Circumstances on the Binding Force of Contracts. Comparative Perspectives,
Intersentia, Antwerp, 2011.
21 Some particular rules of the Chilean Civil Code do allow the modification of specific
contracts in cases of unexpected circumstances: articles 2003 rule 2a (construction contracts
– contrato de construcción), 2180 (loan for use – comodato) and 2227 (bailment – depósito).
Conversely, articles 1983 (lease of rural property – arrendamiento de predios rústicos) and
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the contrary, most of the contemporary Chilean legal doctrine argues for the
application of imprevisión in Chilean private law, based on article 1546 of the
Civil Code, which provides for the principle of good faith in the performance
of contracts.22 However, in a number of decisions the Chilean Supreme Court
reaffirmed the principle of the sanctity of contracts. Recently, in the South Andes
case,23 the Court expressly rejected the possibility of applying imprevisión in
the light of the legal provisions in force, which were interpreted as excluding
the revision of contracts in cases of changed circumstances and, on the con-
trary, as a manifestation of the absolute prevalence of the principle of pacta
sunt servanda.24
3.2.2 Uruguay
The situation of Uruguayan private law is analogous to that described above
for Chile. Thus, there is no express recognition in the Civil Code of the theory
of imprevisión, and legal doctrine is divided about its admission as a ground
for relief for the affected party. Additionally, Uruguayan case law has unani-
mously rejected the application of changed circumstances in cases of excessive
onerousness, stating that the legal provisions in force leave no room for the
admission of imprevisión.25
4 UNEXPECTED CIRCUMSTANCES IN ARGENTINIAN LAW
As stated above, in its original version, the Argentinian Civil Code strongly
supports the principles of freedom of contract and pacta sunt servanda. The
imprevisión theory was incorporated into the second paragraph of article 1198
of the Argentinian Civil Code by Act 17.711 of 1968, which introduced relevant
2003 rule 1 (construction contracts – contrato de construcción) expressly reject the modification
of such contracts on the basis of a change of circumstances.
22 Article 1546: ‘Contracts must be performed in good faith and are consequently binding
not only as to what is expressed therein, but also with regard to all consequences which
are derived from the nature of the obligation, or belong to it by statute or usage’ (Los
contratos deben ejecutarse de buena fe, y por consiguiente obligan no sólo a lo que en ellos se expresa,
sino a todas las cosas que emanan precisamente de la naturaleza de la obligación, o que por la ley
o la costumbre pertenecen a ella). Author’s own translation). The direct sources of this provision
are articles 1134 and 1135 of the Code civil. However, the Chilean legislator did not incor-
porate the concept of equity (l’équité) in the provision, because it was considered unnecessary
regarding other provisions of the Code. See R. Abeliuk, Las obligaciones, Editorial Jurídica
de Chile: Santiago, 2001, p. 119.
23 South Andes Capital S.A. c/ Empresa Portuaria Valparaíso, Corte Suprema, 09.09.2009, rol
2651-08.
24 There is only one reported case, delivered by the Court of Appeal of Santiago, in which
the application of imprevisión was accepted, Guillermo Larraín Vial con Servicio de Vivienda
y Urbanización de la Región Metropolitana, (11.11.2006).
25 See Liksenberg and Maine, supra note 18.
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reforms to the whole law of obligations in the Code. The direct source of such
a rule is Recommendation 15 of the Third National Congress of Civil Law
(Córdoba, 1961) which, in turn, was based on article 1467 of the Italian Codice
Civile.26
Since then, Argentinian legal theory and case law have developed a consistent
doctrine with regard to the subject of unexpected circumstances. In this sense,
the conditions and effects of imprevisión have been widely analysed in theory
and tested in practice, especially in periods of economic crisis which have
affected Argentina since 1975. Because of these reasons and the similarities
between the Argentinian legal provisions and the corresponding articles of
the Brazilian and Paraguayan Civil Codes, a detailed analysis of the matter
with regard to Argentinian private law is given in the following sections.
4.1 The conditions for the application of article 1198
Article 1198 (second part) of the Argentinian Civil Code provides:
In bilateral commutative contracts and in unilateral onerous commutative contracts
for deferred performance or for continuous performance, if extraordinary and
unforeseeable events make the performance of one of the parties excessively
onerous, the affected party may demand the termination of the contract. The same
principle is applicable to aleatory contracts when the excessive onerousness is
derived from causes which are external to the inherent risks of the contract.
In contracts for continuous performance, their termination will not affect that which
has already been performed.
Termination cannot be demanded if the affected party has been at fault or is in
default.
A party against whom the dissolution is demanded may prevent this by offering
to improve the conditions of the contract equitably.27
26 M.A. Araujo, Revisión de los contratos: Teoría de la excesiva onerosidad sobreviniente o
teoria de la imprevisión. Trabajos del Centro de Investigaciones de Derecho Civil, Facultad de
Derecho, U.N.R, 95-101, p. 96 (1997). The Second National Congress of Civil Law (Córdoba,
1937), which analysed the reform project of 1936, also recommended the inclusion of the
imprevisión doctrine in such a project; see Moisset de Espanés, supra note 17. Even before
the introduction of the present text of article 1198 into the Civil Code, case law had recog-
nized the application of the imprevisión theory. For reported cases see Moisset de Espanés,
supra note 17; and L.R. Flah, M. Smayevsky, Teoría de la imprevisión, LexisNexis-Depalma:
Buenos Aires, 2003, pp. 141-142.
27 Art. 1198 (second paragraph): ‘En los contratos bilaterales conmutativos y en los unilaterales
onerosos y conmutativos de ejecución diferida o continuada, si la prestación a cargo de
una de las partes se tornara excesivamente onerosa, por acontecimientos extraordinarios
e imprevisibles, la parte perjudicada podrá demandar la resolución del contrato. El mismo
principio se aplicará a los contratos aleatorios cuando la excesiva onerosidad se produzca
por causas extrañas al riesgo propio del contrato. En los contratos de ejecución continuada
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4.1.1 Contracts covered by the provision
Article 1198 is applicable to bilateral commutative contracts and to unilateral
onerous commutative contracts for deferred performance or for continuous
performance, and to aleatory contracts when the excessively onerous nature
is derived from causes external to the inherent risks of the contract.
As in Chilean law, bilateral contracts are those with reciprocal obligations
(art. 1138) and unilateral contracts are those where only one of the parties
assumes an obligation to the benefit of the other. The contract is onerous if the
mutually expected benefit relies on the performance of the reciprocal obliga-
tions, and gratuitous if one party obtains a benefit without any performance
of its own (article 1139). Finally, the contract is commutative where the reci-
procal obligations are considered to be equivalent by the parties;28 and aleatory
if the expected equivalent consists of an uncertain possibility of a loss or gain
for one of the parties (article 2051). With regard to the latter, the provision
requires that the excessively onerous nature was not the consequence of the
inherent risk of the contract. For instance, contracts which included a ‘U.S.
dollar clause’, i.e. a clause linking the amount of the contract price to the value
of the U.S. dollar on the exchange market, concluded during the economically
extremely unstable period after the governmental change in the exchange
policy of February 1981, were considered by the courts to be aleatory contracts
and therefore excluded from the application of article 1198, because the risk
of variations in the U.S. dollar exchange rate was considered to be inherent
to the contract.29 The express inclusion of aleatory contracts is arguable
because in such contracts uncertainty is part of the nature of the agreement,
and therefore, the parties have assumed the change of circumstances as a
normal consequence. In this regard, the Italian Codice Civile expressly excludes
aleatory contracts from the application of the rules of eccessiva onerosità.30
As a common feature the contract should concern deferred or continuous
performance, i.e. those obligations which are not performed at the same time
as the conclusion of the contract but during a period of time after such con-
clusion. In this sense, it has been held that for the application of this require-
ment it is enough that
la resolución no alcanzará a los efectos ya cumplidos. No procederá la resolución, si el
perjudicado hubiese obrado con culpa o estuviese en mora. La otra parte podrá impedir
la resolución ofreciendo mejorar equitativamente los efectos del contrato.’ Author’s own
translation.
28 The Civil Code contains no definition of such a category of contracts, but legal doctrine
agrees with the concept set out above. See Flah, Smayevsky, supra note 26, p. 34.
29 C1° Civ. y Com., San Isidro, sala II, 1985/02/19, Climberg G. c/ Chiro Tarrab, A.; CNCiv.,
sala B, 1987/04/07, Spada de Makintach, S. c/ Tonelli, C.; cited in Digesto Práctico La Ley:
Revisión de los Contratos, Leiva Fernández, L. (Dir.), La Ley, Buenos Aires, 2003, p. 235.
30 See article 1469 of the Italian Codice Civile.
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‘the change of circumstances takes place in the period of time between the con-
clusion of the contract and its performance, without formally requiring a contract
for deferred or for continuous performance.’31
Moreover, most of the case law agrees that the obligation which is alleged
to be excessively onerous should not yet have been performed. Therefore, if
the price has been paid completely, the seller who has accepted it without
any reservation of his/her rights cannot subsequently invoke the remedies
of article 1198 to terminate or revise the contract. In general, ‘the provision
of article 1198 is not applicable when the juridical relationships derived from
the contract have already been extinguished’.32
4.1.2 The excessively onerous nature of the performance
Article 1198 requires that the performance of one of the parties has become
excessively onerous. This condition has been linked by Argentinian legal
doctrine and case law to the (relative) equivalence of the counter-obligations
which is considered to be part of the nature of commutative contracts. Thus,
it is argued that the contract, as the most important instrument for the
exchange of goods and services, is subject to the principle of commutative
justice and therefore intervention by a third party (the judge) in the contract
is legitimate when extraordinary circumstances lead to a complete rupture
in the economic balance of the contract as was intended by the parties upon
its conclusion.33 Therefore, the performance becomes excessively onerous if
it loses its economic relationship with the counter-performance, making the
sacrifice much larger than the benefit for one of the parties and vice versa.34
As a consequence, the assessment of this degree of onerousness requires
a comparison between the counter-performances, is intrinsic in the contractual
relationship and cannot be made only with reference to the performance of
the affected party.35 Therefore, if both counter-obligations have increased or
31 CNCiv., sala C, 1979/07/05, Hofman, M. c/ González, E.; cited in Digesto Práctico La Ley:
Revisión de los Contratos, supra note 29, p. 234.
32 CNCiv., sala E, 1978/09/05, Barcheta, C. y otro c/ Asociación Civil Santísima Cruz; cited in
Digesto Práctico La Ley: Revisión de los Contratos, supra note 29, with further references
to similar cases on pp. 244-246.
33 See M. Cornet, ‘La aplicación de la teoría de la imprevisión y la emergencia económica’,
Anuario de Derecho Civil, Universidad Católica de Córdoba 7, 77-115 (2002).
34 C. Ghersi, Contratos civiles y comerciales, p. 307, cited in Digesto Práctico La Ley: Revisión
de los Contratos, supra note 29, p. 164.
35 Flah, Smayevsky, supra note 26, p. 38, See CNCom. Sala D, 08.03.84 Beltramino A. c/ Banco
Argentino de Inversión: ‘The onerousness required by article 1198 cannot be valued taking
into account only the performance of the party which alleges the imprevisión, but is related
to the equivalence of the reciprocal obligations of the parties, so that the deferred perform-
ance ceases to be economically correlative and therefore the performance of the contract
as concluded leads to a disproportion in such a performance to the benefit of one of the
parties and to the detriment of the other’; cited by Cornet, supra note 33.
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decreased in value with similar intensity, the original balance is not altered
and so there is no case of an excessively onerous performance.36 Similarly,
external considerations, such as the effects of the contract’s performance on
the economic situation of the affected party, are not sufficient or adequate
standards for the configuration of excessive onerousness if they do not affect
the internal equilibrium of the counter-obligations of the parties.37
Case law has stated that because of the general terms of article 1198, the
determination of excessive onerousness cannot be made by arithmetical para-
meters, but is a task for the judge who has to consider the circumstances of
the particular case in order to establish the seriousness of the detriment in
the balance of the contract as considered by the parties at the time of its
conclusion.38
Finally, the loss of value of the agreed counter-performance has also been
recognized by case law as a situation of excessive onerousness, especially in
cases related to the sale of immovable property where the contract price has
become insignificant because of the devaluation of currency or hyperinfla-
tion.39
4.1.3 Extraordinary and unforeseeable events
For the application of article 1198, the excessively onerous nature of the per-
formance should be caused by extraordinary and unforeseeable events. Both
concepts are intrinsically linked and it is mostly difficult to distinguish them
in legal doctrine and especially in case law. As a common feature, the events
have to take place after the conclusion of the contract and should be external
to the parties.40
However, due to the theoretical difficulties in distinguishing the above-
mentioned conditions, the concept of ‘extraordinary’ has been related by legal
doctrine to unusual events, which do not normally occur and are therefore
unpredictable for the average citizen. The event should be of a general nature,
affecting society as a whole or at least an entire category of parties in the same
situation and should not only be related to the personal circumstances of the
affected party.41 On the other hand, unforeseeability is related to the aptitude
36 M. Smayevsky, Reflexiones acerca de la aplicación de la teoría de la imprevisión en el contrato
de compraventa; cited in Digesto Práctico La Ley: Revisión de los Contratos, supra note 29,
p. 166.
37 R. Lorenzetti La excesiva onerosidad sobreviniente, p. 165; and case law cited in Digesto Práctico
La Ley: Revisión de los Contratos, supra note 29, p. 167 and pp. 260-262.
38 See references to case law in Digesto Práctico La Ley: Revisión de los Contratos, supra note
29, pp. 260-261.
39 CNCiv., sala B, 1981/05/14, Pasqualucci, D. y otra c/ Sticca, J.; cited in Digesto Práctico La
Ley: Revisión de los Contratos, supra note 29, p. 259, with further references to case law.
40 See Digesto Práctico La Ley: Revisión de los Contratos, supra note 29, pp. 250-252.
41 See C. Ghersi, Contratos civiles y comerciales, p. 307, cited in Digesto Práctico La Ley: Revisión
de los Contratos, supra note 29, p. 164.
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of the parties to foresee and to anticipate such events, acting with proper
diligence and care, according to the circumstances of the particular case.42
Additionally, for qualifying a circumstance as extraordinary and unforesee-
able, case law has usually used the same parameters as in cases of force
majeure, especially in relation to articles 514 and 901 of the Argentinian Civil
Code, stating that ‘such an event should be analysed in relation to the provi-
sion of article 514 of the Civil Code, and therefore it should be supervening,
external to the will of the parties and outside the normal standard of
foreseeability for such parties, as well as being unavoidable even with the
diligence required in similar cases’ and that ‘similar to the cases of force majeure
and cas fortuit, the events in cases of imprevisión have to be serious, exceptional,
abnormal and unavoidable, supervening in the conclusion of the contract and
outside the alea or risk inherent to the contract’.43
4.1.4 Inflation as an extraordinary and unforeseeable event
The fact that Argentina has suffered at least three serious economic crises since
the 1970s with devastating effects on the performance of deferred or periodic
obligations derived from contracts concluded before such crises, makes it
necessary to analyse inflation as a relevant event for the application of article
1198. All of the above-mentioned crises were characterized by an accelerated
hyperinflationary process and/or a dramatic drop in the value of currency
caused by the government’s economic decisions and policies.44
Bearing that in mind, both legal doctrine and case law have stated that
since inflation became a normal feature of the Argentinian economic system
from the early twentieth century onwards, its occurrence and effects are indeed
foreseeable for the parties to long-term contracts or to contracts with deferred
performance. Thus, inflation has become an inherent risk in most types of
contracts and then the parties cannot invoke it as an extraordinary and unfore-
seeable event to appeal to the remedies provided by article 1198.45 In this
sense, case law has stated that ‘according to settled and uniform case law,
endemic or structural inflation is not an unforeseeable event which can be
alleged for the termination or readjustment of the counter-performance under
42 H. Cáceres and R. Pizarro, Cláusula de pago en ‘valor dólar’, cited in Digesto Práctico La Ley:
Revisión de los Contratos, supra note 29, p. 165.
43 CNEsp., Civ. y Com, sala III, 1979/12/18, Minedar S.A. y otro c/ Cohen, L., and CNFed. Civ.
y Com., sala II, 1979/08/30, López, M y otra c/ Gobierno Nacional. See also CNCom., sala
B, 1985/08/28, Turimar S.A. c/ Banco Río de la Plata, interpreting a contrario sensu article 901
and stating that an event is extraordinary and unforeseeable if ‘it is totally outside the
ordinary and natural course of things’. All cited in Digesto Práctico La Ley: Revisión de
los Contratos, supra note 29, pp. 252-253.
44 The three crises mentioned above are those of June 1975 (‘rodrigazo’), February 1981 and
December 2001 (‘corralito’).
45 J. Mayo, Teoría de la imprevisión y cláusula dólar; cited in Digesto Práctico La Ley: Revisión
de los Contratos, supra note 29, p. 162.
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the doctrine of imprevisión, because it has been part of our economy for a long
time’;46 and that ‘the inflation in Argentina is a circumstance which is not
extraordinary or unforeseeable, because it was incorporated many years ago
as a normal trend in our economy’.47 The same criterion is applicable when
the contract was concluded in a period of economic instability or when hyper-
inflation had already begun. Then it is considered that the parties deliberately
assumed the risks related to serious variations in the value of currency: ‘the
parties who concluded a contract before June 1975 were astonished by a
sudden inflation which was extraordinary and unforeseeable; but the contracts
concluded after that date, in a period of extreme economic instability, should
be regarded as transactions in which the economic consequences of the govern-
mental policies were foreseen by the parties’.48
However, both legal doctrine and case law agree that the general rule set
out above is not applicable in cases of a sudden and accelerated inflation
deriving from the government’s economic policies which could not be anti-
cipated by reasonable and diligent parties. In such cases, the normal evolution
of the inflationary curve is disrupted dramatically and cannot therefore be
regarded as integrating the foreseeable risks assumed by the parties in a
completely different social and economic environment.49 More precisely, it
is the intensity of the inflation which can be regarded as an extraordinary and
unforeseeable circumstance, and therefore totally outside the legitimate expecta-
tions of the parties.50 Therefore, even if the contract includes devices such
as stabilization clauses, such clauses do not prevent the application of impre-
visión when the contract was concluded under normal economic conditions
which were subsequently radically disturbed by extraordinary and unforesee-
able events. It is argued that the aim of such clauses is to anticipate reasonably
foreseeable circumstances and consequently cannot be regarded as covering
events which were never considered (because they were unforeseeable) by
46 CNCiv., sala C, 1978/10/19, Buscarini L. c/ Rut Don S.A.; cited in Digesto Práctico La Ley:
Revisión de los Contratos, supra note 29, p. 278.
47 CNCiv., sala F, 1979/06/29, Vitulio, A. c/ Wadek, S.A.; cited in Digesto Práctico La Ley:
Revisión de los Contratos, supra note 29, p. 280.
48 CNCiv., sala C, 1978/11/16, Bocaratto, O. y otros c/ Asociación Santísima Cruz; cited in Digesto
Práctico La Ley: Revisión de los Contratos, supra note 29, p. 264.
49 M. Smayevsky, Reflexiones acerca de la aplicación de la teoría de la imprevisión en el contrato
de compraventa; E. Abatti, A. Dibar and I. Rocca, La imprevisión contractual; cited in Digesto
Práctico La Ley: Revisión de los Contratos, supra note 29, pp. 160-161. A large number of
decisions handed down in relation to the economic crises of 1975 and 1981 have confirmed
these statements. See Flah, Smayevsky, supra note 26, pp. 166-176; and Digesto Práctico
La Ley: Revisión de los Contratos, supra note 29, pp. 263-286.
50 See Cornet, supra note 33, adding that in some cases the contract changed its nature from
being commutative to aleatory.
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the parties.51 Thus, it has been held that ‘when the contractual terms which
were agreed upon to provide stability to monetary obligations are surprisingly
altered in their normal course by an event which is external to the parties and
is extraordinary and unforeseeable, then judicial intervention is allowed to
reduce the unfair effects of a contractual unbalance’.52
4.1.5 The influence of the affected party in relation to the disruptive events: fault
and default53
The condition that the party affected by imprevisión should not be in default
when invoking article 1198 has been criticized by Argentinian legal doctrine.
The main objection is that in most cases a breach of contract by the affected
party will be precisely the consequence of the excessively onerous nature of
its performance. Thus, if that party cannot rely on the remedies provided by
article 1198, the ratio legis of such a provision would be distorted.54 As a
consequence of such criticism, this requirement has been strictly construed:
only if the debtor’s default is the cause of the excessive onerousness, will the
affected party not be allowed to invoke imprevisión to be released from its
obligations. Conversely, if the breach of contract is irrelevant to the occurrence
of the excessive onerousness, which is independent from such a breach, the
affected party is not prevented from relying on the provision of article 1198.55
Thus, case law has stated that ‘the breach of contract of the affected party is
not an absolute obstacle to invoke the imprevisión theory, if its default has been
irrelevant to the excessive onerousness of its performance, since in that case
the cause of such excessive onerousness is not the debtor’s default but an
external cause and therefore it would also have taken place without such
default’.56 In the same vein, it has been held that ‘only if the breach of contract
51 J. Mosset Iturraspe, Dólar e imprevisión; and H. Cáceres and R. Pizarro, Cláusula de pago en
‘valor dólar’; cited in Digesto Práctico La Ley: Revisión de los Contratos, supra note 29,
pp.159-160.
52 CNCIv. Sala C, 24.11.83 Rinkevich Alberto y otra v. Uresandi Jorge A., E.D. 107-631, cited by
Cornet (2002). However, rejecting the application of article 1198 in such a case, see CNEsp.,
Civ. y Com., sala III, 1981/06/19, Fipa S.A. c/ Casco S.A.; cited in Digesto Práctico La Ley:
Revisión de los Contratos, supra note 29, p. 246.
53 In the context of this research, default means any nonperformance of his obligation by the
debtor or affected party.
54 Flah, Smayevsky, supra note 26, p. 40.
55 C. Ghersi, Contratos civiles y comerciales, p. 308; and A. Alterini, Contratos civiles, comerciales
y de consumo, p. 452; cited in Digesto Práctico La Ley: Revisión de los Contratos, supra note
29, pp. 168-169.
56 CNCiv., sala g, 1984/10/09, Scialabba, M. c/ Petracca Inmobiliaria S.R.L.; cited by Flah,
Smayevsky, supra note 26.
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is previous to the extraordinary and unforeseeable event, is the debtor pre-
vented from relying on the provision of article 1198’.57
Closely related to the above condition, the provision also requires the
absence of fault on the part of the affected party, i.e. that the event which is
the cause of the excessive onerousness should be external to the affected
party.58 Therefore, such an event should not be caused by the affected party’s
fault and neither should the fault be the cause of the excessive onerousness
deriving from such an event.59 If the debtor had the opportunity to avoid
the consequences of the disruptive events he cannot subsequently invoke the
provision of article 1198.60
This requirement is also strongly linked to the unforeseeable nature of the
events, because the party who did not take the necessary measures with regard
to a foreseeable event which might affect its performance can be regarded as
negligent and, therefore, is prevented from requesting the termination or
adaptation of the contract within the terms of article 1198. Thus, ‘if the ex-
cessive onerousness alleged by the debtor is the consequence of omitting to
take measures which he could take, he is not allowed to rely on his own
negligence to obtain relief from his obligations’.61
4.1.6 Express assumption of risks. The exclusion of article 1198 by the parties
Similarly to most Western legal systems, one of the basic principles of the
Argentinian law of contracts is freedom of contract (article 1197). As a conse-
quence, the parties may freely agree on the allocation of risks in the contract,
e.g. stating that one or more particular risks are assumed exclusively by one
of the parties. Argentinian legal doctrine agrees that this kind of clause is valid,
provided that the party assuming the risk consents thereto.62 Thus, the bar-
gaining process and the situation of the parties are relevant in establishing
the extent of the clause. Furthermore, such an assumption should be strictly
construed and in good faith, being only applicable to the specific situations
provided in the contract and in cases which can be regarded as reasonably
57 CNCiv., sala B, 1982/05/17, Amestoy, R. c/ Pontineri, L. y otros; cited in Digesto Práctico
La Ley: Revisión de los Contratos, supra note 29, p. 291.
58 J. Mosset Iturraspe, Contratos en dólares, Ediciones La Rocca, Buenos Aires, 1990. p. 76 ff.,
cited by Araujo, supra note 26.
59 A. Spota, Desvalorización monetaria e imprevisión contractual; cited in Digesto Práctico La Ley:
Revisión de los Contratos, supra note 29.
60 CNCiv., sala D, 1981/06/12, Ragno C. c/ Lovecchio, N.; cited in Digesto Práctico La Ley:
Revisión de los Contratos, supra note 29, p. 288.
61 CApel. Concepción del Uruguay, sala civ. y com., 1978/07/11, Musachi, V. c/ Benítez, R.,
cited in Digesto Práctico La Ley: Revisión de los Contratos, supra note 29, 288.
62 Cornet, supra note 33; Flah, Smayevsky, supra note 26, p. 44.
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foreseeable by the parties.63 It is added that outside the cases which can be
clearly derived from the nature of the contract, this assumption should be
express.64 Case law has held that waiving the right to invoke imprevisión by
the affected party after the occurrence of the disruptive events may also be
implied from the behaviour of the affected party and the circumstances sur-
rounding the case, e.g. whether such a party has completely performed its
obligation despite the excessive onerousness.65 Nevertheless, the mere fact
that the affected party did not rely on the imprevisión remedies immediately
after the occurrence of the extraordinary events, or that the burdensome
obligation was partially performed, are not sufficient to amount to an implied
waiver of its right.66
It is disputed in legal doctrine whether the parties may exclude the applica-
tion of imprevisión, as provided by article 1198, in their contractual relationship.
Based on the freedom of contract and the undisputed right of contractual
parties to assume the consequences of force majeure (article 513 of the Argen-
tinian Civil Code), some of the legal authors accept the validity of clauses
which generally exclude the application of article 1198. It is argued that if the
debtor is legally allowed to assume the consequences of a performance which
has become impossible, the debtor may equally assume the consequences of
a performance which has become only excessively onerous.67 On the other
hand, it has been stated that as an application of the principle of good faith,
the provision of article 1198 is imperative and therefore cannot be excluded
from the contract by the parties.68 It is added that the provision allowing for
a waiver of force majeure as an excuse for performance is related to ordinary
and reasonably foreseeable cases of force majeure, and therefore the same logic
should be applied to cases of imprevisión: a party cannot assume the risk of
an unknown or unforeseeable event, because such an assumption logically
implies the foreseeability of the event and the associated risk.69 Therefore,
the consequences of an unforeseeable risk which is not allocated by the nature
of the contract or by a specific and express provision in that contract must
be shared by the parties with regard to the circumstances of the particular
63 G. Borda, La reforma del Código Civil. Teoría de la imprevisión; cited in Digesto Práctico La
Ley: Revisión de los Contratos, supra note 29; and L. Rezzónico, Estudios de las obligaciones
en nuestro Derecho Civil, T. I, p. 184; cited by Cornet, supra note 33.
64 See Cornet, supra note 33.
65 CNCiv., sala B, 1987/04/07, Spada de Makintach, S. c/ Tonelli, C.; cited in Digesto Práctico
La Ley: Revisión de los Contratos, supra note 29, p. 303.
66 CS, 1981/10/13, Cicero, R. c/ Romero, J.; cited in Digesto Práctico La Ley: Revisión de los
Contratos, supra note 29, p. 303.
67 Cornet, supra note 33.
68 A. Borda, Influencia de las medidas económicas del año 2002 sobre las relaciones contractuales
entre particulares; cited by Cornet, supra note 33.
69 J. Mosset Iturraspe, La Interpretación económica de los contratos, Rubinzal Culzoni: Santa Fe
(1994).
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case. In any case, the exclusion of imprevisión is not allowed in consumer
contracts because such a provision is regarded as an unfair contractual term.70
With regard to this subject, case law has accepted the validity of a general
exclusion of article 1198, stating that such a provision is inapplicable ‘if the
parties foresee in the contract ‘any’ kind of alteration in the exchange market’
and that ‘there is no impediment to give full effect to the waiver of the right
to invoke the imprevisión theory (…)’;71 but also stressing that such an exclu-
sion cannot be presumed and should be interpreted under strict standards.72
4.2 The effects of imprevisión
4.2.1 The rights of the parties
Provided that the above-mentioned requirements are met, article 1198 states
that the affected party can demand the termination of the contract and the
other party has the right to avoid such a dissolution by offering to modify,
in an equitable way, the conditions of the contract.
Nevertheless, an important part of legal doctrine supports the opinion that
the affected party has the right to request not only the termination of the
contract, but also its modification or adaptation to the new circumstances. In
this sense, it is argued that the principle of favor contractus, which can be
derived from several provisions of the Civil Code (e.g. articles 656, 1069, 1633,
1638 and 2056) and the aim of Act 17.711 to introduce equity standards in
contractual relationships, also allows the affected party to request an adaptation
of the contract.73 Therefore, the interpretation of article 1198 should provide
a solution which preserves the reasonableness and equity of the transaction
as concluded by the parties, an aim which is not satisfied in all cases with
the termination of the contract.74 Additionally, it is argued that if the affected
party may claim the termination of the contract, which is an extreme remedy,
logically he is entitled to request a less absolute and not expressly prohibited
remedy such as the modification of the contract.75 On the other hand, it is
contended that compared with the provision of article 954 where in cases of
70 Article 37 of Act 24.240 on the Defence of the Consumer and its regulation (D.R. 1798/94).
71 CNCom., sala E, 1984/10/08, Nelson, J. c Di Tomaso, Z., cited in Digesto Práctico La Ley:
Revisión de los Contratos, supra note 29, p. 241.
72 CCiv. y Com. Rosario, sala IV, 1981/09/24, Izquierdo, J. c/ Miotto, A.; cited by Cornet, supra
note 33.
73 Flah, Smayevsky, supra note 26.
74 See A.M. Morello, La adecuación del contrato: Por las partes, por el juez, por los árbitros, Librería
Editora Platense: La Plata, 1994.
75 A. Spota, Desvalorización monetaria e imprevisión contractual; and G. Borda, Tratado de Derecho
Civil, pp. 146-147; cited by Digesto Práctico La Ley: Revisión de los Contratos, supra note
29, p. 174.
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laesio the affected party is expressly entitled to request the adaptation of the
contract, in article 1198, in contrast, the legislator has not provided such a
remedy to the party affected by imprevisión. Therefore the will of the legislator
cannot be interpreted differently from that expressed in the legal norm. More-
over, it is argued that the revision of a contract is a much more complex and
significant remedy than its termination, because it implies setting the common
consent of the parties aside and imposing the will of a third party (the judge)
upon them.76
Case law is not uniform with regard to this subject, but in a 1992 decision
the Argentinian Supreme Court strongly rejected the right of the affected party
to request the adaptation of the contract in cases provided for by article 1198.
The Court stated that77
‘the text of article 1198 only gives the affected party the right to request the termina-
tion of the contract, granting the offer of an equitable modification only to the other
party. This Court has repeatedly decided that the first rule for the interpretation
of the law is to give full effect to the legislator’s intention, that the first source for
the determination of that intention is the text of the law, and that judges should
not replace the legislator but should apply the legal norm as is stated. It would
be a serious infringement of such rules to concede to one of the parties a right that
the law does not confer upon him (…) especially when an omission or mistake
by the legislator cannot be presumed, which clearly chose one of the different
options proposed by the foreign legal doctrine and legislation(…)’
In the same sense, the Supreme Court has rejected ex officio modifications in
cases where neither party had requested the revision of the contract, but only
its termination, based on the constitutional right to due process and other
procedural rules as ultra petita.78
Finally, with regard to the right of the advantaged party to propose an
equitable modification of the contract, although some decisions have stated
that such a proposal should be made in specific terms and the judge may only
assess its equity with no power to modify it,79 most of the doctrine and case
law supports the possibility for the advantaged party to propose the modifica-
tion in general terms, indicating its willingness to modify the conditions of
76 Flah, Smayevsky, supra note 26, p. 41.
77 CS 21/04/92 Kamenszein, Víctor J. y otro c/ Fried de Goldring, Malka y otros; J.A. 1992-IV-166;
full text in Morello, supra note 74, pp. 21-24.
78 Araujo, supra note 26, p. 99.
79 CNCiv., sala C, 20/10/78; CNEsp., Civ. y Com,, sala V, 13/12/76; CNEsp., Civ. y Com.,
sala III, 18/12/79; cited by Araujo, supra note 26, p. 100.
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the contract equitably and allowing the judge to establish the specific terms
of such a modification.80
4.2.2 Remedies provided by article 1198: Termination and adaptation of the contract
Regarding the termination of the contract, article 1198 states that in contracts
for continuous performance their termination (resolución) will not affect that
which has already been performed. Thus, in these cases a termination has no
retroactive effect, e.g. in a lease contract the lessor does not have to return
to the lessee the payments already made and the same can be applied to
contracts for personal services. But in a sales contract by instalments,
‘the sums already paid by the buyer should be returned monetarily corrected (…)
to attempt a fair compensation to the creditor’ and ‘to preserve, even in the termina-
tion of the contract, the equivalence of the counter-performances which have to
be returned’.81
In addition, the remedy of termination has to be limited to ‘cases where a
revision is not possible or does not lead to satisfactory solutions’.82
On the other hand, if the advantaged party’s proposed equitable modifica-
tion is accepted or the contract is revised by the judge, the adaptation of the
contract should have as its primary aim the equitable share between the parties
of the effects of the unforeseeable risk and ‘to correct the evident unfairness
imposed by the new circumstances, so that the transaction will still be a good
deal for the creditor and a bad but bearable deal for the debtor’.83 Thus, the
judge does not have to restore the counter-obligations to an absolute equival-
ence or to rewrite the contract to ideally adapt it to the standards of commu-
tative justice, but only to equitably rectify the significant imbalance between
the counter-performances.84 In this sense, the Supreme Court has stated that85
80 CCCiv. y Com. Córdoba, 1978/06/05, Yapur, J. c/ Giorno, M.; adding that ‘such an interpreta-
tion prevents the risk that the judge, confronted with an insufficient proposal by the
advantaged party, determines that a termination of the contract is necessary’. Cited in
Digesto Práctico La Ley: Revisión de los Contratos, supra note 29, p. 330.
81 SC Bs.As. 03.06.80; cited by Cornet, supra note 33.
82 CNCiv., sala G, 1982/05/03, Fucaracce, J. c/ Capellán, J.; cited by Digesto Práctico La Ley:
Revisión de los Contratos, supra note 29, p. 318.
83 CNCiv., sala D, 1984/02/22, Martínez, M. c/ Gentile; CNCiv., sala G, 1981/02/10, Hughes,
L. c/ Alonso Soto, L. y otros, adding that ‘the imprevisión doctrine is not an instrument to
set aside bad deals but to avoid a gross infringement of justice’. Cited in Digesto Práctico
La Ley: Revisión de los Contratos, supra note 29, pp. 317-318.
84 CNCiv. Sala G, 1980/10/03, Sommer, E. c/ Kirschenheuter, L.; cited in Digesto Práctico La
Ley: Revisión de los Contratos, supra note 29, p. 319.
85 C.S., 10/06/992, Astilleros Príncipe y Menghi S.A. c/ Banco Nac. De Desarrollo; cited by Morello,
supra note 74.
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‘the protection granted to the affected party by article 1198 of the Civil Code cannot
lead to simply transferring to the other party the consequences of the imbalance
which was sought to be remedied (…) the nature of the imprevisión theory prevents
that, under the excuse of protecting one of the parties, the burden is placed on the
other party, thereby resulting in a situation which is analogous to the alleged
unfairness and creating a new affected party replacing the former’.
Therefore, the application of the remedies provided by article 1198 cannot
involve the transfer of the excessive onerousness from the affected party to
the creditor.
5 CONCLUSIONS
The comparative overview of the Latin American jurisdictions included in
this paper has shown a clear trend towards the acceptance and recognition
of cases of change of circumstances as a ground for relief for the party affected
by supervening onerousness. Thus, of the seven jurisdictions included, only
Chile and Uruguay may be qualified as unreceptive, and conversely, Argentina,
Brazil, Colombia, Paraguay and Peru are receptive legal systems, even where
the subject is not expressly regulated by a legal provision (as in the case of
Colombia).
This tendency is in line with modern developments in contract law. Non-
legislative codifications such as the UNIDROIT Principles of International Com-
mercial Contracts (PICC), the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) and
the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) include a set of one or more
rules to deal with the subject.86 The same can be said with regard to modern
codifications such as the Dutch Burgerlijk Wetboek (Dutch Civil Code 1992)
and the German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (German Civil Code, after the reform
of 2002).87
Finally, it is interesting to note that most of the receptive Latin American
jurisdictions have followed the Italian Codice Civile on this subject.88 Then,
the system of remedies for the case of change of circumstances is structured
by granting as primary and exclusive remedy to the affected party the right
to claim the termination of the contract; a claim that can be avoided by the
advantaged party offering to equitably modify the terms of the contract.
Therefore, the affected party is not entitled to request any adaptation or
modification of the contract by the court, and no duty to renegotiate is imposed
86 Articles 6.2.1 to 6.2.3 of the PICC, article 6:111 of the PECL and article III.- 1:110 of the
DCFR.
87 Article 6:258 of the BW and §313 of the BGB.
88 For an outline of the Italian law on the subject, see F. Macario, ‘Change of circumstances’,
in: L. Antoniolli, A. Veneziano (Eds.), Principles of European Contract Law and Italian Law.
Kluwer Law International: The Hague, 2005.
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on the advantaged party, who is free to decide whether or not to offer an
equitable modification of the contract.89
In this regard, the system of remedies provided by the PICC and the PECL
seem to be a better alternative to protect the interests of both parties in a
situation of changed circumstances. Thus, as a first effect of a change of circum-
stances a duty to renegotiate must be imposed on the parties. If negotiations
do not succeed within a reasonable period, either party may resort to the court
to request an adaptation of the contract to the new circumstances, and the court
has wide powers to either modify the contract or terminate it, according to
the circumstances of the particular case.90 Together with the important and
interesting domestic developments (such as in the case of Argentinian law),
future reforms of both receptive and unreceptive Latin American jurisdictions
should consider the above-mentioned instruments as a model for the regulation
of the subject.
89 However, as mentioned above, Argentinian legal doctrine and some case law has argued
that the court has the power to adapt the contract.
90 It is not the aim of this paper to analyse the best alternatives for a system of remedies in
case of a change of circumstances. For a comprehensive study of the subject, see Momberg,
supra note 20.
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1 THE DOCTRINE OF IMPRÉVISION
1.1 Definition
In French and Belgian discourse, the doctrine of imprévision is the most
important concept dealing with the effects of unexpected circumstances on
contractual obligations. This idea generally refers to cases in which unforeseen
economic circumstances become apparent after a contract has been concluded
and which make its performance extremely difficult or much more costly, but
do not render it impossible.1 The doctrine of imprévision can be based on the
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assumption that there is an economic imbalance between the contractual
obligations at the time of performance. The doctrine of imprévision is not
applied to speculative contracts like stock exchange transactions, as this ‘specu-
lative’ nature is part and parcel of such contracts.2 From a theoretical point
of view the concept of imprévision is directed at resolving a conflict between
commutative justice demanding a balanced exchange on the one hand and,
on the other, the principle of pacta sunt servanda which corresponds to the more
general objective of legal certainty.
1.2 Historical developments
In Roman law force majeure was a well-accepted concept. Meanwhile, in the
medieval period, the importance of commutative justice was stressed. Saint
Thomas of Aquinus asserted that one who makes a promise and does not keep
it because of changing conditions cannot be blamed for any unfaithfulness.3
This view implied the notion of clausula rebus sic stantibus. According to this
concept contracts providing for successive acts of performance over a future
period of time must be understood as being subject to the condition that the
circumstances will remain the same.4 Post-glossators adopted this doctrine
of imprévision, while Cujas and Pothier did not even mention it.5 In the French
Civil Code the idea of imprévision was not recognised, which may be seen as
the result of the influence of the historical school of Roman law, the Natural
law school and the liberal economy.6 Article 1134 of the Code Civil (Cciv)
lays down the principle of the immutability or sanctity of contracts. The same
idea underlies Article 1793 Cciv. This confirms that the French position is
inspired by the notion of the autonomy of will.7 Historically, Article 1134 Cciv
is construed as a demarcation between the power of the courts and legislation
2 Art. 7 par. 2, loi ‘Faillot’ 21 January 1918 in France.
3 Saint Thomas of Aquinus in his Somme théologique, IIa-IIae p. 110, arts. 3 to 5.
4 The Latin adage is: ‘Contractus qui habent tractum successivum et dependentiam de futuro rebus
sic stantibus intelleguntur’.
5 Voirin, De l’imprévision, pp. 46-47; ‘La genèse de la ‘clausula rebus sic stantibus – Con-
tractus qui habent tractum successivum et dependentiam de futuro rebus sic stantibus
intelleguntur’ (droit romain, Moyen Age, ancien droit)’, in: A. Ruelle & M. Berlingin, Le
Droit Romain d’hier à aujourd’hui. Collationes et oblationes. Liber Amicorum en l’honneur du
professeur Gilbert Hanard, Facultés Universitaires St Louis, 2009.
6 Liberalism, as the predominant philosophical movement in the eighteenth century, gave
rise to some ideas which were incompatible with a restrictive application of the rebus sic
stantibus as provided by the canonists. Pacta sunt servanda, on the contrary, was perfectly
coherent with the concept of laissez-faire. Therefore the code enacted during this period
did not adopt rebus sic stantibus.
7 ‘Le contrat est une emprise sur l’avenir’: Ripert, La règle morale dans les obligations civiles, n°
84, p. 151.
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forbidding judges from interfering with contracts and, therefore, reserving
contractual justice for legislative regulation.
1.3 Legislative exceptions
One will first notice an increasing number of legislative or judicial exceptions
to the principle of the sanctity of contracts. Temporary legislation dealing
specifically with hardship was enacted as a reaction to the world wars and
economic crises. After the outbreak of World War I the legal literature looked
for theoretical justifications to exculpate the debtor who could not perform
his contractual obligations because it had become extremely burdensome. The
concept of rebus sic stantibus attracted new interest and obtained legal accept-
ance in specific statutes.8 Furthermore, a growing number of statutes generally
protecting the ‘weaker parties’ in contracts were enacted. Many of these
statutes are directly related to the imprévision doctrine as is particularly the
case with the Act of 30 July 1930 (Arts. 17 and 20) on insurance contracts. This
is also the case with Art. 37 of the Act of 11 March 1957 on Copyright (L.131-5
Code of Intellectual Property).9 One may also refer to the Act of 3 July 1971
(Art. 833-1 Cciv),10 the Act of 11 July 1975 on divorce reform (Art. 276
Cciv),11 the Act of 4 July 1984 (Art. 900-2 Cciv) and, finally, the Act of 25
January 1985, in its Art. 98 par. 2.12 All these examples demonstrate how far
the principle of the sanctity of contracts is subject to exceptions when major
changes occur in society.
Also in Belgium, in specific sectors statutes were later enacted on a non-
temporary basis in order to deal with unexpected circumstances concerning
8 The Act of 21st January 1918, the ‘Loi Faillot’, allowed for the résolution (but not the révision)
of contracts concluded before 1914 if one of the contractors had been the victim of a
reasonable assumption when concluding the contract; see also the Act of March 1918
(regarding the modification of a lease for real property), as well as the Acts of 6 July 1925,
8 April 1933, 1 January 1924, 11 November 1932, 12 July 1933, and 22 April 1949, concerning
contracts entered into before 2 September 1939 (relating to delivery, construction contracts,
performance, and successive or postponed contracts). See in Belgium, Act of 11 October
1919, Moniteur belge, 29 October 1919; see D. Philippe, Le changement, p. 156.
9 Article 37 of the Act of 11 March 1957 provides that, having sold his exploitation rights,
an author of intellectual work who has suffered a loss of more than 7/12 due to a lésion,
or an insufficient prediction, is entitled to claim a revision of the contract price.
10 In succession law or gratuitous contracts or unilateral contracts, A. 855-1 of the Civil Code
(based on the Act of 3 July 1971) provides for an adaptation of the contract under certain
circumstances when the value of the contracted goods has increased or decreased by more
than a quarter since the division.
11 Amending maintenance payments for a spouse.
12 In the case of a lease including commitments by the lessee to acquire commercial establish-
ments, when the lessee is not able to acquire the establishment due to a reason which is
beyond his control. See Fin-Langer, pp. 367-375.
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especially long-term contracts,13 like leases (Art. 7 of the Law of 16 February
1991 on residential leases, Art. 6 of the Law of 30 April 1951 on commercial
leases,14 Art. 17 et seq. of the Law of 4 November 1969 on tenancies and lease-
hold property),15 divorce by mutual consent (Art. 1288 of the Belgian Civil
Code [Cciv]) or public works (Art. 16 of the general terms on public works).
According to Art.710 Cciv the judge can also order the expiry of a servitude
when it has lost its purpose for the beneficiary.
1.4 Case law
a) Administrative law
The principle of sanctity also became subject to a large number of judicial
exceptions. In France, in administrative law, the imprévision doctrine has been
generally recognised since the famous decision in Gaz de Bordeaux16 where
the Conseil d’Etat, the highest Administrative Court, allowed a contract to be
renegotiated when there were unexpected circumstances. In the absence of
an agreement, administrative law grants an indemnification to a contracting
party based on the principle of continuity of public services.17 This applies
in particular to transport, public works and distribution markets.18 However,
the contractual imbalance must have been caused by an event that is external
and unforeseeable to the contracting parties and that event must result in an
excessive burden for the contracting party. If the imbalance is definite, the
contract can be cancelled.19
Unlike in France, the Conseil d’Etat is not competent to deal with public
contracts; therefore the restrictive approach of the Belgian Cour de cassation
concerning unforeseen circumstances would, in principle, also apply to public
contracts.
13 S. Heremans, ‘Le bouleversement’, R.G.D.C., 2000, p. 473 et seq.; D. Philippe, Le changement,
p. 156. E. De Bock, ‘Stijgende metaalprijzen, is er tegemoetkoming’, NJW, 2005, p. 477.
14 See my comment, D. Philippe, Le changement, p. 162.
15 Law of 15 June 1955 modified by the law of 2 July 1974.
16 In the case ‘Gaz de Bordeaux’, the Conseil d’Etat established the imprévision doctrine. An
unpredictable increase in coal prices had disrupted the balance of a concession contract.
The Administrative High Court granted damages to the concessionaire. CE. 30 March 1916,
D.P. 1916.3.25, S. 1916.3.17, Les grands arrêts de la jurisprudence administrative, 11th ed., n°
50:“Cf.: Annexes XXX.; J. Antoine, ‘La mutabilité contractuelle née des faits nouveaux
extérieurs aux parties", R.F.D.A., 2004, p. 80.
17 CE. 5 November 1982, soc. Propétrol, Rec., p. 380, A.J.D.A., 1983, p. 259, conc. Labetouille.
18 The interpretation of a contract where a public body is involved is not governed by the
rules of droit civil in France, but is a matter of droit administratif. So the reasoning of the
Conseil d’Etat is different from that of the civil and commercial courts.
19 CE. 9 December 1932, Tramways de Cherbourg, D.P. 1933.3.17, Les grands arrêts de la
jurisprudence administrative, 11th ed., n° 50.
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b) The principle of inviolability established by the Cour de cassation
Contrary to the administrative courts, the civil courts have consistently refused
in the past to recognise a revision on the basis of imprévision. However, a
tendency can be observed that civil judges will also intervene even though
the scope of their intervention is quite limited. In any case, this opposing view
between civil and administrative courts shows how difficult the implementa-
tion of imprévision is in French law.
After coming close to recognising the imprévision doctrine at the beginning
of the 19th century,20 the Cour de cassation, the highest civil court, rejected
the concept in 185621 and established the principle of the sanctity of contracts
on 6 March 187622 in the famous case of ‘Canal de Craponne’.23 The contracts
in question, dating from 1560 and 1567, referred to the water supply for an
irrigation canal in the plains of Arles at a fixed price. Much later, in the 19th
century, confronted with inflation and an increase in labour costs, those in
charge of canal maintenance requested that the price be increased. The Aix
Court of Appeal confirmed the tribunal’s judgment in which the price had
been increased. However, this decision was overruled by the Cour de cassation
arguing that time and equity could not allow a judge to modify the agreement
between the parties according to Article 1134 Cciv.
c) Exceptions
The principle of the sanctity of contracts has been consistently adhered to by
the highest civil courts. Yet, in a growing number of cases, judges have been
allowed to revise contracts.
The civil courts generally take into consideration changed circumstances
that render the performance of a contract more difficult and give the parties
an incentive to renegotiate the terms of their contract.24 The obligation to
renegotiate is justified by the principle of good faith between the parties in
20 Req., 20 August 1838, S. 1838, 1, p. 973; D.P. 1838, 1, p. 380.
21 Cass. civ., 9 January 1856 (7 cases) D.P. 1856, 1, p. 33, report Nicias-Gaillard, which con-
sidered that an unpredictable increase in a contingent fee did not constitute force majeure
since it would not make the performance of an insurance contract against the risks of
military recruitment impossible. Despite changing circumstances, the contract should be
declared valid: Cass., 11 March 1856, D.P. 1856, 1, p. 100. 2 April 1856, D.P. 1856, 1, p. 101.
7 March 1859, 1, p. 118. Adde. Cass. civ., 24 March 1874 (2nd case), S. 1874, 1, p. 428.
22 D.P. 1876, 1, p. 193, note A. Giboulot; S. 1876, 1, 161.
23 Cass. civ., 6 March 1876, (De Galliffet c/. Commune de Pélissanne) D.P. 76.1.195.S. Giboulot,
76.1.161, Grands arrêts n° 94.
24 Cf.: Cass. com., 3 November 1992, ‘arrêt Huard’, Bull. 1992 IV n° 338 p. 241, J.C.P., 1993-11-
24, n° 46-47, p. 469. See also, Cass. com., 24 November 1998, Bull. 1998 IV n° 277 p. 232,
J.C.P.E., 1999-07-22, n° 29, p. 1242, obs. C. Jamin; Cass., 29 June 2010, D. 2010 , 2481 and
obs. Mazeaud; see, however, for a confirmation of the pacta sunt servanda principle Civ.
3, 18 March 2009, no 07-21260, Bulletin, RTD civ. 2009.528, obs. B. Fages.
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the execution of a contract as laid down in Article 1134 Cciv. The instability
of the contract must be due to an exterior event after its conclusion and must
not have been caused by either of the parties.
At this stage, great uncertainty still exists with regard to the conditions
for the application of imprévision. It is particularly unclear whether or not these
circumstances really have to be new and unforeseeable upon the conclusion
of the contract and whether they have to be beyond the control of the parties.
A report (by Professor Catala and his team of distinguished legal scholars)
recommending that the French Civil Code be reformed was submitted to the
French Minister of Justice on September 22, 2005. It is currently still under
discussion and the Ministry of Justice is preparing to revise the Civil Code
on the basis of this report.25 The report does not expressly recognise the
doctrine of imprévision because the drafters consider that the parties themselves
have to foresee the difficulties in performing their obligations.26 But the draft
does introduce a rule that recognises the relevance of unexpected circum-
stances. Article 1135-1 of the draft Cciv allows the parties to insert a
renegotiation clause in case of unexpected circumstances that affect the equi-
librium of the contract so that one of the parties loses its interest in performing
the contract. Article 1135-2 Cciv provides that, in the absence of such a clause,
the parties can request the president of the court of first instance to order a
renegotiation. This draft article specifies that the negotiations must be con-
ducted in good faith. If such negotiations are of no avail, the parties can
terminate the contract. With reference to the Unidroit Principles, it has been
suggested that such negotiations must be conducted on a constructive and
timely basis.27 It has been pointed out that the proposals for the adaptation
of a contract must be in conformity with the original contractual framework.
Damages can be claimed if one party does not negotiate in good faith.28 There
are many authors who argue in favour of the renegotiation of a contract by
the judge if there are unexpected circumstances.29/30
The draft prepared by the Ministry of Justice goes further; in case of failure
of the renegotiation by the parties, the judge can not only terminate the con-
tract (as proposed in the Catala report), but he is also entitled to revise it in
agreement with the parties.31
25 See the report presented to Parliament by the Ministry of Justice in July 2008, article 136.
26 See commentary, p. 35, by A. Ghozi.
27 S. Primont, L’économie du contrat, PU Aix-Marseille: 2004, p. 272, n° 414.
28 Primont, L’économie, p. 273.
29 See for a revision of the contract by the judge: C. Jamin, ‘Révision et intangibilité du contrat
ou la double philosophie de l’article 1134 du code civil’, March 1998, p. 46, p. 55 et seq.;
C. Thibiergen-Guelfucci, Libres propos sur la transformation du droit des contrats (RTD civ.,
1997), p. 357, n° 11 s., p. 366; Ripert wrote already ‘l’immutabilité du contrat apparaît comme
un anachronisme’, La règle morale, n° 84, p. 151.
30 See also a recent proposal aiming to expressly recognise the ‘imprévision’ in Article 1134
of the Civil Code dd. 22 June 2011, n° 3563, submitted by M.T. Thoraval and others.
31 See http://crfpa.unblog.fr/2009/01/19/point-sur-la-reforme-du-droit-des-contrats/.
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In Belgium, in the past, the Cour de cassation did not recognise the doctrine
of imprévision.32 However, some lower courts have referred to this principle,
but have rejected its application due to the fact that the conditions for its
application have not been met.33 In the literature, various authors argue that
this principle should be recognised.34
Furthermore, we can underline a recent decision of the Supreme Court
of 19 June 2009. In a long-term international contract, the price of raw materials
rose sharply. The Court of Appeal proceeded to the adaptation of the contract.
This decision was confirmed by the Cour de cassation. The Court considered
that on the basis of Article 7 of the Vienna Convention, the international usages
apply to the sale of goods. Unidroit principles are international usages. These
principles recognise the adaptation of the contract in case of a change of
circumstances; consequently the contract could in this case be adapted on this
basis. Furthermore, the Supreme Court considered that Article 79 of the Vienna
Convention which exonerates the debtor in case of impediment must have
a broad interpretation and must also apply in case of a change of circumstances
which renders the performance of the contract substantially more burden-
some.35
Another interesting case of the Supreme Court dd. 14 November 201036
entitled the husband to cease the payment of alimony after 30 years in case
of a substantial decrease in his income and increase in the income of his
previous wife. This decision was based on abuse of right.
2 OTHER CONCEPTS
Imprévision can be distinguished from other concepts which might also be
relevant when it comes to a change of circumstances.
32 See Cass., 14 April 1994, Pas., 1994, I, 365; 20 April 2006, Juridat, See also Cass., 7 February
1994, Juridat, JC94271_2, Pas., I, 150; Cass., 4 September 2000, Juridat, JC00942_1, Pas., 2000,
I, 345; JL02CG1_2; Liège, 7th chamber, 16 December 2002, JL02CG1_2.; Cass., 20 April 2006,
Juridat, JC064K1_6.
33 S. Heremans, ‘Le bouleversement de l’économie contractuelle à la suite d’un changement
de circonstances : quelques éclairages nouveaux’, R.G.D.C., 2000, 2nd part, p. 573 with the
analysis of various decisions, among others comm. Liège, 15 September 1995, R.D.C., 1998,
p. 446; P. Wery, ‘L’imprévision et ses succédanés’, J.L.M.B. 1996, p. 105.
34 See A. Van Oevelen, Kroniek van het verbintenissenrecht, (1993-2004), R.W., 2004-2005, p. 1644;
S. Heremans, ‘Le bouleversement’, p. 573; L. Vael, Beschouwingen, p. 703; C. Delforge, La
spécificité des contrats à long terme, (thesis), UCL, 2006, note p. 247; E. De Bock, op. cit.; D.
Philippe, Le changement; J.-F. Romain, Le principe de convention-loi (portée et limites): réflexions
au sujet d’un nouveau paradigme contractuel – Les obligations contractuelles (Jeune barreau de
Brussels, 2000), no 38.1, p. 142.
35 This case can be read on the website Juridat; it will be published with observations of D.
Philippe in the next number of DAOR. (droit des affaires/ondernemingsrecht).
36 C.09.0608.F; justel 20101014-4.
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2.1 Force majeure
In general, the courts are reluctant to equate an unforeseen event rendering
the contract more onerous with an impossibility to perform. Accordingly, new
circumstances which make the performance substantially more difficult do
not constitute a case of force majeure.37 However, some decisions have given
this concept a wide interpretation so that it can be extended to cases of
changed circumstances. To give an example, force majeure has been applied
in cases of frustration of purpose. The famous case, well known in comparative
law, of Dispot Merlin v. Robillard is the best example. A contract between
the parties regulated an express service by road between Rouen and Paris.
Two years later, with unexpected speed, a rail connection between these two
cities was established. The judge allowed the contract to be terminated by
applying the doctrine of force majeure.38
The way in which the doctrine of force majeure is applied depends on how
the effects of an obligation are defined.39 In one case, the lessor was released
from his obligation to repair because the leased property could not be retained
without excessive expenses. Although it did not make the performance of the
contract impossible but merely more costly, it came close to a fortuitous loss.
This was based on the definition of the content of the lessor’s obligation.40
The obligation to repair was held not to extend to repairs caused by unforesee-
able circumstances, which led to substantial expenses.
In Belgium, the courts have often given a broad interpretation to the concept
of impossibility and the position is that the debtor is not required to ruin
himself by performing the contract.41 Thus, e.g., expensive renovations to
living accommodation by a landlord due to new legislation have been con-
37 See J. Carbonnier, Les Obligations, vol. IV, Paris: P.U.F 21st ed. 1998, n° 144, p. 270; P.H.
Antonmattéi, Contribution à l’étude de la force majeure, Paris: LGDJ 1992, n° 118, p. 82; P.
Voirin, De l’imprévision, pp. 81-84, Cass. civ., 18 January 1950, 1950, I, 227.
38 Comm. Rouen, 28 August 1843, upheld on appeal Rouen, 9 February 1844, D., 1845, p. 4.
39 Applying the doctrine of force majeure, it is important to establish the content of an obliga-
tion. Tunc distinguishes between obligations of means and obligations to procure. If the
contractual obligation qualifies as an obligation of means, the debtor is only liable if he
is proved to be at fault, whereas with regard to obligations to procure, the debtor bears
the burden of proof that he was not at fault. Nevertheless, Tunc considered that imprévision,
on the one hand, and the determination of the content of an obligation, on the other, are
distinct. While imprévision extends to the question whether the contract must be continued
or terminated, this doctrine assesses the level of ‘diligence’ which is required in the perfor-
mance of the obligation. Cf. A. Tunc, ‘Force majeure et absence de faute en matière con-
tractuelle’, R.T.D.Civ., 1945, p. 235; ‘La force majeure dans ses rapports avec le contenu
de l’obligation contractuelle’, J.T., 1946, p. 313.
40 See, Y. Rouquet, ‘De l’étendue de l’obligation d’entretien du bailleur’, Dalloz 2001, p. 3622.
41 Comm. Brussels, 9 March 1981, J.C.B., 1982, p. 165.
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sidered as a case of force majeure. The judge considered that these expenses
were disproportionate to the equilibrium of the contract.42
2.2 Cause
A cause is the legal reason for an obligation, but it is also used as an expression
for the motives or the counterpart of an obligation. In the absence of a cause,
an obligation does not have to be performed. In the last few years, this concept
has been applied more and more frequently.43 The cause must be present at
the formation of the contract so that future developments are consequently
not taken into consideration. However, some situations are very close to the
concepts of imprévision and frustration of purpose. If, for example, a patent
does not lead to the results that the parties had sought in the contract, case
law considers that the contract lacks any cause.44 Similarly, a contract con-
cluded between potential heirs and a genealogist was held to lack a cause when
the heirs could have had knowledge of the succession without the intervention
of a genealogist. A promise to sell agreed in 1908 but only invoked in 1965
was declared void due to a lack of cause because the price had become ridicu-
lous.45 In certain borderline cases, future circumstances can deprive a contract
of its cause, which is seen as the purpose of the contract.46
In Belgian law, the cause must be present at the conclusion of the contract
and does not apply in principle in case of a change of circumstances.47
2.3 Mistake
A contract which has been concluded due to a mistake is void. A mistake is
only considered relevant (1) if it determined the consent of the mistaken party,
(2) if it concerns essential qualities of the object of the contract, and (3) if the
mistaken party is not at fault. A unilateral mistake is not operable under the
42 Civ. Brussels, 15 February 1973, J.T., 1973, p. 258.
43 J. Ghestin, La notion d’erreur en droit positif français actuel (1963), p. 262 et seq. Cf. J.M. Guegen,
‘Le renouveau de la cause en tant qu’instrument de justice contractuelle’, D., 1999, p. 352;
criticising this concept, see X. Lagarde, ‘Sur l’utilité de la théorie de la cause’, D., 2007, p.
740; the draft Catala maintains the concept of cause (see Articles 1124 to 1126-1).
44 Cass., 21 February 1837, S., 1837, I, 187; 22 August 1844, S., 1844, I, 831; Cass. req, 12 April
1861, S., I, 735. J. Ghestin, L’erreur, n. 220.
45 Cass. civ., 20 February 1974, Bull. civ., III, nr. 85, p. 65.
46 See société pour l’extension et l’embellissement de la ville de Biarritz c/ Guillaume, quoted
by E. de Gaudin de la Grande, ‘La cause’, Jurisclasseur Périodique, art. 1131-133 Cciv.
47 See J. Dabin, La théorie de la cause, Brussels, 1919; P. Van Ommeslaghe, Observations sur
la théorie de la cause dans la jurisprudence et doctrine moderne, RCJB 1970, p. 326 et seq.
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doctrine of mistake.48 A mistake must be present at the formation of the
contract; mistakes as to future circumstances cannot be taken into con-
sideration. For example, the fact that an advertisement is not as successful
as expected is not sufficient to apply the rules of mistake.49
A mistake concerning motives is only considered relevant if the motives
and their realisation in the future become part of the contractual agreement.
Some borderline cases concern the following situation: a piece of land was
sold and the buyer’s intention was to build a house.50 No guarantee was given
by the seller that planning permission would be granted, but the property was
sold at the normal price for building land. Furthermore, the seller knew of
the buyer’s plans. Planning permission was eventually refused, however. In
the absence of a contractual guarantee the seller was not held liable. However,
the doctrine of mistake was applied.51 This case concerned circumstances
which were present at the formation of the contract (no planning permission)
although there were strongly related unexpected developments which occurred
subsequently (the refusal of planning permission although both contracting
parties had expected that it would be granted).
In Belgium, a mistake relating to future circumstances cannot be taken into
consideration.52
A mistake as to motives is only accepted if such motives were integrated
into the framework of the contract.53 When, for example, a feasibility study
carried out by the seller was a decisive element in the buyer entering into the
contract, and the subsequent sales were not in line with the forecasts in the
study, the Cour de cassation held that the contract was void.54
2.4 Sujétions imprévues (unforeseen burden)
The doctrine of sujétions imprévues applies under similar conditions as impré-
vision, i.e. with regard to new circumstances, which are unforeseeable and
48 Cass.,24 April 2003, n° 01-17.458 (n° 503 FS-P+B) , D., 2004, p. 450.
49 See Cass., 16 May 1939, Giurisprudenza comparata di diritto civile, 1948, n° 88 and obs. G.B.
Funaioli. See J. Ghestin, L’erreur, p. 63.
50 See also Rennes, 28 March 1999: The case also concerned a contract for the sale of land
where planning permission was subsequently refused. The Court of appeal decided that
the lack of a possibility to build constituted a substantial quality of the land and applied
the regime of hidden defects instead of the regime of mistake. An appeal was rejected, Cass.
civ., 11 February 1981, Bull. Civ., III, n° 31.
51 Riom, 17 May 1979, D., 1980, J, p.12 with obs. G.A.
52 See Ghent, 12 May 1923, Pas., 1924, II, p. 1, Brussels, 8 June 1972, Pas., 1972, II, p. 167.
53 See Ghent, 5 April 1979, Recueil général de l’enregistrement et du notariat 1980, p. 436, n° 22551.
54 Cass., 27 October 1995, Pas., 1995, I, 95, J.T., 1996, 61 (this case is not so clear-cut because
the feasibility study had been carried out by the other party; the buyer could also have
invoked misrepresentation); Cass., 3 March 1967, Pas., I, 811.
166 11 – France and Belgium
beyond the control of the parties, leading to a substantial distortion of the
contractual framework. However, contrary to imprévision, it concerns ordinary
circumstances which are a natural occurrence (for instance, the discovery of
rocks in the ground) in a construction contract. Sporadically, the courts have
extended this doctrine to cases where the circumstances did not have a natural
essence. This has been the case with regard to the increased prices for raw
materials.55
If the requirements of sujétions imprévues are met, French law recognises
a change of circumstances and grants the contractor an indemnification.56
Article 1793 Cciv provides that, in a construction contract, the price of the work
cannot be modified when a lump-sum payment has been stipulated. This article
has been subject to various exceptions in cases of a substantial disruption of
the contractual agreement due to unforeseen circumstances.57
The same principles apply in Belgium. Sujétions imprévues has also been applied
by the courts, although rarely, in cases where the circumstances were not ones
which occurred naturally. This was the case with regard to price increases
for raw materials, for example.58/59
2.5 Interpretation
According to Article 1156 Cciv, in case of doubt, judges will interpret the will
of the parties in order to determine the effects of a contract. Frequently, parties
have not thought about various situations that give rise to a dispute and have
not expressly regulated this matter. Some authors have denounced the hypo-
crisy of determining a will that does not exist, arguing that a more honest
approach would be to construe a solution based on good faith or usage.60
The rebus sic stantibus clause is related to interpretation. The parties only accept
55 See Civ. Brussels, 11th chamber; 30 May 1969, SABCA v. Etat belge, unpublished, confirmed
by Brussels, 4th chamber, 10 December 1970, RG 1753, quoted by A. De Grand Ry, M.A.
Flamme & P. Matheï, n° 374, p. 607.
56 F. Llorens, p. 300; Cass. civ., 23 June 1873 & Cass. req., 20 April 1874, D.P., p. 329; Cass.
civ., 6 March 1967, J.C.P., IV, p. 58.
57 L. Fin-langer , L’équilibre contractual, Paris: LGDJ, p. 384, n° 542; Cass., 8 March 1965, G.P.,
1997, 32 with obs. M. Peisse; Cass. civ., 12 March 1997, Bull., III, n°54; S. Primont, L’économie,
p. 274.
58 Brussels, 8 March 2001, Juridat JB01381_1, RG 95/AR. See for a recent application, Brussels,
4th chamber, 3 April 2007, RG 1999/AR/2591.
59 See Civ. Brussels, 11ch; 30 May 1969, SABCA v. Etat belge, unpublished, confirmed by
Brussels, 4th chamber, 10 December 1970, RG 1753, quoted by A. De Grand Ry, M.A. Flamme
& P. Matheï, n° 374, p. 607.
60 Mazeaud, n° 346; F. Llorens, p. 302; J. Maynau, Les fictions de contrats dans le Code civil et
depuis le Code civil (thesis), Montpellier: 1924, p. 146; F. Terre, L’influence de la volonté indivi-
duelle et qualification, Paris: 1957, p. 200.
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that they are bound by the contract on the basis of an implied term that the
contract will not be binding if unforeseeable circumstances occur, which render
the performance of the contract extremely burdensome for one of the parties.61
Judges have, for instance, applied the mechanism of interpretation in the
following case of unexpected circumstances: a labour contract signed before
World War II contained a clause referring to the jurisdiction of Rouen. The
war divided the country into two parts and the contracting parties were
subsequently in the free zone of the country. The judge disregarded the com-
petence clause and held that the court of Lyon had jurisdiction.62
In Belgium, there have indeed been decisions in which interpretation has been
invoked as the legal basis for amending the contract in cases of changed
circumstances.63
Furthermore, the presence of a tacit condition precedent can be implied
by the judge on the basis of interpreting the contract. For instance, with the
sale of land the parties may assume that planning permission will be granted.
If planning permission is refused after the conclusion of the contract, the
contract can be brought to an end ex tunc on the basis of the condition preced-
ent doctrine.64
2.6 Lésion
The doctrine of lésion allows a party to rescind the contract when there is a
profound imbalance between the values of the respective obligations at the
time of concluding the contract.65 This doctrine is only recognised by the
legislator under specific assumptions.66 As a general rule, a change of circum-
stances after the conclusion of the contract does not give rise to the notion
of lésion.67
There are some cases, however, in which the courts have invoked lésion
in a case of unexpected circumstances. For example, a judge resorted to lésion
instead of imprévision to justify the rescission of a contract. The contract,
61 Bomsel, La théorie de l’imprévision en droit civil français, Paris: Jouve 1922, p. 22.
62 Cass. soc., 11 June, 1942, D.C., 1943, p. 135 with obs. J. Flour.
63 See Civ. Brussels, 24 May 1884, Pas., 1884, III, p. 247; see P. Orianne, Le contrat de concession,
Novelles, p. 247; E. Causin, ‘L’interprétation des contrats’, in L’interprétation en droit, Brussels,
1978.
64 See Liège, 25 March 1970, J.Lg,1970-1971, p. 115.
65 C. Chantepie, ‘La lésion’, L.G.D.J., 2006; l; Fin-Langer, ‘L’équilibre contractuel’, L.G.D.J.,
2002; M.A. Perot-Morel, De l’équilibre des prestations dans la conclusion du contrat, Paris, 1961.
66 For instance, in case of the sale of land, if the difference in value is higher than 7/12; Art.
1674 et seq. of the Civil Code.
67 P. Voirin, De l’imprévision, p. 70 et seq.; J. Ghestin, Le contrat, p. 451; B. Margo, Lésion « a
posteriori » et imprévision dans les contrats (thesis), Paris: 1949, pp. 150-179.
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concluded just before World War I, granted one of the parties an option to
buy property some years later at a fixed price. The option could be cancelled
within 5 years. Due to a significant depreciation in currency after World War
I, the actual price represented only ? of the value of the original agreed price.
In order to overcome this unjust result, the judge applied the doctrine of
lésion.68 This solution was confirmed by the legislator in the Act of 28 Novem-
ber 1949, according to which a lésion, in case of a unilateral promise to sell,
must be assessed at the time of performance.69
Similar solutions apply in Belgium.70
2.7 Good faith (Article 1134, 3 Cciv) and equity (Article 1135 Cciv)
The parties are bound by the content of a contract, but the contract must be
performed in accordance with the norms derived from the law, usage and
equity. The relationship between good faith (Article 1134, 3 Cciv) and equity
is not clearly defined. Good faith can entail an obligation to renegotiate a
contract. However, the effects of good faith remain uncertain in French law.71
Nonetheless, it is admitted that, in principle, good faith cannot have a correct-
ive effect.72 In a recent decision, the Cour de cassation refused to intervene
concerning the content of contractual obligations.73 The judge nevertheless
sanctioned an unfair use of contractual rights. For example, it needs to be
stressed, as mentioned earlier, that the obligation of renegotiation in case of
a change of circumstances is based on good faith.
Some authors propose that equity could have a corrective function so that
the judge can adjust the contract in case of a change of circumstances.74 Article
1135 Cciv permits a court to impose obligations on the parties on the basis
68 See Cass. req., 19 April 1926, S., 1926, I, p. 128. See Article 1674 of the Civil Code.
69 Art. 1675, §2 of the French Civil Code.
70 See Cass., 13 July 1923, Pas. 1923 with the conclusions of Terlinden, rejecting recourse against
Brussels, 5 April 1922, Pas., 1922, II, p. 65, appeal by the judgment of Civ. Brussels, 22 June
1921, Pas., 1923, II, p. 67; Civ. Ghent, 23 May 1923, J.T., 1921-1924, c. 490; Civ. Liège, 10
July 1923, Pas., 1923, III, p. 145. In my opinion this was an incorrect application of the
doctrine of lésion because the imbalance was not present when the contract was concluded,
but only when the contract was performed.
71 See B. Fauvarque Cosson & S. Amrani Mekki, Droit des contrats, 2007, p. 2966.
72 C. Albiges, De l’équité en droit privé, 200, n° 305, Paris: LGDJ 2000; concerning the distinction
between article 1134-3 and article 1135 C.Code, see P. Jacques, ‘Regards sur l’article 1135
du Code civil’, Dalloz, 2005, 295.
73 Cass. com., 10 July 2007, n° 06-14.768, 2007, AJ 1955, obs. X. Delpech.
74 D. Tallon, La révision du contrat pour imprévision au regard des enseignements du droit
comparé, Droit et vie des affaires, Etudes à la mémoire de A. SAYAG, Paris: Litec 1998; F.
Cherigny, La révision judiciaire des conventions en droit privé français (thesis), Poitiers: 1994.
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of equity while Article 1134, par. 3 Cciv concerns the behaviour of the parties
in the performance of the contract.75
Under Belgian law good faith requires collaboration and cooperation between
the parties in the performance of the contract.
With regard to the performance of a contract, the concept of good faith
is recognised by Article 1134, par. 3 Cciv, while the aspect of good faith with
regard to the completion of a contract is recognised by Article 1135 of the Civil
Code.76
In the literature four different implications of good faith are distinguished,
namely (1) the completion, (2) modification, (3) derogation or (4) adaptation
of a contract. However, the Cour de cassation has rejected the adaptive effect
of good faith.77 Sometimes the courts have decided that insisting on the
performance of a contract that is not based on a just equilibrium is contrary
to good faith.78 However, as we will explain in the next paragraph, the court
has recognised the abuse of rights in case of a change of circumstances and
abuse of rights is based on Article 1134, par. 3 Cciv.
The completing effect of good faith can, in principle, be based on Article
1135 Cciv, but only insofar as this principle can accommodate a change of
circumstances. For instance, when an unforeseen event occurs, the judge can
complete the contract in order to provide a legal regime for this new circum-
stance.79
2.8 Abuse of rights (Belgium)
The doctrine of abuse of rights applies when a person uses his legal position
to intentionally cause harm to another person or to obtain an advantage which
is disproportionate in comparison with the damage caused to another per-
son.80
Based on the doctrine of abuse of rights, the courts might consider it
abusive to insist on the performance of a contract if the debtor incurs a sub-
stantial commercial loss and the creditor realises high profits.81 In the past,
Belgian law did not recognise, in principle, unexpected circumstances on the
75 Jacques, p. 306, n° 163.
76 D. Philippe, De Rechter en de inhoud van de overeenkomst, in De overeenkomst vandaag en morgen
(Kluwer, 1990), p. 543 et seq.
77 Cass.,7 February 1994, Juridat, JC94271_2, Pas., I, 150; Cass.,4 September 2000, Juridat,
JC00942_1, Pas., 2000, I, 345; JL02CG1_2; Liège, 7th chamber 16 December 2002, JL02CG1_2.
78 Liège, 21 December 2001, J.T., 2002, p. 564; see Liège 12 October 1999, J.L.M.B., 99/1221.
79 D. Philippe, ‘De inhoud’.
80 P. A. Foriers, ‘Observations sur le thème de l’abus de droit en matière contractuelle’, R.C.J.B.,
1994, pp. 189 to 240.
81 See L. Campion, La théorie de l’abus des droits (1925), n° 226 to 227.
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basis of an abuse of rights. It has, however, been recognised in the case of 14
October 2010 quoted above.
2.9 Caducité
The doctrine of caducité applies if, after the formation of the contract, new
circumstances arise that lead to a lacuna regarding an essential element of
the contract (i.e. the subject matter of the contract). Caducité does not necessar-
ily require a distortion of the contractual equilibrium, as is the case with
imprévision, or an impossibility to perform, as in case of force majeure; further-
more, the new circumstances must not have been unforeseeable. Caducité allows
the aggrieved party to terminate the contract ex nunc.82 The lapsing of an
index mechanism to determine prices in a long-term supply contract has been
considered to be an example of caducité.83
In a decision dated 16 November 1989, the Cour de cassation admitted
that the doctrine of caducité not only applies in cases where certain elements
of the contract are absent, but also when the cause, i.e. the purpose of the
contract, is frustrated, thereby converging with the notion of frustration of
purpose. However, the relevant decision concerned a gratuitous contract and
it is questionable whether this doctrine could also be applied with regard to
non-gratuitous contracts. More recently, the Cour de cassation has held in an
important case that this doctrine is not relevant for non-gratuitous contracts.84
2.10 Deferred payment
Debtors may encounter difficulties in making payment due to unforeseeable
circumstances. In such situations the judge is entitled to reschedule the pay-
ment according to Art. 1244-1 Cciv. This provision cannot be considered as
a rule concerning unexpected circumstances because the content of the debtor’s
obligation remains unchanged.85 However, in connection with the problems
82 Civ. Namur 26 April1990, R.R.D.1990, p. 489.
82 J. F. Romain, ‘Clarifications concernant la théorie de la caducité des actes juridiques, en
particulier des libéralités testamentaires, par disparition de leur cause-mobile déterminant’;
obs. under Cass., 21 January 2000, R.C.J.B., 2004, 77; for a recent discussion on the applica-
tion of this doctrine following the entry into force of regulation 1400/2002 in case of
exclusive distribution agreements, comm. Brussels, 28 March 2006, J.T., 2006, and observa-
tions P. Kileste & C. Staudt, p. 511; P.-A. Foriers, La caducité des obligations contractuelles
par disparition d’un élément essentiel à leur formation, Brussels: Bruylant 1998.
83 See D. Philippe, Les clauses relatives au changement de circonstances dans les contrats à long
terme in La vie du contrat à prestations successives, 1991, p. 170.
84 Rôle C980335F, N Justel F-20000121-7.
85 D. Philippe, Changement de circonstances et bouleversement de l’économie contractuelle, Bruylant
1986, p. 143; P. Voirin, De l’imprévision, p. 208.
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in performing obligations after World War I, some judges used this provision
as a legal basis for correcting contractual obligations.86
2.11 Unjust enrichment
The rules on unjust enrichment could have been considered as a legal basis
for renegotiating a contract in case of an imbalance in the contractual obliga-
tions where one party would profit to the detriment of the other party who
suffers a loss. The application of unjust enrichment is, however, dependent
upon four conditions, namely (1) an enrichment of one party, (2) at the expense
of the other party, (3) a causal link between the enrichment and the expense,
and (4) subsidiarity, which means that this doctrine will not apply if the
enrichment has a legal cause. This concept does not apply, in principle, to a
change of circumstances because in such cases the unjust enrichment can be
put down to a cause. The agreed terms of the contract provide a legal ground
for the enrichment and the expense incurred.87
The same solution applies in Belgium.
3 CONCLUSION
We can first specify that in commercial contracts, the change of circumstances
is contractually regulated by hardship clauses.
Furthermore, this doctrine is in full evolution in Belgium and France and
the adoption of the European optional instrument on contract law, which
organises the change of circumstances, will certainly have an influence on
internal national French and Belgian law.88
86 M. Planiol & G. Ripert, p. 549; P. Voirin, De l’imprévision, p. 208; Rouen, 19 May 1871 (the
war between France & Germany), D., 1871, 2, 179.
87 J. Ghestin, Ch. Jamin & M. Billiau, Les effets du contrat, Paris: 2001, n° 312, p. 357.
88 See Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the common
European sales law, 11 October 2011, COM ( 2011) 635 final, 2011/284, COD, article 89
of the proposal.
